Dear Forest,
Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots
before the election, and their trading of assets should be required
to be rational relative to these announced ratings?
I had this idea, too. But upon closer inspection, it is not quite easy
to define
As a newbie in this list, I have no preference about the best voting method.
I am aware that instinctively Condorcet criterion is desirable if consensus
does not exist, but approval or range can produce good results too.
However, based in Bucklin experiences in USA, I think that any method that
-
In case the folks on this list care about the integrity and accuracy
of the vote counts too. The decision this week is monumental and
could determine the fate of this country and the world.
9/3/2007
National Election Data Archive (NEDA)
Park City, UT
Friends,
The Voter Confidence and
I LIKE Condorcet for its easy to state ranking, while permitting voters to
state bullet and Approval desires conveniently.
This combination makes sense to me for:
In MANY elections there are only one or two front runners, and
little interest in remaining candidates - so bullet voting
Diego Renato: I think that any method that
violates later-no-harm (except asset voting) is likely to provide incentive
to bullet vote and became a costly version of plurality.
--REPLY:
careful.
1. It has sometimes been claimed, falsely, that IRV, because it enjoys
later no harm offers no
I was wondering, can someone can expliain to me how they how work? Also, can
someone explain what is the Smith and Schwartz sets are. and how do we
determine which? Thanks in advance.
_
Discover sweet stuff waiting for you at the
John,
Have a look at the links.
http://condorcet.org/
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Main_Page
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Smith_set
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Schwartz_set
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Schulze_method
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Ranked_Pairs
