Greg, you didn't actually say that IRV is good, you just said that it's
unlikely to be bad.
Huh? One reason I think it's good in part because it's very likely to
elect elect the Condorcet candidate, if that's what you mean by
unlikely to be bad. Some other reasons I think it's good is that it
Jonathan Lundell writes:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 8:45 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
What Approval sincerely represents from a voter is a
*decision* as to where to place an Approval cutoff.
But is it not true that what
On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:53 AM, Greg wrote:
Greg, you didn't actually say that IRV is good, you just said that
it's
unlikely to be bad.
Huh? One reason I think it's good in part because it's very likely to
elect elect the Condorcet candidate, if that's what you mean by
unlikely to be bad. Some
At 04:29 PM 11/25/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 1:19 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Or are only IRV supporters allowed to use polling data
to show the greatness of IRV, while advocates of other
methods have to use complete ballot data?
I think we must be careful about using
Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Kristofer
re: You may say that parties, wanting to be re-elected, would
stay in center ...
I think parties are more inclined to keep one foot in the center while
stretching as far as they can toward the extreme with the other. That's
why we so often
On Nov 26, 2008, at 8:30 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Personally, I don't think that any available single-winner method,
IRV
not excepted, is particularly great, though I prefer ranked-ordinal
methods to FPTP or TTR.
It's almost certainly true that TTR has generally better results
than
It seems that voting method Approval has cut its
ties to English term approval (at least at the EM
list).
In ranking based methods EM people seem to assume
that voters have some easy to identify transitive
order of the candidates in their mind (=sincere
opinion).
I find it revealing that there
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] a
écrit :
If IRV does elect the true Condorcet winner in all
realistic elections (as opposed to the CW according to
strategic ballots), and the Australian two-party (two and a
third?)
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
Unmanipulable Majority.
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
context.
I think it would be better not to
- Yes, I agree with most of this
- Voters should be made aware of the different approaches so that they can use
the intended one (or the one that suits them better)
- Computerized methods could add something (e.g. more sincere input data,
possibility of loops in the strategy changes) to the
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wednesday, 26 November, 2008, 7:53 PM
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi
On Nov 26, 2008, at 1:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Jonathan Lundell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing
*wrong* with voting insincerely (or, equivalently,
strategically), in this sense; a voter has a right to do
their best to achieve an optimum result in a particular
A good summary. If we only cared about the easy ones Plurality would be
good enough.
DWK
On Wed, 26 Nov 2008 08:43:42 -0500 Brian Olson wrote:
On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:53 AM, Greg wrote:
Oh, and actually it _is_ likely to be bad. See that first graph? See how
over thousands of simulated
To Greg Dennis:
I appreciate your efforts to express your arguments clearly and defend
them with good data. Nevertheless, I find them mostly unpersuasive.
You say in your latest post that IRV resists strategic voting and
Condorcet is susceptible to burial. But both of these beliefs have
That is incorrect. There have been tight (not easy) elections where
IRV chose the Condorcet winner. The recent Pierce County Executive and
Assessor-Recorder races are two examples.
Also, there's actually a decent amount of real world ranking data
available. IRV data from San Francisco,
Yes, one could use also some more neutral terms than
(in)sincere and manipulation (or falsify).
Terms like personal opinion based or personal
utility based would be quite neutral (but longer).
If one wants to replace also strategic one could
try something like optimized or tactically best.
(I'm
Topic is IRV vs Condorcet.
My point last time was that easy races are no challenge to either.
Now I concede that not all hard races are a challenge, but the few that IRV
has handled do not guarantee that it will do all well, considering the
opportunity for failure.
DWK
On Wed, 26 Nov 2008
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
It is also far from obvious to me that Approval
uniquely
requires a strategic decision.
In the EM discussions people seem to assume
that at least one should put the cutoff between
some leading candidates.
Greg,
When someone asks for examples of IRV not working well in practice, they are
usually protesting against
contrived examples of IRV's failures. Sure any method can be made to look
ridiculous by some unlikely
contrived scenario.
I used to sympathize with that point of view until I
--- On Thu, 27/11/08, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, 27 November, 2008, 3:25 AM
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.11.08, Juho Laatu
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