RE: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

I am sure this site: https://www.microsoftonline.us.com/ is a phishing site and a fade office 365 site that I wish LE can revoke this cert. Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 01:55:40AM -0800, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy wrote: > 1. Neither registries nor registrars in the DNS system would ordinarily > have control over the existence of sub-domains. In some cases the whole > _purpose_ of the registration is to create such sub-domains

Re: SHA-1 collision

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 5:16 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > For example, in a certificate request, while the attacker can "choose" > such a bunch of bits in the public key, the value also has to be a valid > public key for which the

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 01:12:38AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy wrote: > I am sure this site: https://www.microsoftonline.us.com/ is a phishing site > and a fade office 365 site that I wish LE can revoke this cert. Why? It works just fine over HTTP, too. - Matt

RE: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

Do you think this site is an authentic site from Microsoft? If it is a fake site, then CA should revoke the issued certificate. Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Matt

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

As you have quoted it, Let's Encrpyt's CPS says: "the CA is *entitled* to revoke the certificate" The key word is "entitled." Meaning that Let's Encrypt may revoke the certificate if they chose, but are not required to. Therefore not revoking the certificate is compatible with their CPS. It's

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain thatdoesn't exist

Exactly that??s the meaning of ??entitle??. Based on the interpretation, I understand that when a firefighter is on a vocation, even a fire breaks next to him, it??s of his choice to go hiking, fly kites whatever as he may only be entitled on weekdays rather than in a vocation. IMO, the point

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

According to what I??ve known, ??Acknowledgment and Acceptance: An acknowledgment and acceptance that the CA is entitled to revoke the certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber or Terms of Use Agreement or if the CA discovers that the Certificate is

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On Fri, Feb 24, 2017 at 03:09:10AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy wrote: > Do you think this site is an authentic site from Microsoft? > If it is a fake site, then CA should revoke the issued certificate. Why? - Matt ___

Release and revoke (was: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist)

By and large I'd say that Matt's no's should instead be yes's. If we adopt the standpoint that releasing a domain is equivalent to saying "I no longer use that name" then a revocation is equivalent to adding "...and anyone who does use that name must surely be an imposter." In other words, we

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

This list hosted an extensive discussion on this issue in May of 2016, subject line "SSL Certs for Malicious Websites": https://groups.google.com/d/topic/mozilla.dev.security.polic y/vMrncPi3tx8/discussion Most (all?) of the people on this thread participated on that one, and said most (all?) of

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 03:55:43AM +, Richard Wang via dev-security-policy wrote: > If "apple", "google", "Microsoft" is not a high risk domain, then I don’t > know which domain is high risk domain, maybe only "github". That's kinda the problem: you don't know, and neither does anyone else,

Re: Audit Reminder Email Summary

Forwarded Message Subject: Summary of February 2017 Audit Reminder Emails Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 20:00:51 + (GMT) Mozilla: Audit Reminder Root Certificates: ISRG Root X1 Standard Audit: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=1987=pdf Audit Statement Date: 2015-12-15 BR

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On Thursday, 23 February 2017 01:11:54 UTC, Richard Wang wrote: > https://crt.sh/?id=65208905 for google.ligboy.org Without wanting to jump on this pre-existing dogpile: This specific example is illustrative of two important factors that should be considered in examining the threat here: 1.

SHA-1 collision

Hello i just saw this in the news... a SHA-1 collision has been achieved. https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/02/at-deaths-door-for-years-widely-used-sha1-function-is-now-dead/ proof site: https://shattered.io/ authors: Marc Stevens (1), Elie Bursztein (2), Pierre Karpman (1), Ange

Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that doesn't exist

On 22/02/17 17:08, Richard Wang wrote: > I think "apple-id-2.com" is a high risk domain that must be blocked to issue > DV SSL to those domains. I don't represent Let's Encrypt, but their policy on such things is relevant to this discussion, and it is here:

Re: SHA-1 collision

identical prefix, not chosen prefix. I was more interested in an SHA-1 collision ASIC. From: dev-security-policy on behalf of Adrian R. via dev-security-policy