Hi,
I've replaced all the Microsoft Symbol fonts in the MAM website
(www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley) with Unicode to make the website
accessible to more people. Other web browsers besides Microsoft
Internet Explorer can now display the math and Greek symbols used in the
formal definitions,
Hi,
I think it's misleading to compare voting methods pseudo-empirically the
way Greg did below, because the positions on the issues that the
candidates will take (assuming they want to win) depend (in part) on the
voting method, and the decisions by potential candidates whether to run
Forest,
What nicer distribution can you think of..
Nice (and nicer) is a fuzzy emotional/aesthetic term that I might apply to
food, music, people etc.
but seems unscientific and out-of-place here (and I'm not sure exactly what
it's supposed to mean).
I can see that such a distribution is
At 03:13 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On another note, Abd says the only method that got better Bayesian
Regret scores than Range, among those Warren has tested, is Range +
top two runoff. To my knowledge, that's not true, as Warren says a
DSV variant of Range got better scores
At 06:25 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is
used by some methods to denote the candidates above are those I can
accept; those below, I really don't like. At least that's what I
understand, though some methods may
At 12:31 PM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Are there any other ways of defining a sincere and non-strategic
ratings ballot? Direct external reference of the sort I'd pay
amount Z to have X elected fails because of income differences and
the nonlinearity of money. Definitions based on
At 01:32 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Good point; you're quite right. My claim might be right in the context
of zero polling knowledge, but not otherwise.
Which is all the worse for Approval.
I responded to Mr. Bouricius. His example was misleading, in fact,
because the illogical
At 04:47 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Dec 2, 2008, at 1:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes. Preference can be determined, generally, rather easily, by one
of two methods. The first method is pairwise comparison. With a
series of pairwise comparisons, we can construct a rank
Regarding my proposed Unmanipulable Majority criterion:
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted above B on more
than half the ballots, then it must not be possible to make
-Original Message- From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 07:19 PM 12/1/2008, Paul Kislanko wrote:
PS. This is what I don't like about approval. In my generalized
voter-friendly ballot, Approval requires me to vote A=B=C=D... when I
really
like A a lot better than the others. But that method
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20081203/
Tight population grouping at the left moving to widely spread on the
right.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
(Sent from my iPhone)
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
At 06:25 PM 11/26/2008, Ralph Suter wrote:
To Greg Dennis:
I appreciate your efforts to express your arguments clearly and
defend them with good data. Nevertheless, I find them mostly unpersuasive.
Yes, we noticed. That they were unpersuasive. That Mr. Suter comments
on this is significant,
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 10:52 PM
The tragedy is that IRV is
replacing Top Two Runoff, an older reform that actually works better
than IRV.
I have seen statements like this quite a few times, and they puzzle me. I can
see the benefit in TTRO in knowing
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