Hi Greg,
--- En date de : Sam 11.10.08, Greg Nisbet [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I suggest Condorcet//Approval with ranking among
disapproved candidates
disallowed. Though apparently you are adamant about
Clone-Winner
compliance.
I merely said that of the methods I am aware of, Schulze,
Aaron,
I agree that not electing a voted CW is undesirable, and any method
that fails the Condorcet criterion needs to be justified by complying
with at least one desirable criterion that isn't compatible with Condorcet.
Low social utility (SU) Condorcet winners with little solid support and
1. the right way to compare election methods is Bayesian Regret (BR).
http://rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html
For a long time I thought this was only applicable for single-winner
voting methods.
However, I eventually saw how to do it for multiwinner methods also:
Chris Benham sent this to me. I think he meant to send it to the entire list;
I've made the same mistake.
Reply to follow.
--- On Sun, 10/12/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
To: EM
I'll attempt to organize the Range Voting vs Condorcet debate somewhat.
From what I can see, the following methods have been proposed/have some
argument defending them/are reasonably good representatives of the groups
being considered:
Range Voting:
There are two types of arguments against this
For the Intel Science Talent Search, Warren Smith and I are working on a
system to measure how representative the groups created by various
multiwinner electoral methods are. This shall be done by having the public
have opinions of various binary social issues and the candidates will have
stance
