Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two, why have Approval in the first place?). You support A B C. If A is

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

2009-01-23 Thread Michael Allan
Juho Laatu wrote: Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual discussion better. My aim with this discussion is to study if one can combine that with the good old privacy / secret vote principles. The most significant combo (I think) is that of the existing general electoral systems of the state

Re: [EM] Generalizing manipulability

2009-01-23 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Juho Laatu wrote: I try to summarize my comments in the form of some rough definitions. A simple method requires 1) a 'simple' method to convert honest preferences into optimal votes A zero-info method requires 2) this method may not use info about other voters, but still be able to convert

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

2009-01-23 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Juho Laatu wrote: d) voting on laws, too I read this as allowing individual voters to vote directly too, without any proxies between them and the decisions (on laws and on anything). Quite OK but I have some concerns on what will happen in the tax raise questions. It is possible that the

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

2009-01-23 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 09:51 AM 1/23/2009, Jobst Heitzig wrote: I did not mean to say the voter has no opinion. He may well hold the opinion that, say, A is much better than B in some respect, and B is much better than A in another respect, so that neither is A preferable to B nor B to A nor are they equivalent

Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?

2009-01-23 Thread Chris Benham
Kevin, I can't see what's so highly absurd about failing mono-append. It's basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that doesn't seem especially more important. Is it absurd to fail mono-raise? The absurdity of failing mono-append is compounded by the cheapness of meeting it. As with

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 06:47 AM 1/23/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I'll say again: if there are more than two viable parties, the this could happen. If there will be only two viable parties, why use Approval? You've missed something crucial: Approval is being proposed for public partisan elections where

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

2009-01-23 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 10:22:13 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual discussion better. My aim with this discussion is to study if one can combine that with the good old privacy / secret vote principles. The most significant combo (I think) is that

Re: [EM] Simple illustration of center-squeeze effect in runoff voting

2009-01-23 Thread Dave Ketchum
On Fri, 23 Jan 2009 12:47:53 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:41 AM 1/21/2009, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: My usual argument against Approval (in favor of something more complex) is this: Say there are three viable parties (if there will be only two,