Hallo,
this problem had already been mentioned here:
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.politics.election-methods/10991
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Jun 30, 2009, at 10:44 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
One can infer a plurality ballot from any kind of ranked ballot, but
not the
other way around.
One can infer an approval ballot from any kind of ranked ballot that
allows
equal ranks, but not the other way around.
Except for strategic
Yes, as usual I wasn't very clear. The way that SHOULD have been worded is:
One can use plurality to count any kind of ranked ballots, but only
plurality to count plurality ballots.
One can use approval to count any kind of ranked ballots that allow equal
rankings, but only approval to count
Paul Kislanko wrote:
... avoids the whole strategy discussion. If I'm asked to fill out
a ranked ballot without knowing how it will be counted, I can't
strategically vote insincerely.
I would say that I can't vote at all and would probably boycott the election.
It's more a technique for
Jameson,
Sorry to be so tardy in replying.
That is not a bad suggestion; I like both systems. Yours gives less of a
motivation for
honest rating: In most cases, it makes A100 B99 C0 equivalent to A100 B51 C0.
No, mine gives more motivation for honest rating (in the sense that it gives
less
Now it is July 1 and I have responses from kisla...@airmail.net, jlund...@pobox.com
, Markus Schulze.
Merging is possible, provided each state provides and describes data
suitable for this purpose, such as:
Condorcet X*X array. Because of possibility of extra candidates
from some
