Re: [DNSOP] Mitigation of name collisions

2016-10-03 Thread Danny McPherson
> > I realize that you, Warren, are virtuous and would not do anything bad with > all of the secrets people fling at your server, but given the reality of the > TLD ecosystem, how confident are you that nobody else running such a server > would? Precisely why they ought to be notified of thei

Re: [DNSOP] Mitigation of name collisions

2016-10-03 Thread Danny McPherson
> On Oct 3, 2016, at 6:31 PM, Warren Kumari wrote: > > ... and just for the record, much much more could have been determined > (and users better warned / informed) if the address handed out was a > server which displayed an error / links to more information[0], or if > the name-servers serving

Re: [DNSOP] Draft on censorship, and DNS

2014-11-08 Thread Danny McPherson
On 2014-11-07 09:39, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: There is an Internet-Draft "A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques" draft-hall-censorship-tech-00 which is on the agenda of the Security Area Open Meeting next week at IETF 91 Honolulu. I applaud the effort, I've reviewed the DNS part and I fi

Re: [DNSOP] call to work on edns-client-subnet

2014-05-09 Thread Danny McPherson
On May 8, 2014, at 12:43 PM, Suzanne Woolf wrote: > > Ah, sorry. Was trying to reflect what the discussion was saying, not impose > an “edict”. It seemed like a reasonable starting position. > > Do you disagree? If so I’ll hope you’ll say what you think on the subject…. Yes, I think I do disa

Re: [DNSOP] call to work on edns-client-subnet

2014-05-07 Thread Danny McPherson
On May 7, 2014, at 1:13 PM, Suzanne Woolf wrote: > This sounds to me like a) support for working on edns-client-subnet (and > possibly things like it in the future), with b) a resulting RFC as > "Informational". > > I've found this discussion very helpful in solidifying the thoughts Tim > al

[DNSOP] DNSSEC Operational Considerations

2010-01-22 Thread Danny McPherson
Does anyone have a decent reference to a document that outlines what operators should be considering WRT DNSSEC (e.g., >512B thing, allowing TCP, EDNS0 considerations, validating recursors deployment, any studies to projections of recursive load hits for RAM, CPU and transactions in various imp

Re: [DNSOP] trolls (Re: Reflectors are Evil was Re: Anycast was Re: Cache)

2008-09-03 Thread Danny McPherson
On Sep 3, 2008, at 3:19 PM, Dave CROCKER wrote: > > +1 > > The benefit of an open process is its ability to obtain unexpected > input that is > useful. > > The detriment is that it places an additional burden on everyone to > filter out > the noise. > > Failure to do that adds more noise. I a

Re: [DNSOP] Reflectors are Evil was Re: Anycast was Re: Cache poisoning on DNSSEC

2008-09-03 Thread Danny McPherson
On Sep 3, 2008, at 9:42 AM, Dean Anderson wrote: > > I choose to report on why this data is not credible and should not be > accepted by the DNSOP WG. I believe the WG has heard your position: "There has been no further discussion of these attacks since the two very small motivating attacks were

Re: [DNSOP] Reflectors are Evil was Re: Anycast was Re: Cache poisoning on DNSSEC

2008-09-03 Thread Danny McPherson
Dean, I'm not going to argue this point by point with you, I simply provided data points on what folks who do this as part of their day job have observed and reported. You can choose to accept this, or not. As for bots and C&Cs and what's done in practice today and what's not, well, I know a lit

Re: [DNSOP] Reflectors are Evil was Re: Anycast was Re: Cache poisoning on DNSSEC

2008-09-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On Sep 2, 2008, at 12:44 PM, Dean Anderson wrote: > > I find this hard to believe from three standpoints: > > 1) the expected number of open DNS recursors and their collective > bandwidth doesn't seem to be large enough to support a 40Gbps attack. Really? With trivial amplification vectors 20 lo

Re: [DNSOP] Reflectors are Evil was Re: Anycast was Re: Cache poisoning on DNSSEC

2008-09-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On Sep 2, 2008, at 9:47 AM, Joe Abley wrote: >> >> There is "usually" no harm to anyone from open resolvers. No one has >> reported any further attacks since this draft was conceived. > > That is not true. It's possible that the forums in which such attacks > are discussed are not available to you

Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: [rt.amsl.com #1387] AutoReply: submit new internet draft about Universal Resource Name Resolution

2008-02-02 Thread Danny McPherson
On Feb 2, 2008, at 4:59 AM, Lican Huang wrote: > Hi, > > Who can tell me why I got a response of a trouble tickect message > as following when I submit an Internet Draft to Internet- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ? AMS just finished transition of all IETF IT services, and it appear

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 7:42 PM, Mark Andrews wrote: As for the TSIG or SIG(0) recommendation, I'm not sure what the numbers are for client support today, but I suspect it's at best an negligible sample. Well all Windows XP/2003/Vista boxes can be configured to support TSIG, with

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 1:08 PM, John Kristoff wrote: Since this group can be a bit pedantic about terminology, what Danny is referencing is what I was specifically referring to as "resolvers". I totally made up those four categories for my purposes of describing some of the work we were doing as a

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 1:52 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: On Sun, Sep 30, 2007 at 10:32:39PM -0600, Danny McPherson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 51 lines which said: Section 4's reference to BCP 84, in part, creates a false sense of useful action on part of the opera

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-30 Thread Danny McPherson
I do support this document being published as BCP. A couple of minor comments: Section 4's reference to BCP 84, in part, creates a false sense of useful action on part of the operator, IMO (in addition, there's a typo; s/were/where/). In situations were more complex network setups are in pla