Re: [Election-Methods] Bucklin

At 01:16 PM 12/9/2007, Jonathan Lundell wrote: >Approval fixes Florida 2000 nicely, though, only because Nader had no >serious chance of election, so a Nader voter wouldn't have hurt >Nader's chances (zero) by approving Gore as well. Right. In a two-party system, any possible difficulty for the v

Re: [Election-Methods] Bucklin

At 09:29 AM 12/9/2007, Diego Santos wrote: >2007/12/9, Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >Well, I consider almost any form of Bucklin more palatable than IRV, >and of course it is better than Plurality. > > >Bucklin is not so bad, but I still think that a better ranked method

Re: [Election-Methods] Bucklin

At 04:30 AM 12/9/2007, Jan Kok wrote: >On Dec 7, 2007 7:54 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > The case in Brown v. Smallwood was one where the result > > overturned by the court was clearly just, and the reversal -- a long > > time after the election -- was very poor public poli

Re: [Election-Methods] Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

On Dec 10, 2007, at 8:00 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: > Since A & C are tied, you cannot do any better than B. > > Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win. > > I do not like '>>' for Condorcet. '>>' seems like a useful shorthand to describe the "sincere preferences" of the voters here. It

Re: [Election-Methods] Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

Since A & C are tied, you cannot do any better than B. Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win. I do not like '>>' for Condorcet. On Mon, 10 Dec 2007 14:17:53 -0300 Diego Santos wrote: > Suppose this scenario: > > 46: A >> B > C > 5: B >> A > C > 5: B >> C > A > 44: C >> B > A > > B

Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

Hi, Diego Santos wrote: > 2007/12/3, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a >> few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote >> strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner >> could

[Election-Methods] RE : Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

Diego, --- Diego Santos <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Suppose this scenario: > > 46: A >> B > C > 5: B >> A > C > 5: B >> C > A > 44: C >> B > A > > B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters. In my opinion, if B is able to get fully 100% of the voters to give him a ranki

[Election-Methods] Is the Condorcet winner always the best?

Suppose this scenario: 46: A >> B > C 5: B >> A > C 5: B >> C > A 44: C >> B > A B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters. A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates with less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are used) of the mo

Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

2007/12/3, Steve Eppley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Perhaps I failed to emphasize, when I mentioned the withdrawal option a > few days ago, that it sharply reduces the incentive to vote > strategically? A candidate strategically raised over the sincere winner > could withdraw if necessary to elect th

Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

At 01:12 AM 12/5/2007, Juho wrote: >On Dec 5, 2007, at 5:24 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > >>If someone can buy a candidate's withdrawal, they could presumably >>also buy the candidate if the candidate wins, and the latter is >>actually more dangerous! > >Buying the withdrawal of a losing candidate