Thank you for making this announcement Pedro. This change of legal
ownership is covered by section 8.1 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy,
including the following statement:
If the receiving or acquiring company is new to the Mozilla root program,
it must demonstrate compliance with the entirety of
I didn't want to hijack the thread so here's a new one.
On 29/11/2018 6:39 μ.μ., Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 2:16 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos
mailto:ji...@it.auth.gr>> wrote:
Mandating that CAs disclose revocation situations that exceed the
5-day
requirement with
Reminder: the 3-week discussion period for this request to EV-enable two
DigiCert roots ends next Friday 7-December.
- Wayne
On Fri, Nov 16, 2018 at 5:00 PM Wayne Thayer wrote:
> This request is to enable EV treatment for the DigiCert Assured ID Root CA
> and DigiCert Global Root CA as
On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 4:03 PM Dimitris Zacharopoulos via
dev-security-policy wrote:
> I didn't want to hijack the thread so here's a new one.
>
>
> Times and circumstances change.
You have to demonstrate that.
When I brought this up at the Server
> Certificate Working Group of the CA/B
I would appreciate it if we could move the discussion of exceptions to the
deadline for revoking certificates containing underscores to a new thread.
As it relates to this request, any failure to meet the revocation deadline
would trigger the creation of an incident bug. (that is unless we as a
Sure, my intent was to keep it narrowed to understanding the potential
impact to this conversation.
I raise this concern because I think it would reflect poorly if these
certificates were not revoked. There has been past precedent - e.g. not
granting EV to Turktrust after misissuance came to
We can revoke them all by then. The question is do the browsers really want us
to?
Since we started a public discussion, here's the details:
There are several prominent websites that use certs with underscore characters
in connection with major operations. I was hoping to get permission to
This is a message addressed to the CA/Browser community related to the request
to transfer the ownership of the Roots currently held by WISeKey, to the OISTE
Foundation.
My name is Pedro Fuentes, Chief Security Officer at WISeKey. I’m sending you
this message as primary contact for WISeKey, as
This deadline is roughly five weeks before all underscore certificates must
be revoked (per Ballot SC12). Given the number of underscore certificates
under various DigiCert operated hierarchies, would you think it appropriate
to consider whether or not SC12 (and, prior to that, the existing BR
On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 2:16 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos
wrote:
> Mandating that CAs disclose revocation situations that exceed the 5-day
> requirement with some risk analysis information, might be a good place
> to start.
This was proposed several times by Google in the Forum, and consistently
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