[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-03 Thread Sam Hartman
> "Stephane" == Stephane Bortzmeyer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Stephane> But suggesting ORNS (Open Recursive Name Servers) for Stephane> the solution to this issue is, indeed, a bad idea (do Stephane> note I did not say the N word), for the reasons Stephane> explained in draf

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-03 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Tue, Oct 02, 2007 at 12:40:31PM -0400, Sam Hartman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 17 lines which said: > I'd appreciate it if you took Paul's comments a lot more seriously > and looked at whether the dnsop view on this issue extends to other > parts of the ietf. To the extent that i

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-03 Thread Sam Hartman
> "Joao" == Joao Damas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Joao> It does indeed as Stephane pointed out. Opening up your Joao> resolver so you can server roaming users, without further Joao> protection, is, at best, naive. I'd appreciate it if you took Paul's comments a lot more seriousl

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Mark Andrews
> On Oct 1, 2007, at 7:42 PM, Mark Andrews wrote: > > > > >> As for the TSIG or SIG(0) recommendation, I'm not sure what > >> the numbers are for client support today, but I suspect it's at > >> best an negligible sample. > > > > Well all Windows XP/2003/Vista boxes can be configured to > >

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 7:42 PM, Mark Andrews wrote: As for the TSIG or SIG(0) recommendation, I'm not sure what the numbers are for client support today, but I suspect it's at best an negligible sample. Well all Windows XP/2003/Vista boxes can be configured to support TSIG, with

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Mark Andrews
> As for the TSIG or SIG(0) recommendation, I'm not sure what > the numbers are for client support today, but I suspect it's at > best an negligible sample. Well all Windows XP/2003/Vista boxes can be configured to support TSIG, with free software, if not natively. All Li

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 1:08 PM, John Kristoff wrote: Since this group can be a bit pedantic about terminology, what Danny is referencing is what I was specifically referring to as "resolvers". I totally made up those four categories for my purposes of describing some of the work we were doing as a

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread John Kristoff
On Mon, 1 Oct 2007 10:47:44 -0600 Danny McPherson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Perhaps expanding in the "Problem Description" section > would be beneficial. Something mentioning that Many > SOHO and broadband access devices provide some flavor > of name resolution services (e.g., there are 4 flav

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Danny McPherson
On Oct 1, 2007, at 1:52 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: On Sun, Sep 30, 2007 at 10:32:39PM -0600, Danny McPherson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 51 lines which said: Section 4's reference to BCP 84, in part, creates a false sense of useful action on part of the operator, This could

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-10-01 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Sun, Sep 30, 2007 at 10:32:39PM -0600, Danny McPherson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 51 lines which said: > Section 4's reference to BCP 84, in part, creates a false sense of > useful action on part of the operator, This could be said of all the parts of the I-D which mentions non-

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-30 Thread Danny McPherson
I do support this document being published as BCP. A couple of minor comments: Section 4's reference to BCP 84, in part, creates a false sense of useful action on part of the operator, IMO (in addition, there's a typo; s/were/where/). In situations were more complex network setups are in pla

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-29 Thread Ned Freed
On 28-Sep-2007, at 1136, Paul Hoffman wrote: > It is not "obvious", at least to some of the people I have spoken > with. It is also not obvious to VPN vendors; otherwise, they would > have easy-to-use settings to make it happen. I'm surprised by that comment. I'm not. As it happens I've

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Dean Anderson
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Dean Anderson wrote: > > > Maybe its not mentioned because its not a practical solution. But > > whatever the reason it isn't mentioned, a 25 million user VPN is not > > going to happen with 10/8. A comcast person recently complained

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Dean Anderson wrote: > Maybe its not mentioned because its not a practical solution. But > whatever the reason it isn't mentioned, a 25 million user VPN is not > going to happen with 10/8. A comcast person recently complained on PPML > that there wasn't enough RFC1918 space fo

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joe Abley
On 28-Sep-2007, at 1516, Dean Anderson wrote: Not widely supported in clients. Therefore, not a solution. In fact, it's quite feasible in operating systems which can run a local instance of (say) BIND9. It would be fair to say that installing and configuring BIND9 on an average laptop is

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Dean Anderson
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: > On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, > Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote > a message of 36 lines which said: > > > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely > > choose to provide recursive lookup to the publ

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 12:04 PM -0400 9/28/07, Joe Abley wrote: On 28-Sep-2007, at 1136, Paul Hoffman wrote: It is not "obvious", at least to some of the people I have spoken with. It is also not obvious to VPN vendors; otherwise, they would have easy-to-use settings to make it happen. I'm surprised by that com

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Joe Abley wrote: > I'm surprised by that comment. > > I think it's a common use case that organisations who deploy VPNs have split > DNS; that is, namespaces available through internal network resolvers that do > not appear in the global namespace. In my experience, it is norm

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Wouters
On Fri, 28 Sep 2007, Jaap Akkerhuis wrote: > There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming > users to trust locally-assigned DNS servers. > > Open recursive servers doesn't help in against man in the middle > attacks. If you want to avoid that use VPN's or (for DNS) T

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joe Abley
On 28-Sep-2007, at 1136, Paul Hoffman wrote: It is not "obvious", at least to some of the people I have spoken with. It is also not obvious to VPN vendors; otherwise, they would have easy-to-use settings to make it happen. I'm surprised by that comment. I think it's a common use case that

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 9:19 AM +0200 9/28/07, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 36 lines which said: > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, na

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Jaap Akkerhuis
There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming users to trust locally-assigned DNS servers. Open recursive servers doesn't help in against man in the middle attacks. If you want to avoid that use VPN's or (for DNS) TSIG. I seem to remember that the ID actually

Re: [DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Joao Damas
It does indeed as Stephane pointed out. Opening up your resolver so you can server roaming users, without further protection, is, at best, naive. Joao On 28 Sep 2007, at 12:15, Jaap Akkerhuis wrote: There are two major reasons for an organization to not want roaming users to tru

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread John C Klensin
--On Thursday, 27 September, 2007 18:45 -0700 Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The Security Considerations section for this document is much > too narrow. It ignores one of the main reasons that many > organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to > the public, namely for

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Paul Hoffman
The Security Considerations section for this document is much too narrow. It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, namely for their own roaming users. Without an open, known-good nameserver at a fixed address, roaming

[DNSOP] Re: Last Call: draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil (Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks) to BCP

2007-09-28 Thread Stephane Bortzmeyer
On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 06:45:55PM -0700, Paul Hoffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote a message of 36 lines which said: > It ignores one of the main reasons that many organizations purposely > choose to provide recursive lookup to the public, namely for their > own roaming users. No, it is *not* ig