Ryan Sleevi writes:
>Current (and presently proposed) Mozilla policy does not allow them. Nor are
>they supported in Mozilla NSS anymore (and their previous support was not one
>you should use for security-critical purposes). Nor are they supported in
>other UAs.
I should point
boeck.de>; r...@sleevi.com;
> mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: Other Curves
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, despite the Bitcoin community's enthusiasm, secp256k1 has very
> bad side-channel properties:
>
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/161.pdf
> https://
emy.row...@digicert.com>
> *Cc:* Hanno Böck <ha...@hboeck.de>; r...@sleevi.com;
> mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> *Subject:* Re: Other Curves
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, despite the Bitcoin community's enthusiasm, secp256k1 has
> very b
ck.de>; r...@sleevi.com;
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
Unfortunately, despite the Bitcoin community's enthusiasm, secp256k1 has very
bad side-channel properties:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/161.pdf
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1051
On Wed, Feb 01, 2017 at 11:51:48PM +0100, Hanno Böck wrote:
> On Wed, 1 Feb 2017 22:38:54 +
> Jeremy Rowley wrote:
>
> > Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves
> > (well, that’s what I’ve read anyway).
>
> Overall they have mostly
essage-
> From: Hanno Böck [mailto:ha...@hboeck.de]
> Sent: Wednesday, February 1, 2017 3:52 PM
> To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
> Cc: r...@sleevi.com; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: Other Curves
>
> On Wed, 1 Feb 20
ty-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
On Wed, 1 Feb 2017 22:38:54 +
Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com> wrote:
> Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves
> (well, that’s what I’ve read anyway).
Overall they have mostly the same weaknesses th
...@hboeck.de]
Sent: Wednesday, February 1, 2017 3:52 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Cc: r...@sleevi.com; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
On Wed, 1 Feb 2017 22:38:54 +
Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com> wr
On Wed, 1 Feb 2017 22:38:54 +
Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves
> (well, that’s what I’ve read anyway).
Overall they have mostly the same weaknesses than the NIST curves.
There are differences in detail,
row...@digicert.com>
Cc: r...@sleevi.com; mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com
<mailto:jeremy.row...@digicert.com> > wrote:
Some of these curves are considered much be
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Jeremy Rowley
wrote:
> Some of these curves are considered much better than the NIST curves
> (well, that’s what I’ve read anyway). With how many new curves there are
> (many with an international flavor), it’d be nice if Mozilla
in RFCs, HSMs, and
in applications.
From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 1, 2017 3:34 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
That seems altogether a bad idea for the eco
ty-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Other Curves
Do you mean for signing by the CA, or as the key in the EE cert?
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.row...@digicert.com
<mailto:jeremy.row...@digicert.com> > wrote:
I know the use of other ECC curves comes up often, but
That seems altogether a bad idea for the ecosystem.
Current (and presently proposed) Mozilla policy does not allow them. Nor
are they supported in Mozilla NSS anymore (and their previous support was
not one you should use for security-critical purposes). Nor are they
supported in other UAs.
I'm
Do you mean for signing by the CA, or as the key in the EE cert?
On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 2:26 PM, Jeremy Rowley
wrote:
> I know the use of other ECC curves comes up often, but I couldn't recall
> where Mozilla landed on using other ECC curves. Requests for secp256k1
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