Re: Mozilla's Expectations for OCSP Incident Reporting

2020-05-15 Thread Tom Delmas via dev-security-policy
Browsers by default just ignore any OCSP error. So while the browser might have seen an error getting the OCSP reply, the user is not aware of it. And why Browsers do ignore OCSP errors? Because some CA don't take OCSP errors seriously. So yes, it has an impact: it comfort Browsers in that

Re: Possible violation of CAA by nazwa.pl

2018-07-26 Thread Tom Delmas via dev-security-policy
> The party actually running the authoritative DNS servers is in control of the domain. I'm not sure I agree. They can control the domain, but they are supposed to be subordinate of the domain owner. If they did something without the owner consent/approval, it really looks like a domain

Submission to ct-logs of the final certificate when there is already a pre-certificate

2018-04-02 Thread Tom Delmas via dev-security-policy
Following the discussion on https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/non-logging-of-final-certificates/58394 What is the position of Mozilla about the submission to ct-logs of the final certificate when there is already a pre-certificate? As it helps discover bugs (

Re: wosign and letsencrypt.cn / letsencrypt.com.cn

2016-12-22 Thread Tom Delmas
Hi Gerv, > It's never come up. But I think we would be reluctant to intervene; Thank you for that answer. I understand it. > there are other mechanisms for sorting out such disputes, and it's not > our job to interpret or enforce trademark law or domain name dispute > resolution law. There are