Re: Apple: Patch Management
On Monday, December 9, 2019 at 2:03:20 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote: > On Fri, Dec 06, 2019 at 07:08:46PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 3:28:10 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote: > > > [aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO] > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via > > > dev-security-policy wrote: > > > > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability > > > > scanner > > > > worked. Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was > > > > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA. > > > > > > There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, > > > so > > > I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here. Can you > > > expand > > > on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to > > > pass? What was the information on which you were relying when you came to > > > the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities? Were you > > > misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an > > > Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution? Or > > > "other"? > > > > In order to identify vulnerabilities, the vulnerability scanner (1) > > attempts to identify/profile software listening on ports and (2) compares > > software versions against public CVEs and proprietary data sources. EJBCA > > is not broadly used software, and the vulnerability scanner did not have > > custom EJBCA detection logic. Upon our deeper investigation, we > > discovered that it (1) only scans the HTTP service and not the EJBCA > > software, which we would consider insufficient on its own and (2) is not > > as effective at flagging vulnerabilities in EJBCA because CVEs are not > > published by EJBCA. We don’t feel we were mislead by the vendor. > > Thanks for clarifying how the security scanning software worked; that's > useful. I'm not confident that we've determined any root causes for the > failure, though, especially things that other CAs in the ecosystem can learn > from. I'll try a different phrasing, which will hopefully provide more > clarity as to what I'm trying to achieve: > > What specific, actionable items would you recommend all CAs undertake to > remove or mitigate the risk of this, or a substantially similar, problem > occurring in their environment? > > > CVEs are not published by EJBCA. > > Does anyone else feel that this is a really, really, *really* bad idea? The > CVE system, whilst far from perfect, seems to be the agreed upon medium for > managing these types of issues, and it disappoints me that EJBCA would > appear to be "opting out" of it. Should discussions with EJBCA, either from > their customers or the wider community, be initiated? > > - Matt The actions we took are as follows: * We revisited the functionality of the vulnerability scanner, its ability to identify vulnerabilities in the CA software, and questioned our previous assumptions about how it functions. * We revisited the support and patch management notification mechanisms employed by the CA software vendor. * We revisited the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements to ensure appropriate coverage for the relevant requirements. * We no longer rely on the vulnerability scanner as a key control to detect security vulnerabilities with EJBCA. * We made our review of software releases and decisions about upgrading a key control. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Apple: Patch Management
On Fri, Dec 06, 2019 at 07:08:46PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 3:28:10 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote: > > [aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO] > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy > > wrote: > > > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability scanner > > > worked. Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was > > > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA. > > > > There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, so > > I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here. Can you expand > > on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to > > pass? What was the information on which you were relying when you came to > > the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities? Were you > > misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an > > Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution? Or > > "other"? > > In order to identify vulnerabilities, the vulnerability scanner (1) > attempts to identify/profile software listening on ports and (2) compares > software versions against public CVEs and proprietary data sources. EJBCA > is not broadly used software, and the vulnerability scanner did not have > custom EJBCA detection logic. Upon our deeper investigation, we > discovered that it (1) only scans the HTTP service and not the EJBCA > software, which we would consider insufficient on its own and (2) is not > as effective at flagging vulnerabilities in EJBCA because CVEs are not > published by EJBCA. We don’t feel we were mislead by the vendor. Thanks for clarifying how the security scanning software worked; that's useful. I'm not confident that we've determined any root causes for the failure, though, especially things that other CAs in the ecosystem can learn from. I'll try a different phrasing, which will hopefully provide more clarity as to what I'm trying to achieve: What specific, actionable items would you recommend all CAs undertake to remove or mitigate the risk of this, or a substantially similar, problem occurring in their environment? > CVEs are not published by EJBCA. Does anyone else feel that this is a really, really, *really* bad idea? The CVE system, whilst far from perfect, seems to be the agreed upon medium for managing these types of issues, and it disappoints me that EJBCA would appear to be "opting out" of it. Should discussions with EJBCA, either from their customers or the wider community, be initiated? - Matt ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Apple: Patch Management
On Monday, November 25, 2019 at 5:32:12 PM UTC-8, Apple CA wrote: > On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 3:28:10 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote: > > [aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO] > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy > > wrote: > > > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability scanner > > > worked. Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was > > > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA. > > > > There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, so > > I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here. Can you expand > > on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to > > pass? What was the information on which you were relying when you came to > > the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities? Were you > > misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an > > Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution? Or > > "other"? > > > > - Matt > > Thank you for your questions. Due to the Thanksgiving holiday in the US, we > expect to reply to your questions as early as the week of 02 December. In order to identify vulnerabilities, the vulnerability scanner (1) attempts to identify/profile software listening on ports and (2) compares software versions against public CVEs and proprietary data sources. EJBCA is not broadly used software, and the vulnerability scanner did not have custom EJBCA detection logic. Upon our deeper investigation, we discovered that it (1) only scans the HTTP service and not the EJBCA software, which we would consider insufficient on its own and (2) is not as effective at flagging vulnerabilities in EJBCA because CVEs are not published by EJBCA. We don’t feel we were mislead by the vendor. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Apple: Patch Management
On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 3:28:10 PM UTC-8, Matt Palmer wrote: > [aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO] > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability scanner > > worked. Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was > > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA. > > There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, so > I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here. Can you expand > on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to > pass? What was the information on which you were relying when you came to > the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities? Were you > misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an > Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution? Or > "other"? > > - Matt Thank you for your questions. Due to the Thanksgiving holiday in the US, we expect to reply to your questions as early as the week of 02 December. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: Apple: Patch Management
[aside: this is how incident reports should be done, IMHO] On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 07:23:27PM -0800, Apple CA via dev-security-policy wrote: > We did not have an accurate understanding of how the vulnerability scanner > worked. Our understanding of its capabilities lead us to believe it was > scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in EJBCA. There's a reasonable chance that other CAs may have a similar situation, so I think it's worth digging deeper into the root causes here. Can you expand on how this misunderstanding regarding the vulnerability scanner came to pass? What was the information on which you were relying when you came to the understanding of the vulnerability scanner's capabilities? Were you misled by the vendor marketing or technical documentation, or was it an Apple-internal assessment that came to an inaccurate conclution? Or "other"? - Matt ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
