On Dec 10, 2007, at 8:00 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote: > Since A & C are tied, you cannot do any better than B. > > Get far enough away, and A or C will properly win. > > I do not like '>>' for Condorcet.
'>>' seems like a useful shorthand to describe the "sincere preferences" of the voters here. It's easy to accept that this profile: 46: A > B >> C 5: B >> A > C 5: B >> C > A 44: C > B >> A ...should choose B as a good compromise, with the A voters saying A is good, B OK, C very bad. But Diego's profile suggests to me that the A voters are saying something like A is good, B is bad, C is very bad. Not that they can express it in a normal linear ballot, just that we're being told a little more about their opinions. In my example, the effect of a later-no-harm voting rule is evident. In Diego's, a rule (such as STV) that elects A doesn't seem unreasonable to me. The problem is that with an ordinary linear ballot (no '>>'), we can't distinguish between the cases. Not that I'm arguing that we should employ '>>'; offhand, that strikes me as a complication to be avoided. > > > On Mon, 10 Dec 2007 14:17:53 -0300 Diego Santos wrote: >> Suppose this scenario: >> >> 46: A >> B > C >> 5: B >> A > C >> 5: B >> C > A >> 44: C >> B > A >> >> B beats A and C, but he is approved for only 10% of the voters. >> >> A possible patch is to avoid rank-only ballots and ignore candidates >> with less than 1/2 approval (or total score, if range ballots are >> used) >> of the most approved candidate. This simple rule also solves DH3 >> pathology. >> ________________________________ >> Diego Santos ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
