Juho Laatu wrote: > Yes, it is good to facilitate mutual > discussion better. My aim with this > discussion is to study if one can > combine that with the good old > privacy / secret vote principles.
The most significant combo (I think) is that of the existing general electoral systems of the state (private/secret ballot), and the new primary system of the public sphere (public/open ballot). There's a synergy between them - both together are better than either would be alone. Likewise for state legislative voting (closed, inaccessible) and public voting on norms (open, accessible) - synergy there too. So we rationalize society's voting systems. > > But can private voting fit in the public sphere? There are at > > least two practical problems: i) Given the protections of free > > speech, there is no way to generally enforce a secret ballot.... > I see three alternative approaches > (for each individual voter) here. > > 1) The vote is forced secret. The > voter can tell how she voted > (=freedom of speech). But she can > not prove to the coercer or buyer > how she voted. > > 2) The voter can choose if her vote > is public or secret. She can also > tell what her secret vote was. > > 3) The vote is public. > > What I mean is that also enforced > secrecy and free speech can be > combined. Not in the public sphere - neither (1) nor (3) is enforceable - only (2) is allowed. It is the nature of the public sphere, and part of the legitimacy it confers on the process. More on that later... > I think current systems rely on > private voting and public discussion > (although different than the proxy > based discussion). It may be possible > to enrich this with better mutual > discussion / delegable voting rights > without sacrificing secret votes / > privacy. Yes, it might be *possible*, but I think it would be difficult in practice (and not ideal in principle) to do so within a *single* voting system. The most rational design is separate, special purpose systems (primary and general) that work together. > I don't see the need of a > representative / proxy to know who > her voters exactly are to be crucial. > In some aspect it is better that she > doesn't know (no vote buying, > services to those that voted, no hard > feelings against those that this time > voted someone else etc.). > > The (secret) voters on the other hand > will get more power when they can let > several representatives / proxies > understand that they got or may get > the vote :-). All of this is easier, more natural, if agreement (voter for candidate/delegate) is *actually* expressed. Then it's more human. We weren't *built* to deal with the strange paradox of private expression (collective mass opinion). There's no natural correlate for it. > Yes. Having a rich hierarchical > discussion structure is one key > benefit of the proxy structure. > (Also secret voters may participate. > Some of the proxies are low level > and nearby in any case.) Yes, and there *will* be secret voters in the public primaries. We cannot disallow secret ballots, and enforce purity. Nor would it even be ideal - some allowance for extreme situations is better. But hopefully there will not be *too* many private voters, as they will not be able to participate properly (more on this later). > > > Yes, continuous talk may improve the > discussion. > > This topic has however also the other > side. One reason behind terms of few > years is that this way the > representatives will have some time > to work in peace. Continuous voting > may also make the system more > populist (no tax raises ever since > all those representatives might be > kicked out right away, without the > calming period before the next > elections). There is no direct action as a consequence of primary results. The public cannot *force* anything. All power remains with the administration, the general electoral systems (non-continuous), and the legislative assembly (inaccessible to public). But those systems are *informed* by the public system, and this can amount to effective control. It sounds paradoxical, because we've separated control from power, but it's actually the rational thing to do. In engineering theory, the control/guidance systems and the power systems are kept well separate from each other, and their designs are radically different. The pilot in the cockpit does not reach his hands into the engine turbines, or forcefully move the elevator, ailerons, and rudder. The cockpit is fitted with low power instruments and controls, at a safe distance from the engines etc. > It is possible to have also some > hysteresis in the system. This allows > for example short protests by the > voters and allowing them to still > change their mind before the > representative will be kicked out. > In some systems and at some levels > it however may not matter if the > representatives / proxies change > frequently. Hysteresis and other decoupling is provided by the separation of the two types of voting system - the system of public controls (as it were) and the system of administrative power. More in reply to your other message... -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info