Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

OK. Then the model is one where the voters may have various opinions on various matters but that doesn't necessarily mean that they would have a complete ordering of the candidates. I can imagine that I could have e.g. cyclic opinions on food when there are three alternatives and three properties

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote: I think current systems rely on private voting and public discussion (although different than the proxy based discussion). It may be possible to enrich this with better mutual discussion / delegable voting rights without

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote: with these counter-features: a) continuous results, with shifting votes Maybe mostly positive, but also something negative. Hopefully the negative parts are corrected in the synergy with the government's voting

Re: [EM] Generalizing manipulability

--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: I try to summarize my comments in the form of some rough definitions. A simple method requires 1) a 'simple' method to convert honest preferences into optimal votes A zero-info method

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

--- On Fri, 23/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: d) voting on laws, too I read this as allowing individual voters to vote directly too, without any proxies between them and the decisions (on laws and on anything). Quite OK but I have

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

Juho Laatu wrote: OK. Then the model is one where the voters may have various opinions on various matters but that doesn't necessarily mean that they would have a complete ordering of the candidates. I can imagine that I could have e.g. cyclic opinions on food when there are three alternatives

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

Juho Laatu wrote: I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2) The voter can choose if her vote is public or secret.

Re: [EM] Beatpath GMC compliance a mistaken standard?

Hi Chris, --- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit : I can't see what's so highly absurd about failing mono-append. It's basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that doesn't seem especially more important. Is it absurd to fail mono-raise? The

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: What I mean is that it may quite OK to assume that people are able to find some preference order when voting. And therefore we can force them to do so. If we regard the preference order as list of contingent choices (this view has come up in

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: What I mean is that it may quite OK to assume that people are able to find some preference order when voting. And therefore we can force them to do so. How can any such coercion be compatible with participation in a democracy? It is

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

On Jan 25, 2009, at 3:50 PM, James Gilmour wrote: Jonathan Lundell Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2009 10:21 PM If we regard the preference order as list of contingent choices (this view has come up in IRV discussions), then the ability to vote in a plurality election implies the ability to

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

Jonathan Lundell wrote: ... if a voter can pick a favorite (as required for plurality), then a voter can build an ordered list. Only if abstention is an option beginning at any iteration. In other words, the voter has to have the option of saying, I will stay home rather than vote for any

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

On Jan 25, 2009, at 4:18 PM, Bob Richard wrote: Jonathan Lundell wrote: ... if a voter can pick a favorite (as required for plurality), then a voter can build an ordered list. Only if abstention is an option beginning at any iteration. In other words, the voter has to have the option of

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

--- On Mon, 26/1/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote: On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: What I mean is that it may quite OK to assume that people are able to find some preference order when voting. And therefore we can force them to do so. If we regard the

Re: [EM] Why the concept of sincere votes in Range is flawed.

--- On Mon, 26/1/09, James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk wrote: On Jan 25, 2009, at 12:40 AM, Juho Laatu wrote: What I mean is that it may quite OK to assume that people are able to find some preference order when voting. And therefore we can force them to do so. How can

Re: [EM] The structuring of power and the composition of norms by communicative assent

On Sun, 25 Jan 2009 13:19:13 -0500 Michael Allan wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: I see three alternative approaches (for each individual voter) here. 1) The vote is forced secret. The voter can tell how she voted (=freedom of speech). But she can not prove to the coercer or buyer how she voted. 2)