Yes, this is as intuitive as it comes in terms of IRV strategy, but I
still find it ultimately counter-intuitive for the average voter.
Candidate C has a the second-most number of first choices, which
likely corresponds to the second-biggest campaign (second-most amount
of money, volunteers, name
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: You may say that parties, wanting to be re-elected, would
stay in center ...
I think parties are more inclined to keep one foot in the center while
stretching as far as they can toward the extreme with the other. That's
why we so often hear that the
Hi Greg,
--- En date de : Ven 21.11.08, Greg Dennis [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
A fair point. I don't see it in practice, though. In
the recent San
Francisco IRV elections, for example, there were three open
seats
(incumbents weren't running). Two of the seats saw 9
candidates
running, one
On Nov 21, 2008, at 11:00 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
Here's one IRV example with three strong candidates and where voters
do have some incentive to compromise.
45: ABC
10: BAC
15: BCA
30: CBA
We have one centrist candidate (B) between two others.
According to this poll it seems that B will be
Perhaps intuitiveness is a bit in the eyes of the beholder, but I'll
tell you the strategies I find intuitive:
- Burying a candidate with strong first choice support
- Bullet voting for a candidate with strong first choice support
- A compromise in which you switch your first choice vote to a
--- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Perhaps intuitiveness is a bit in the eyes of the beholder,
but I'll
tell you the strategies I find intuitive:
- Burying a candidate with strong first choice support
Yes. This is close to the case that I discussed.
I didn't assume strong
