On Dec 21, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Jan Kok wrote:
I personally have voted on bylaws or platform issues at political
conventions, where I wanted to cast a weak vote rather than a strong
yes or no vote. The reason was that I had only a weak opinion, and
would have preferred to let those with strong
Hello,
--- Jan Kok [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
To restate the questions my own way: What do we _mean_ by best,
fairest, most democratic, etc. Is there some standard (criterion,
figure of merit) that we can all agree upon for evaluating and
comparing voting methods?
It appears that, so far,
Markus,
Thank you for your insight. I certainly agree with you that only the best
method should be used, but I would pose to you the question: Why is it that
the best method isn't used?
You and I (though not some others) would agree that the condorcet criterion
is the correct one when
Ian,
I think a big part of the reason that Condorcet methods aren't adopted is
that from the perspective of a party in power, it's clear how such methods
could undermine their ability to stay in power. IRV has some ability to
disregard weak candidates, that's all; if a party in power is sometimes
Ian,
I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to
comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an
election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative:
If no beats-all candidate exists, eliminate the plurality loser.
Like
A correction:
2007/12/22, Diego Santos [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Ian,
I do not understand your argument. Borda elimination is not so simple to
comprehend for all voters. If is not possible to use Schulze or MAM in an
election, perhaps pairwise sorted plurality would be a easy alternative:
If no
