subject:"RE\: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10"

Re: OCSP Responder monitoring (was Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10)

2017-12-19 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy

Thanks Rob! I went through the list and filed a bug for each CA if there
wasn't one already open (with one exception that I'm still researching).
All open OCSP issues are included in the list at
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Incident_Dashboard

Wayne

On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 10:49 PM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

>
> Some example reports:
>
> 1. CAs / Responder URLs that are in scope for, but violate, the BR
> prohibition on returning a signed a "Good" response for a random serial
> number, and are also in scope for Mozilla's consideration:
> https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders?trustedExclude=constrained%
> 2Cexpired%2Conecrl=Mozilla=Server+Auth
> entication=Good
>
>
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Re: OCSP Responder monitoring (was Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10)

2017-12-11 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy

No. It has been prohibited for years in the Baseline Requirements. With an
expectation that CAs monitor such requests in light of DigiNotar

On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 8:54 PM Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> writes:
>
> >CAs / Responder URLs that are in scope for, but violate, the BR
> prohibition
> >on returning a signed a "Good" response for a random serial number
>
> Isn't that perfectly valid?  Despite the misleading name, OCSP's "Good"
> just
> means "not revoked", and a not-revoked reply to a random serial number is
> correct because it's not revoked.
>
> Peter.
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Re: OCSP Responder monitoring (was Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10)

2017-12-11 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy

Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy  
writes:

>CAs / Responder URLs that are in scope for, but violate, the BR prohibition 
>on returning a signed a "Good" response for a random serial number

Isn't that perfectly valid?  Despite the misleading name, OCSP's "Good" just
means "not revoked", and a not-revoked reply to a random serial number is 
correct because it's not revoked.

Peter.
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OCSP Responder monitoring (was Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10)

2017-12-11 Thread Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy

Inspired by Paul Kehrer's research a few months ago, I've added a 
continuous OCSP Monitoring feature to crt.sh:


https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders

This page shows the latest results of 3 OCSP checks (performed hourly) 
against each CA / Responder URL that crt.sh has ever encountered:

  1. a GET request for an unexpired certificate.
  2. a POST request for an unexpired certificate.
  3. a POST request for a randomly-generated serial number.

The results can be sorted and filtered in various ways: try editing the 
form at the top of the page and then clicking "Update"; or try clicking 
a value in any of the "Response" columns.


The "B" (for "Bytes") column lists the size of each HTTP response. 
Click on any of these values and you'll see the actual OCSP response 
that crt.sh saw; each OCSP response can be viewed as a hex dump, ASN.1 
dump, or in the text form used by "openssl ocsp -resp_text".


There are many well behaved Responders, but there's also a wealth of 
interesting misbehaviours to explore!


Some example reports:

1. CAs / Responder URLs that are in scope for, but violate, the BR 
prohibition on returning a signed a "Good" response for a random serial 
number, and are also in scope for Mozilla's consideration:

https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders?trustedExclude=constrained%2Cexpired%2Conecrl=Mozilla=Server+Authentication=Good

2. All CAs / Responder URLs, sorted by GET response size (largest first):
https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders?dir=^=6

3. All CAs / Responder URLs, sorted by GET response time (fastest first):
https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders?dir=v=10
(No surprise that Comodo's OCSP Responders are fastest from this 
particular network perspective ;-) ).


4. All CAs / Responder URLs where 'comodo' is a substring of the 
Responder URL:

https://crt.sh/ocsp-responders?url=%25comodo%25

On 15/11/17 00:19, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy wrote:

Hi Ben,

DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

Downloading the issuer (https://crt.sh/?id=8949008) and then running:

openssl ocsp -issuer 8949008.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.root.cartaodecidadao.pt/publico/ocsp -noverify

gives this response:

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 14 23:59:47 2017 GMT

So this does not appear to be resolved.


DN: C=PT, O=SCEE, CN=ECRaizEstado

The SCEE root for the Government of Portugal is now responding with
unknown/revoked statuses.


DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Accredited Certification Authority, CN=MULTICERT Certification Authority
002

Download https://crt.sh/?id=8642581 and run:

openssl ocsp -issuer 8642581.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp -noverify

and

openssl ocsp -issuer 8642581.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/procsp -noverify

and the responses are:

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:03:40 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:03:40 2017 GMT

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:03:58 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:03:58 2017 GMT

Not fixed.


DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Entidade de Certificação Credenciada, CN=MULTICERT - Entidade de
Certificação 001

(Issuer: https://crt.sh/?id=128496365)

openssl ocsp -issuer 128496365.crt -serial 1010101010101010101002101010
-no_nonce -noverify -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp

1010101010101010101002101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:15:45 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:15:45 2017 GMT

Also not fixed.

I believe Kathleen has opened bugzilla issues for these so it would
probably be good to copy this correspondence there as well.

-Paul

On November 15, 2017 at 6:50:43 AM, Ben Wilson (ben.wil...@digicert.com)
wrote:

Could someone re-check Multicert and SCEE? (See below.)  They have
indicated to us that they have now patched their OCSP responder systems.



DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=12729446

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.root.cartaodecidadao.pt/publico/ocsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Accredited Certification Authority, CN=MULTICERT Certification Authority
002

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=117934576

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/procsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Entidade de Certificação Credenciada, CN=MULTICERT - Entidade de
Certificação 001

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=11653177

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp



DigiCert/Government of Portugal, Sistema de Certificação Electrónica do
Estado (SCEE) / Electronic Certification System of the State:



DN: C=PT, O=SCEE, CN=ECRaizEstado

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=8322256

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.ecee.gov.pt


--
Rob

RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-11-14 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

Hi Ben,

DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

Downloading the issuer (https://crt.sh/?id=8949008) and then running:

openssl ocsp -issuer 8949008.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.root.cartaodecidadao.pt/publico/ocsp -noverify

gives this response:

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 14 23:59:47 2017 GMT

So this does not appear to be resolved.


DN: C=PT, O=SCEE, CN=ECRaizEstado

The SCEE root for the Government of Portugal is now responding with
unknown/revoked statuses.


DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Accredited Certification Authority, CN=MULTICERT Certification Authority
002

Download https://crt.sh/?id=8642581 and run:

openssl ocsp -issuer 8642581.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp -noverify

and

openssl ocsp -issuer 8642581.crt -serial 101010101010101101010101010
-no_nonce -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/procsp -noverify

and the responses are:

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:03:40 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:03:40 2017 GMT

101010101010101101010101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:03:58 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:03:58 2017 GMT

Not fixed.


DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Entidade de Certificação Credenciada, CN=MULTICERT - Entidade de
Certificação 001

(Issuer: https://crt.sh/?id=128496365)

openssl ocsp -issuer 128496365.crt -serial 1010101010101010101002101010
-no_nonce -noverify -url http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp

1010101010101010101002101010: good
This Update: Nov 15 00:15:45 2017 GMT
Next Update: Nov 15 00:15:45 2017 GMT

Also not fixed.

I believe Kathleen has opened bugzilla issues for these so it would
probably be good to copy this correspondence there as well.

-Paul

On November 15, 2017 at 6:50:43 AM, Ben Wilson (ben.wil...@digicert.com)
wrote:

Could someone re-check Multicert and SCEE? (See below.)  They have
indicated to us that they have now patched their OCSP responder systems.



DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=12729446

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.root.cartaodecidadao.pt/publico/ocsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Accredited Certification Authority, CN=MULTICERT Certification Authority
002

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=117934576

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/procsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A.,
OU=Entidade de Certificação Credenciada, CN=MULTICERT - Entidade de
Certificação 001

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=11653177

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp



DigiCert/Government of Portugal, Sistema de Certificação Electrónica do
Estado (SCEE) / Electronic Certification System of the State:



DN: C=PT, O=SCEE, CN=ECRaizEstado

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=8322256

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.ecee.gov.pt
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-11-14 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy

Could someone re-check Multicert and SCEE? (See below.)  They have indicated to 
us that they have now patched their OCSP responder systems.



DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação 
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=12729446

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.root.cartaodecidadao.pt/publico/ocsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A., 
OU=Accredited Certification Authority, CN=MULTICERT Certification Authority 002

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=117934576

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/procsp



DN: C=PT, O=MULTICERT - Serviços de Certificação Electrónica S.A., OU=Entidade 
de Certificação Credenciada, CN=MULTICERT - Entidade de Certificação 001

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=11653177

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.multicert.com/ocsp



DigiCert/Government of Portugal, Sistema de Certificação Electrónica do Estado 
(SCEE) / Electronic Certification System of the State:



DN: C=PT, O=SCEE, CN=ECRaizEstado

Example cert: https://crt.sh/?id=8322256

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.ecee.gov.pt



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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-14 Thread mihkeltammsalu--- via dev-security-policy


> AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)
> 
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> 
> DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
> emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

Hello,

Thank you for your attention to the problem. SK ID Solutions is aware of the 
OCSP issue and we are already making detailed action plan for resolving the bug 
reported #1398233. If needed planning is made we will provide also the incident 
report.

Mihkel Tammsalu
SK ID Solutions AS
Service Manger
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-08 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,

In case you're not on the distribution for the DigiCert bug for this, here is 
my recent post.

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1398269#c2 

Cheers,

Ben


-Original Message-
From: dev-security-policy 
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+ben=digicert@lists.mozilla.org] On 
Behalf Of Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy
Sent: Friday, September 8, 2017 6:19 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

On September 9, 2017 at 2:16:38 AM, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
(dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:

Bugs filed…



~

Thanks,
Kathleen


Thank you very much Kathleen! If I receive additional responses I will update 
the bugs directly.

-Paul
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smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-08 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

On September 9, 2017 at 2:16:38 AM, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy
(dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:

Bugs filed…



~

Thanks,
Kathleen


Thank you very much Kathleen! If I receive additional responses I will
update the bugs directly.

-Paul
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-08 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy

Bugs filed…


>
> AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)
>

Bug #1398233

> 
> Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional
> 

Bug #1398240

> 
> CA Disig a.s. (Fixed as of 2017-08-31)
> 

Bug #1398242

> 
> certSIGN (partially resolved)
> 

Bug #1398243

> 
> Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)
> 

Bug #1398246

> 
> DigiCert:
> 


Bug #1398269


> 
> DocuSign (OpenTrust/Keynectis)
> 

Bug #1398247


> 
> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius) (Fixed as of 2017-08-31)
> 

Bug #1398251

> 
> IdenTrust (fixed as of 2017-08-31)
> 

Bug #1398255

> 
> Izenpe S.A. (fixed as of 2017-09-05)
> 

Bug #1398258


> 
> PROCERT
> 

Existing Bug: 1391058

> 
> SECOM Trust Systems Co. Ltd.
> 

Bug #1398259

> 
> Visa
> 

Bug #1398261

~

Thanks,
Kathleen



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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-08 Thread Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy


> On Sep 8, 2017, at 12:27, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy 
>  wrote:
> 
>> I have updated the list again to note the additional responders fixed (in
>> this update: CA Disig, PKIoverheid, Izenpe). To make this email slightly
>> less enormous I've also started removing everything but the CA's name when
>> I have confirmed that all the reported responders are now properly
>> responding to my queries.
> 
> Should I still file a bug for those, so that the incident report is recorded 
> in Bugzilla?

Yes, it will be much easier to track there instead of being buried in this 
thread.
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-08 Thread Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy

I'm going to file the Bugzilla Bugs for each of these CAs, as follows.

==
Bug Summary: : Non-BR-Compliant OCSP Responders

Bug Description:
Problems have been found with OCSP responders for this CA, and reported in the 
mozilla.dev.security.policy forum here:

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/o1MX07iWDco/RuM1NK_0AQAJ

As per section 4.9.10 of the BRs, OCSP responders MUST NOT respond with a 
“good” status for unissued certificates. The effective date for this 
requirement was 2013-08-01.

Please provide an incident report in this bug, as described here:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Responding_To_A_Misissuance#Incident_Report
==


> I have updated the list again to note the additional responders fixed (in
> this update: CA Disig, PKIoverheid, Izenpe). To make this email slightly
> less enormous I've also started removing everything but the CA's name when
> I have confirmed that all the reported responders are now properly
> responding to my queries.

Should I still file a bug for those, so that the incident report is recorded in 
Bugzilla?

Thanks,
Kathleen

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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-05 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

I have updated the list again to note the additional responders fixed (in
this update: CA Disig, PKIoverheid, Izenpe). To make this email slightly
less enormous I've also started removing everything but the CA's name when
I have confirmed that all the reported responders are now properly
responding to my queries.


AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ Muntaner 244
Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de
Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068,
CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional -
AAPP
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

CA Disig a.s. (Fixed as of 2017-08-31)

--Data removed for brevity, see older emails for more info

certSIGN (partially resolved)

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
Notes: This is fixed as of 2017-08-31

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
Notes: Per Cristian Garabet this will be resolved 2017-09-15

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=1869a83f83b8f034336ab09fe52563c00c80c4b45897b3ea15e658fd14306208
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2   (c)03, OU=Secretaria
d'Administracio i Funcio Publica, CN=EC-SAFP
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=15d3c7463f477e2627c4c9a158e429abd6bfe63101d6745560a36d1c03363d30
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2 (c)03, OU=Universitats i
Recerca, CN=EC-UR
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=7432b4c29e1360668814ec282ad78208cd521e62b8d8d60d5084fdf8daad57cb
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2 (c)03, OU=Universitats i
Recerca, CN=EC-UR
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=3148d57a495fd7bdf4653dfdd3d3c9d186547df42e296c4e1b6a7c679179d03f
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio,
OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-3 (c)05, OU=Universitat Rovira i
Virgili, CN=EC-URV
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=caa2a1fe7756bd5e227add40c5e06808dc0a79f1e8c93e4bf982df4893b284e4
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), OU=Serveis
Publics de Certificacio, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verarrel (c)03,
OU=Jerarquia Entitats de Certificacio Catalanes, CN=EC-ACC
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=356a5f4d994e9efa7caefc491768911d65ec25977465b610e2f29aa4472631c3
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN:

RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-04 Thread Peter Miškovič via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,
Problem with OCSP response for RootCA (CA Disig Root R1 and CA Disig Root R2) 
was fixed on Thursday August 31, 2017.
Regards
Peter Miskovic

From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 2:48 PM
To: 
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking 
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 
August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained in 
line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD" status for such 
certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the DigiNotar incident 
as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP 
request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial 
is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:

CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

-Paul

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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-01 Thread Policy Authority PKIoverheid via dev-security-policy

> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
> 
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com

Dear community,

My apologies for the delayed response. The last few days we’ve been in close 
contact with our TSP KPN to identify and remedy this issue. I can confirm that 
a fix for this issue has been deployed yesterday and that the OCSP responder 
(OCSP2) in question now responds as expected to these kind of requests. 

As to Nick’s question about how we and the auditor missed this: KPN switched to 
another OCSP responder (OCSP3) when BR requirement 4.9.10 became effective. 
Around that time KPN deployed a software update regarding OCSP2 which was 
necessary so this responder would also comply with BR requirement 4.9.10. 
Although the software upgrade took place, the configuration change to the OCSP2 
responder was somehow never executed. Nevertheless, all TLS certificates issued 
after 10/25/2013 should be directing users to OCSP3. That responder was and is 
compliant with BR 4.9.10 from the effective date. 

Today we have published a new requirement for our PKIoverheid TSPs regarding 
audit criteria and scoping. See bug: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1391864 Result of this new 
requirement should be that ALL BR requirements are in scope of the audit 
including a technical requirement like BR 4.9.10.

Furthermore, we have formulated a plan to prevent future issues like these, 
which involves active monitoring of the OCSP responses. Not only because of 
uptime requirements (that was already monitored), but also input/output 
validation to confirm OCSP responders are behaving like it should. Said 
mechanism would probably take the form of a fixed interval query which results 
would be reported by email to us and (possibly) the sub CA from the PKIoverheid 
TSP in question. This new measure will be effective no later than 10/1/2017.  

Please let me know if you have any questions. 

Best regards,
Mark Janssen
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-01 Thread Policy Authority PKIoverheid via dev-security-policy

> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
 
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com

Dear community,

My apologies for the delayed response. The last few days we’ve been in close 
contact with our TSP KPN to identify and remedy this issue. I can confirm that 
a fix for this issue has been deployed yesterday and that the OCSP responder 
(OCSP2) in question now responds as expected to these kind of requests. 

As to Nick’s question about how we and the auditor missed this: KPN switched to 
another OCSP responder (OCSP3) when BR requirement 4.9.10 became effective. 
Around that time KPN deployed a software update regarding OCSP2 which was 
necessary so this responder would also comply with BR requirement 4.9.10. 
Although the software upgrade took place, the configuration change to the OCSP2 
responder was somehow never executed. Nevertheless, all TLS certificates issued 
after 10/25/2013 should be directing users to OCSP3. That responder was and is 
compliant with BR 4.9.10 from the effective date. 

Today we have published a new requirement for PKIoverheid TSPs regarding audit 
criteria and scoping. See bug: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1391864 Result of this new 
requirement should be that ALL BR requirements are in scope of the audit 
including a technical requirement like BR 4.9.10.

Furthermore, we have formulated a plan to prevent future issues like these, 
which involves active monitoring of the OCSP responses. Not only because of 
uptime requirements (that was already monitored), but also input/output 
validation to confirm OCSP responders are behaving like it should. Said 
mechanism would probably take the form of a fixed interval query which results 
would be reported by email to us. This new measure will be effective no later 
than 10/1/2017.  

Please let me know if you have any questions. 

Best regards,
Mark Janssen
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-09-01 Thread 加毛寿 via dev-security-policy

※個人情報保護のため、宛先を非表示（ＢＣＣ）にて送信しています。
-

Paul-san,

Thank you for the notice.
We are going to investigate on this matter.

Best regards,
Hisashi Kamo
Secom Trust Systems

> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy 
> [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+h-kamo=secom.co...@lists.mozilla.org] On 
> Behalf Of Paul Kehrer
> via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 10:02 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10
> 
> I have updated the list below to try to capture all the information provided 
> in this thread about which responders have been
> fixed (and verified using another random serial number), which ones have a 
> date, and removed the ones that are actually under
> technical constraint that I missed.
> 
> I have received several responses from CAs that were CC'd informing me that 
> they are investigating but until the issues are
> resolved or I have a date for resolution I have not noted those 
> communications below.
> 
> 
> AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)
> 
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> 
> DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA, 
> emailAddress=p...@sk.ee Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA
> 
> Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional
> 
> Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ Muntaner 244 
> Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com,
> OU=Jerarquia de Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF 
> A-62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1 Example
> cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la 
> Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC
> Firmaprofesional - AAPP Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> CA Disig a.s.
> 
> Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service 
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
> OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service 
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
> OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1 Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2 Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2
> 
> certSIGN
> 
> Email sent to off...@certsign.ro
> 
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN 
> Enterprise CA Class 3 G2 Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
> Notes: This is fixed as of 2017-08-31
> 
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
> Notes: Per Cristian Garabet this will be resolved 2017-09-15
> 
> Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)
> 
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
> la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics
> de Certificacio ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, 
> OU=Administracions Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
> la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics
> de Certificacio ECV-2, OU=Veg

Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-31 Thread Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy

Kurt, I think both the past experiences of m.d.s.policy with incidents that 
went undetected by auditors, and my own personal experience (not as part of the 
Web PKI) with professional audit firms is that they're not strong on the sort 
of technical requirements that we've seen here.

If the rule says I ought to have annual meeting at which I must keep minutes, 
the auditors are likely to remember to ask to see the minutes and to identify 
"did not hold required meetings" as a problem. If the rule says I mustn't issue 
certs with a "foo" extension it's very unlikely the auditors will inspect any 
certs - let alone all of them - specifically to check for that extension. This 
is definitely a limitation that we need to keep in mind and which CAs 
themselves must keep in mind if relying on audits in their own business - as 
for example Symantec did.

As a rule of thumb, audit is good at identifying certain types of policy 
problems but not effective for detecting criminality or bugs. If you want to 
detect those (and we do) you need other measures in place.

That said, I would like to see feedback from CAs on why *they* missed this and 
what they've done to try not to be on the list next time something like this 
happens. They too need to be aware that passing audit is the low bar, if it's 
the extent of their goals then Mozilla's root programme probably isn't for them.
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-31 Thread David Fernandez via dev-security-policy

El miércoles, 30 de agosto de 2017, 10:58:34 (UTC+2), Paul Kehrer  escribió:
> Hi David,
> 
> If you use the cert at https://crt.sh/?id=1616324 as issuer (the root
> itself) and run this command:
> 
> openssl ocsp -issuer 1616324.crt -serial 10101010101010111101001101
> -url http://ocsp.izenpe.com -noverify
> 
> You will get back
> 
> This Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2017 GMT
> Next Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2018 GMT
> 
> Of course, no serverAuth certificates should be issued directly off the
> root, but the root is still enabled for that purpose so the responder
> should respond UNAUTHORIZED here (UNAUTHORIZED instead of UNKNOWN to allow
> the root to stay offline).
> 
> On August 30, 2017 at 4:42:10 PM, David Fernandez via dev-security-policy (
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:
> 
> Hi Paul,
> can you provide what you posted, for example attaching the ocsp response. I
> mean if I query for a non-existant certificate, I get the following answer:
> 
> openssl ocsp -no_cert_verify -no_signature_verify -issuer SSLEV_IZENPE.cer
> -serial 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191 -url
> http://ocsp.izenpe.com
> 
> Response verify OK
> 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191: revoked
> This Update: Aug 30 08:36:05 2017 GMT
> Next Update: Sep 1 08:36:05 2017 GMT
> Reason: certificateHold
> Revocation Time: Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
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Hi Paul,
We have been looking for the same problem in all our IZENPE's Subordinate CAs, 
and found that the problem was only affecting to our Root.
After performing the changes to fix the problem and validations in our 
Development system, we have fix the problem in our production enviroment a 
couple of hours ago.
Thank you for warning all of us.

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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-31 Thread Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy


On 2017-08-29 14:47, Paul Kehrer wrote:

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective
1 August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically
Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD"
status for such certificates."


I have to wonder why you were able to find so many. Is this not covered 
in the audit?



Kurt
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-31 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy


On 31/08/2017 07:24, Peter Miškovič wrote:

Hi Paul,
we found the problem with OCSP response for SubCA R1I1 and SubCA R2I2 and fixed 
it yesterday afternoon.
Problem with OCSP response for RootCA will be fixed to the end of next week. 
They are offline and there is no real possibility to issue a SSL certificate 
directly by them even if  they are enabled for issuing.



Please be aware that the requirement is there to avoid positive
responses for fake certificates that were never issued by the real CA
(such as in the DigiNotar incident).

But I understand the need to use slower, more careful update procedures
for root CA related infrastructure.  (I don't speak for Mozilla).


Regards
Peter Miskovic


From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 2:48 PM
To: 
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking whether they are 
compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 August 2013, OCSP responders for 
CAs which are not Technically Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a 
"GOOD" status for such certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the 
DigiNotar incident as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP request for 
the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial is 
extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:


CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2


-Paul




Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-31 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

I have updated the list below to try to capture all the information
provided in this thread about which responders have been fixed (and
verified using another random serial number), which ones have a date, and
removed the ones that are actually under technical constraint that I missed.

I have received several responses from CAs that were CC'd informing me that
they are investigating but until the issues are resolved or I have a date
for resolution I have not noted those communications below.


AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ Muntaner 244
Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de
Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068,
CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional -
AAPP
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

certSIGN

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
Notes: This is fixed as of 2017-08-31

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
Notes: Per Cristian Garabet this will be resolved 2017-09-15

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=1869a83f83b8f034336ab09fe52563c00c80c4b45897b3ea15e658fd14306208
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2   (c)03, OU=Secretaria
d'Administracio i Funcio Publica, CN=EC-SAFP
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=15d3c7463f477e2627c4c9a158e429abd6bfe63101d6745560a36d1c03363d30
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2 (c)03, OU=Universitats i
Recerca, CN=EC-UR
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=7432b4c29e1360668814ec282ad78208cd521e62b8d8d60d5084fdf8daad57cb
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11

RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Peter Miškovič via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,
we found the problem with OCSP response for SubCA R1I1 and SubCA R2I2 and fixed 
it yesterday afternoon.
Problem with OCSP response for RootCA will be fixed to the end of next week. 
They are offline and there is no real possibility to issue a SSL certificate 
directly by them even if  they are enabled for issuing.

Regards
Peter Miskovic


From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 2:48 PM
To: 
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking 
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 
August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained in 
line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD" status for such 
certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the DigiNotar incident 
as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP 
request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial 
is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:


CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2


-Paul
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

On August 30, 2017 at 4:53:54 AM, Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy (
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:

This CA is technically constrained:



DN: C=CH, L=Zurich, O=ABB, CN=ABB Issuing CA 6





Hi Ben,

ABB Intermediate CA 3 (https://crt.sh/?id=7739892), which issued ABB
Issuing CA 6, does have a name constraints extension. Unfortunately that NC
extension does not comply with BR 7.1.5 because it fails to encode an IPv6
exclusion:

The Subordinate CA Certificate MUST also include within excludedSubtrees an
iPAddress GeneralName of 32 zero octets (covering the IPv6 address range of
::0/0)

This is an interesting edge case since the CA is partially, but not fully
constrained.

-Paul
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread identrust--- via dev-security-policy

On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 9:41:07 AM UTC-4, Paul Kehrer wrote:
> I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking
> whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective
> 1 August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically
> Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD"
> status for such certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of
> the DigiNotar incident as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware
> of all issuances in its infrastructure and has been a requirement for over
> 4 years now.
> 
> The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer
> name hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an
> OCSP request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef".
> This serial is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.
> 
> The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they
> respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but
> are embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots
> in the Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put
> notes about whether they've been contacted:
> 
> AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)
> 
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> 
> DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
> emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA
> 
> Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional
> 
> Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ Muntaner 244
> Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de
> Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068,
> CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la
> Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional -
> AAPP
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
> 
> CA Disig a.s.
> 
> Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
> OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
> OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1
> 
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2
> 
> certSIGN
> 
> Email sent to off...@certsign.ro
> 
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN
> Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
> 
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
> 
> Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)
> 
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
> de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
> ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
> Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net
> 
> DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
> de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio
> ECV-2, OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions
> Locals de Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=1869a83f83b8f034336ab09fe52563c00c80c4b45897b3ea15e658fd14306208
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net
> 
> DN:

RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Peter Miškovič via dev-security-policy


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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread David Fernandez via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,
thank you for the clarification, I thought you were talking about subordinates.
Regards,
 
El miércoles, 30 de agosto de 2017, 10:58:34 (UTC+2), Paul Kehrer  escribió:
> Hi David,
> 
> If you use the cert at https://crt.sh/?id=1616324 as issuer (the root
> itself) and run this command:
> 
> openssl ocsp -issuer 1616324.crt -serial 10101010101010111101001101
> -url http://ocsp.izenpe.com -noverify
> 
> You will get back
> 
> This Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2017 GMT
> Next Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2018 GMT
> 
> Of course, no serverAuth certificates should be issued directly off the
> root, but the root is still enabled for that purpose so the responder
> should respond UNAUTHORIZED here (UNAUTHORIZED instead of UNKNOWN to allow
> the root to stay offline).
> 
> On August 30, 2017 at 4:42:10 PM, David Fernandez via dev-security-policy (
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:
> 
> Hi Paul,
> can you provide what you posted, for example attaching the ocsp response. I
> mean if I query for a non-existant certificate, I get the following answer:
> 
> openssl ocsp -no_cert_verify -no_signature_verify -issuer SSLEV_IZENPE.cer
> -serial 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191 -url
> http://ocsp.izenpe.com
> 
> Response verify OK
> 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191: revoked
> This Update: Aug 30 08:36:05 2017 GMT
> Next Update: Sep 1 08:36:05 2017 GMT
> Reason: certificateHold
> Revocation Time: Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy

Hi David,

If you use the cert at https://crt.sh/?id=1616324 as issuer (the root
itself) and run this command:

openssl ocsp -issuer 1616324.crt -serial 10101010101010111101001101
-url http://ocsp.izenpe.com -noverify

You will get back

This Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2017 GMT
Next Update: Jun 22 11:06:43 2018 GMT

Of course, no serverAuth certificates should be issued directly off the
root, but the root is still enabled for that purpose so the responder
should respond UNAUTHORIZED here (UNAUTHORIZED instead of UNKNOWN to allow
the root to stay offline).

On August 30, 2017 at 4:42:10 PM, David Fernandez via dev-security-policy (
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org) wrote:

Hi Paul,
can you provide what you posted, for example attaching the ocsp response. I
mean if I query for a non-existant certificate, I get the following answer:

openssl ocsp -no_cert_verify -no_signature_verify -issuer SSLEV_IZENPE.cer
-serial 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191 -url
http://ocsp.izenpe.com

Response verify OK
0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191: revoked
This Update: Aug 30 08:36:05 2017 GMT
Next Update: Sep 1 08:36:05 2017 GMT
Reason: certificateHold
Revocation Time: Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread David Fernandez via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,
can you provide what you posted, for example attaching the ocsp response. I 
mean if I query for a non-existant certificate, I get the following answer:

openssl ocsp -no_cert_verify -no_signature_verify  -issuer SSLEV_IZENPE.cer 
-serial 0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191 -url http://ocsp.izenpe.com

Response verify OK
0x295990755083049101712519384020072382191: revoked
This Update: Aug 30 08:36:05 2017 GMT
Next Update: Sep  1 08:36:05 2017 GMT
Reason: certificateHold
Revocation Time: Jan  1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Peter Miškovič via dev-security-policy

Hi Paul,
thank you for the information. We had yesterday a holiday here in Slovakia. We 
are starting the investigation of this problem now.
Regards.
Peter Miskovic

From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 2:48 PM
To: 
mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking 
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 
August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained in 
line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD" status for such 
certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the DigiNotar incident 
as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP 
request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial 
is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:

AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA, 
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, 
emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ 
Muntaner 244 Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com, 
OU=Jerarquia de Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF 
A-62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la 
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional - AAPP
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

certSIGN

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN 
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio ECV-2, 
OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions Locals de 
Catalunya, CN=EC-AL
Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
la Concepcio 11

Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy

Hi Ben,

I'm not sure it should matter that a CA _does_ only issue client certs --
in the DigiNotar-style situation for which this rule was envisioned, the
relevant thing is whether the cert is _capable_ of issuing server certs.

Alex

On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> This CA only issues client certificates:
>
>
>
> DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de
> Certificação Electrónica do Estado, C=PT
>
>
>
>
>
> Ben Wilson, JD, CISA, CISSP
>
> VP Compliance
>
> +1 801 701 9678
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 6:48 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10
>
>
>
> I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking
> whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective
> 1 August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically
> Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD"
> status for such certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of
> the DigiNotar incident as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware
> of all issuances in its infrastructure and has been a requirement for over
> 4 years now.
>
>
>
> The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer
> name hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an
> OCSP request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef".
> This serial is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.
>
>
>
> The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs
> (they respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh)
> but are embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted
> roots in the Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and
> put notes about whether they've been contacted:
>
>
>
> AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)
>
>
>
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
>
>
>
> DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
> emailAddress=p...@sk.ee 
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91e
> aeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
>
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA
>
>
>
> Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional
>
>
>
> Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com 
>
>
>
> DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b
> 9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
>
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
>
>
>
> DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com  c...@firmaprofesional.com> , L=C/ Muntaner 244 Barcelona, OU=Consulte
> http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de Certificacion
> Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068, CN=AC
> Firmaprofesional - CA1
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f05983
> 93f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
>
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
>
>
>
> DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la
> Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional -
> AAPP
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b52382
> 9b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
>
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com
>
>
>
> CA Disig a.s.
>
>
>
> Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk 
>
>
>
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification
> Service
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294
> de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
>
> OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1
>
>
>
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification
> Service
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1
> ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
>
> OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2
>
>
>
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df0
> 3a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
>
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1
>
>
>
> DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d8
> 7e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
>
> OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2
>
>
>
> certSIGN
>
>
>
> Email sent to off...@certsign.ro 
>
>
>
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN
> Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1
> b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
>
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro
>
>
>
> DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
>
> Example cert: https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d
>

Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy


On 2017-08-30 08:46, Adriano Santoni wrote:
 >>  - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs ( 
https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 / https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )


Those two are actually the same certificate; it's not clear to me why 
they appear twice on crt.sh


I didn't look if all the name constrains match, but they're at least in 
a different order.



Kurt
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-30 Thread Adriano Santoni via dev-security-policy

>>  - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs ( 
https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 / https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )


Those two are actually the same certificate; it's not clear to me why 
they appear twice on crt.sh



Il 29/08/2017 18:50, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy ha scritto:

On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

Symantec / GeoTrust

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=IT, O=UniCredit S.p.A., CN=UniCredit Subordinate External
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=049462100743d2bcb10780e7c4eb2c
e1197a3f8bea7fad5ef9141f008eb1e6ca
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.unicredit.eu/ocsp


Note: There are 7 associated certificates for this CA (
https://crt.sh/?caid=294 )

Of those:
5 are issued by Symantec / GeoTrust:
   - 1 is expired ( https://crt.sh/?id=9219 )
   - 4 are revoked ( https://crt.sh/?id=12722071 / https://crt.sh/?id=6941850
/ https://crt.sh/?id=47086214 / https://crt.sh/?id=12165934)
2 are issued by Actalis
   - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs ( https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 /
https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )

As they are technically-constrained subordinate CAs, they are (presently)
exempted from that MUST requirement.
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smime.p7s
Description: Firma crittografica S/MIME
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy

This CA is technically constrained:

 

DN: C=CH, L=Zurich, O=ABB, CN=ABB Issuing CA 6

 

 

From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 6:48 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

 

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking 
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 
August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained in 
line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD" status for such 
certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the DigiNotar incident 
as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

 

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP 
request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial 
is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

 

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:

 

AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

 

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

 

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA, 
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee  

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

 

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

 

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com  

 

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com 
 , L=C/ Muntaner 244 Barcelona, OU=Consulte 
http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de Certificacion 
Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068, CN=AC 
Firmaprofesional - CA1

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la 
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional - AAPP

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

CA Disig a.s.

 

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk  

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2

OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417

OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947

OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341

OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

 

certSIGN

 

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro  

 

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN 
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

 

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

 

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

 

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

 

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio ECV-2, 
OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions Locals de 
Catalunya, CN=EC-AL

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.catcert.net

 

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona,

Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread Policy Authority PKIoverheid via dev-security-policy

> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
> 
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com

Hi Paul,

Thanks for bringing this to our attention! We will look into it asap.

Regards,
Mark Janssen
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread identrust--- via dev-security-policy

On Tuesday, August 29, 2017 at 12:51:05 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> > Symantec / GeoTrust
> >
> > CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
> >
> > DN: C=IT, O=UniCredit S.p.A., CN=UniCredit Subordinate External
> > Example cert:
> > https://crt.sh/?q=049462100743d2bcb10780e7c4eb2c
> > e1197a3f8bea7fad5ef9141f008eb1e6ca
> > OCSP URI: http://ocsp.unicredit.eu/ocsp
> 
> 
> Note: There are 7 associated certificates for this CA (
> https://crt.sh/?caid=294 )
> 
> Of those:
> 5 are issued by Symantec / GeoTrust:
>   - 1 is expired ( https://crt.sh/?id=9219 )
>   - 4 are revoked ( https://crt.sh/?id=12722071 / https://crt.sh/?id=6941850
> / https://crt.sh/?id=47086214 / https://crt.sh/?id=12165934)
> 2 are issued by Actalis
>   - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs ( https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 /
> https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )
> 
> As they are technically-constrained subordinate CAs, they are (presently)
> exempted from that MUST requirement.

IdenTrust acknowledge this post and will begin reviewing.
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Re: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy

On Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> Symantec / GeoTrust
>
> CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.
>
> DN: C=IT, O=UniCredit S.p.A., CN=UniCredit Subordinate External
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=049462100743d2bcb10780e7c4eb2c
> e1197a3f8bea7fad5ef9141f008eb1e6ca
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp.unicredit.eu/ocsp


Note: There are 7 associated certificates for this CA (
https://crt.sh/?caid=294 )

Of those:
5 are issued by Symantec / GeoTrust:
  - 1 is expired ( https://crt.sh/?id=9219 )
  - 4 are revoked ( https://crt.sh/?id=12722071 / https://crt.sh/?id=6941850
/ https://crt.sh/?id=47086214 / https://crt.sh/?id=12165934)
2 are issued by Actalis
  - 2 are technically constrained sub-CAs ( https://crt.sh/?id=147626411 /
https://crt.sh/?id=47081615 )

As they are technically-constrained subordinate CAs, they are (presently)
exempted from that MUST requirement.
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RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy

This CA only issues client certificates:

 

DN: CN=Cartão de Cidadão 001, OU=ECEstado, O=SCEE - Sistema de Certificação 
Electrónica do Estado, C=PT

 

 

Ben Wilson, JD, CISA, CISSP

VP Compliance

+1 801 701 9678



 

From: Paul Kehrer [mailto:paul.l.keh...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 6:48 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

 

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking 
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective 1 
August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically Constrained in 
line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD" status for such 
certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of the DigiNotar incident 
as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware of all issuances in its 
infrastructure and has been a requirement for over 4 years now.

 

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer name 
hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an OCSP 
request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef". This serial 
is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

 

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they 
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but are 
embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots in the 
Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put notes about 
whether they've been contacted:

 

AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

 

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

 

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA, 
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee  

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

 

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

 

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com  

 

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com 
 , L=C/ Muntaner 244 Barcelona, OU=Consulte 
http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de Certificacion 
Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068, CN=AC 
Firmaprofesional - CA1

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la 
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional - AAPP

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

 

CA Disig a.s.

 

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk  

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2

OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417

OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947

OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

 

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341

OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

 

certSIGN

 

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro  

 

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN 
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

 

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c

OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

 

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

 

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

 

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge de 
la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio ECV-2, 
OU=Vegeu https://www.catcert.net/verCIC-2  (c)03, OU=Administracions Locals de 
Catalunya, CN=EC-AL

Example cert: 
https://crt.sh/?q=88f6298c5a8cc66cefb8ea214a528c3efce36a26213fe4fd260613967d39e7d4

OCSP URI:

RE: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

2017-08-29 Thread Stephen Davidson via dev-security-policy

Hello:

Many thanks.  The CA listed for Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid 
(Logius) is operated by KPN Corporate Market not QuoVadis.  We will pass on the 
information to PKIoverheid.

Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
Email sent to supp...@quovadisglobal.com
DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
Organisatie CA - G2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com

Kind regards, Stephen Davidson



From: dev-security-policy 
[dev-security-policy-bounces+s.davidson=quovadisglobal@lists.mozilla.org] 
on behalf of Paul Kehrer via dev-security-policy 
[dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org]
Sent: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 10:41 AM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Violations of Baseline Requirements 4.9.10

I've recently completed a scan of OCSP responders with a focus on checking
whether they are compliant with BR section 4.9.10's requirement: "Effective
1 August 2013, OCSP responders for CAs which are not Technically
Constrained in line with Section 7.1.5 MUST NOT respond with a "GOOD"
status for such certificates." This rule was put in place in the wake of
the DigiNotar incident as an additional method of ensuring the CA is aware
of all issuances in its infrastructure and has been a requirement for over
4 years now.

The scan was performed by taking the list of responders (and valid issuer
name hash/issuer key hashes) that Andrew Ayer has aggregated and making an
OCSP request for the serial number "0xdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef".
This serial is extremely unlikely to have been issued legitimately.

The following OCSP responders appear to be non-compliant with the BRs (they
respond GOOD and are not listed as technically constrained by crt.sh) but
are embedded in certificates issued in paths that chain up to trusted roots
in the Mozilla store. I have grouped them by owner where possible and put
notes about whether they've been contacted:

AS Sertifitseerimiskeskuse (SK)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=EE, O=AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, CN=EE Certification Centre Root CA,
emailAddress=p...@sk.ee
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=74d992d3910bcf7e34b8b5cd28f91eaeb4f41f3da6394d78b8c43672d43f4f0f
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.sk.ee/CA

Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional

Email sent to i...@firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=cd74198d4c23e4701dea579892321b9e4f47a08bd8374710b899aad1495a4b35
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, emailAddress=c...@firmaprofesional.com, L=C/ Muntaner 244
Barcelona, OU=Consulte http://www.firmaprofesional.com, OU=Jerarquia de
Certificacion Firmaprofesional, O=Firmaprofesional S.A. NIF A-62634068,
CN=AC Firmaprofesional - CA1
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=649d5190f9fff58de60313c2f0598393f9dba05368b1dbfe93ec806015fb8796
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

DN: C=ES, O=Firmaprofesional SA, OU=Certificados Digitales para la
Administracion Publica, serialNumber=A62634068, CN=AC Firmaprofesional -
AAPP
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=d4ef928ee32c3838d40e5756b523829b1dafcd46fd84428ba03d59330a4ae5e7
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.firmaprofesional.com

CA Disig a.s.

Email sent to tspnot...@disig.sk

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R1I1 Certification Service
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=da74b18f3651bf90a8b2c07f8df294de19e441dcaa6913627261752199c302a2
OCSP URI: http://subcar1i1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar1i1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig R2I2 Certification Service
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=1a088e912ddb15a3b52ab1396af2a1ce0dcfab170e007e551f63231c76975417
OCSP URI: http://subcar2i2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/subcar2i2

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R1
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=e1abb0faeaa7312f2c3e041cbd2df03a507e346b9716442463ed61106aff6947
OCSP URI: http://rootcar1-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar1

DN: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=239ffa86d71033ba255914782057d87e8421aedd5910b786928b6a1248c3e341
OCSP URI: http://rootcar2-ocsp.disig.sk/ocsp/rootcar2

certSIGN

Email sent to off...@certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN Enterprise CA Class 3 G2, CN=certSIGN
Enterprise CA Class 3 G2
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=98ab1983ae9f6a6116e5010e3ab2b1b0bf266fa205a140b1bc1d340ff4ff6355
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

DN: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA
Example cert:
https://crt.sh/?q=3003bf8853427c7b91023f7539853d987c58dc4e11bbe047d2a9305c01a6152c
OCSP URI: http://ocsp.certsign.ro

Consorci Administració Oberta de Catalunya (Consorci AOC, CATCert)

CCADB does not list an email address. Not CC'd.

DN: C=ES, O=Agencia Catalana de Certificacio (NIF Q-0801176-I), L=Passatge
de la Concepcio 11 08008 Barcelona, OU=Serveis Publics de Certificacio

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