Re: Audit Letter Validation (ALV) on intermediate certs in CCADB

2019-11-20 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
On 11/19/19 4:59 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: Note: I will add a report to wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Intermediate_Certificates to list all of  the intermediate certificates that have been added to OneCRL and their revocation status. This will enable the CA Community to identify which certificates have

PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1593814 , Rob Stradling, Jeremy Rowley, and I started discussing possible steps that might be taken to prevent misencoding strings in certificates, and it seemed appropriate to shift this to a more general m.d.s.p. discussion, rather than solely on th

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Clarify Section 5.1 ECDSA Curve-Hash Requirements

2019-11-20 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 3:24 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 12:06 PM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > >> >> On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 1:54 PM Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < >> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> >>> A few more questions have come up about this change: >>>

Policy 2.7 Proposal: Update Minimum Versions of Audit Criteria

2019-11-20 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
The last change I am proposing for version 2.7 of the Mozilla Root Store policy is an update to the minimum versions of audit criteria that we will accept in audits. I have conferred with the WebTrust Task Force and was informed that we can update the minimum version requirements for audit statemen

WebTrust direct URLs to PDF audit statements will be down during site update

2019-11-20 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
All, CPA Canada just informed me that the PDF file URLs that we use in the CCADB for WebTrust audits will be down for a while as they perform a site update. You will still be able to access the audit statements via the Seal files on the CA websites during this time. We apologize for the in

Re: PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy writes: >In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1593814 , Rob Stradling, >Jeremy Rowley, and I started discussing possible steps that might be taken to >prevent misencoding strings in certificates Is there any official position on strings that have c

Re: PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 9:48 PM Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy > writes: > > >In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1593814 , Rob Stradling, > >Jeremy Rowley, and I started discussing possible steps that might be > taken to > >prevent misencoding strings in

Re: PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Ryan Sleevi writes: >Do you believe it’s still applicable in the Web PKI of the past decade? Yes, the specific cert I referenced is current valid and passed WebTrust and EV audits. >If you could link to the crt.sh entry, that might be easier. Here's the Microsoft one I mentioned: Microsoft

Re: PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 10:54 PM Peter Gutmann wrote: > Ryan Sleevi writes: > > >Do you believe it’s still applicable in the Web PKI of the past decade? > > Yes, the specific cert I referenced is current valid and passed WebTrust > and > EV audits. > "Passed" is... a bit misleading as to the (l

Re: PrintableString, UTF8String, and RFC 5280

2019-11-20 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Ryan Sleevi writes: >I don't think the hyperbole helps here. It wasn't hyperbole, it was extreme surprise. When someone told me about this I couldn't believe it was still happening after the massive amount of publicity it got at the time, so it was more a giant "WTF?!??" than anything else. Ot