Peter,
DHS is only using Mozilla’s trust store for determining trust. They are not
using a government-based trust store.
We talked to Entrust last week. Entrust was creating certificates with
“entrust.net” as the old way. Recently, Entrust has been generating
certificates with
On Tuesday, 26 November 2019 16:53:21 UTC, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> The proposed section to add to the CCADB Policy (www.ccadb.org/policy)
> has been updated and is here:
>
> https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/issues/33#issuecomment-558714086
Typo in "Format Specifications for SHA-256
All,
The proposed section to add to the CCADB Policy (www.ccadb.org/policy)
has been updated and is here:
https://github.com/mozilla/www.ccadb.org/issues/33#issuecomment-558714086
This is the last call for feedback on it.
Thanks,
Kathleen
___
Yeah, there's something amiss with how you're analyzing the issue here -
whether an entrust.com or entrust.net domain is in use shouldn't matter.
More generally, Mozilla is unlikely to add any root certificates whose
expected uses don't contain a significant public-facing component. The root
On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 14:12:46 -0800
Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> CAs should have been keeping track of and resolving their own known
> problems in regards to not fully following the BRs and Mozilla
> policy. For example, I expect that a situation in which I responded
> with
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