Re: [EM] A new simulation

Hi Adb ul-Rahman, still, Asset Voting is majoritarian and therefore not democratic. The reason why we have been studying methods with chance components (that is, non-deterministic methods) is that we wanted to find a democratic method, i.e. one that does not give any subset of the voters (no

[EM] Unmanipulable Majority strategy criterion

Kristofer, You wrote addressing me: You have some examples showing that RP/Schulze/etc fail the criterion. By my lazy etc. I just meant  'and the other Condorcet methods that are all equivalent to MinMax when there are just 3 candidates and Smith//Minmax when there are not more than 3 candidates

Re: [EM] The path to election reform, was Re:

Hello, --- En date de : Jeu 4.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Ok, so sincerity doesn't matter. It's a red herring, it's something not to be dwelled upon. My, my, is this an appeal to the common meaning of sincerity? After all we've done to point out the technical

Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 1

Hi, I will have to try to keep my responses briefer as I am short on time. --- En date de : Jeu 4.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : De: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] Objet: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 1 À: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL

Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet

--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Alright. You may like Minmax for being Minmax, and that's okay; but in my case, I'm not sure if it would withstand strategy (there's that hard to estimate the amount of strategy that will happen again), and the Minmax

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

--- On Fri, 5/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: One approach to sincerity is to compare voter behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the request is to mark all candidates that one approves then placing the cutoff between two main candidates is