Kyle Hamilton wrote:
(legitimate sites will never ask you to add an exception my ass.)
If we shorten the phrase to
Legitimate banks and stores will not ask you to do this
would you not agree that is true enough as far as the average non-expert
user need be concerned?
The furor seems to be
On 1/1/09 22:34, Gervase Markham wrote:
Ian G wrote:
2. In general, such a group will reject any proposal that appears to
favour one member against another; but they will accept any proposal
that requires the same amount of additional work, and increases the
power of the group. In other
On 2/1/09 09:16, Daniel Veditz wrote:
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
(legitimate sites will never ask you to add an exception my ass.)
If we shorten the phrase to
Legitimate banks and stores will not ask you to do this
would you not agree that is true enough as far as the average non-expert
user
Legitimate sites will never ask you for your credit card, national ID
number, or any other sensitive information after asking you to add an
exception.
-Kyle H
On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 12:16 AM, Daniel Veditz dved...@mozilla.com wrote:
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
(legitimate sites will never ask you to
A few amusing (lies, damned lies, and) statistics...
Small business accounts for slightly more than 50% of the US gross
domestic product (source:
http://www.smallbusinessnotes.com/aboutsb/rs299.html). There were, in
2005 (latest year for which statistics are available), 6 million small
employers
On 28-Dec-08, at 11:43 AM, patri...@certstar.com wrote:
I have a good friend who is working 24/7 and sometimes uses my PC whe
visiting. It is easy to forget to change username on Google groups,
but of course it was my mistake. Sorry about the confusion.
Hi Patricia,
As you have no doubt
On Dec 31 2008, 3:10 pm, Paul Hoffman phoff...@proper.com wrote:
I read that blog posting to mean that they were going to keep issuing certs
using MD5 signatures, but would use unpredictable sequence numbers like other
VeriSign CAs do. Someone can validate that by buying a new cert from
At 11:05 AM -0800 1/2/09, geoff.tol...@gmail.com wrote:
On Dec 31 2008, 3:10 pm, Paul Hoffman phoff...@proper.com wrote:
I read that blog posting to mean that they were going to keep issuing certs
using MD5 signatures, but would use unpredictable sequence numbers like
other VeriSign CAs do.
On 01/02/2009 06:55 PM, ro...@comodo.com:
That thread has a lot going on and I don't propose to try to
address it all. However, I will address your reading of our CPS in an
attempt to bring some degree of clarity.
If I correctly understood your referenced post, you asserted that:
1)
On 01/03/2009 05:38 AM, Eddy Nigg:
Before anybody else does, I prefer from posting it myself :-)
http://blog.phishme.com/2009/01/nobody-is-perfect/
http://schmoil.blogspot.com/2009/01/nobody-is-perfect.html
For the interested, StartCom is currently checking if I can release our
internal
On 03.01.2009 04:59, Eddy Nigg wrote:
The report is available from here: https://blog.startcom.org/?p=161
That's surely interesting, but the report does not contain any details
of interest.
It only says
The attack ... involved proxying ,intercepting all communication from
and to the
On Fri, Jan 2, 2009 at 6:17 PM, Nelson B Bolyard nel...@bolyard.me wrote:
There are some (few) users who have become aware of the advice that they
must check that the certificate belongs to the intended party, but they
still have no concept of a MITM attack, so they look at the subject name
in
On 01/03/2009 07:31 AM, Ben Bucksch:
On 03.01.2009 04:59, Eddy Nigg wrote:
The report is available from here: https://blog.startcom.org/?p=161
That's surely interesting, but the report does not contain any details
of interest.
It only says
The attack ... involved proxying ,intercepting all
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