On Thursday, December 15, 2016 at 10:56:52 AM UTC-8, Brian Smith wrote:
> It is important to fix the DoS issue with the path building when there
> are many choices for the same subject. SKI/AKI matching only fixes the
> DoS issue for benign cases, not malicious cases. Therefore some way of
>
On Tuesday, December 13, 2016 at 2:36:15 PM UTC-8, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> Thanks to all of you who have reviewed and commented on this request from
> Government of Taiwan, Government Root Certification Authority (GRCA), to
> include their renewed Government Root Certification Authority root
>
On 02/02/2017 00:46, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
All,
I've added another Potentially Problematic Practice, as follows.
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Problematic_Practices#Issuer_Encoding_in_CRL
The encoding of the Issuer field in the CRL should be byte-for-byte equivalent
with the encoding of the
Nick Lamb writes:
>In practice then I think we should try to ask local experts (ie people at
>least resident in the relevant country) when trying to judge whether the
>Locality and State elements of a Subject DN are acceptable for identifying
>the actual Subject unless it
On 03/02/2017 05:22, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2017 at 3:59 PM, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 02/02/2017 00:46, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
All,
I've added another Potentially Problematic Practice, as follows.
This request from the Government of Turkey, Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi (Kamu
SM), is to include the “TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 1” root
certificate, and enable the Websites trust bit. This SHA-256 root certificate
will eventually replace the SHA1 “TÜBİTAK UEKAE Kök Sertifika
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