On Nov 9, 2009, at 11:48 PM, Matthew Welland wrote:
Approval
Does not meet the desire of some to be able to differentiate
between I like, I like a lot etc. (note: this seems like
perfectionism to me. Large numbers of voters and opinions all over
the bell curve should make individual
Matthew Welland wrote:
So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval? I'm
not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect results. I'm
interested in flaws that result in big problems such as those we see
with plurality and IRV.
IMHO, it is that you need
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one or two sentences.
Well, here's a very simple Condorcet system which can easily be
explained in two
Dear Robert,
you wrote:
Round Robin tournament, Ranked Ballot: The contestant who wins in a
single match is the candidate who is preferred over the other in more
ballots. The candidate who is elected to office is the contestant who
loses to no one in the round robin tournament.
that's
This method is also quite hand countable (unlike many other Condorcet
methods). That was certainly an important feature in those days :-).
It has some randomness in the results (when no Condorcet winner exists).
Here's another one. Elect the candidate that wins all others in
pairwise
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 10:37 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
IMHO, it is that you need concurrent polling in order to consistently elect
a good winner. If you don't have polling and thus don't know where to put
the cutoff (between approve and not-approve), you'll face
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:37:56 am Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Matthew Welland wrote:
So, to re-frame my question. What is the fatal flaw with approval? I'm
not interested in subtle flaws that result in imperfect results. I'm
interested in flaws that result in big problems such as
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Trying some fresh thinking for Condorcet, and what anyone should be able
to see in the X*X array. I am ignoring labels such as Schulze and
Ranked Pairs - this is human-doable and minimal effort - especially with
normally having a CW and most cycles having the minimal three
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one or two sentences.
Well, here's a very simple
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Warren,
I don't seem to understand the definition:
A single-winner voting system fails the NESD property if, when every
honest voter
changes their vote to rank A top and B bottom (or B top and A bottom;
depends on the voter which way she goes), leaving it otherwise
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Kristofer,
both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority
can always get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting.
So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which
*democratic* method (that does not allow any
On Nov 10, 2009, at 5:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Warren,
I don't seem to understand the definition:
A single-winner voting system fails the NESD property if, when every
honest voter
changes their vote to rank A top and B bottom (or B top and A bottom;
Let me clarify my thinking a bit (I hope) behind NESD and NESD*.
NESD stands for Naive Exaggeration Strategy == Duopoly.
NES means the voter strategy of
1) identify the top two candidates most likely to win.
2) Exaggerate your (otherwise honest) vote to rank one top
and the other bottom. (With
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Matthew Welland wrote:
On Tuesday 10 November 2009 03:57:34 am you wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
Suite of complicated systems that strive to reach Condorcet
ideals.
1. No regular bloke would ever trust 'em because you can't explain
how they work in one
Hello Kristofer,
you wrote:
However, my point was that Range goes further: a minority that acts
in a certain way can get what it wants, too; all that's required is that
the majority does not vote Approval style (either max or min) and that
the minority does, and that the minority is not too
Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
you wrote:
You could probably devise a whole class of SEC-type methods. They would
go: if there is a consensus (defined in some fashion), then it wins -
otherwise, a nondeterministic strategy-free method is used to pick the
winner. The advantage of yours
What I wrote last time is about as simple as you get. Canceling the
smallest margin cancels a three-member cycle, leaving the strongest
member as CW. Could take more canceling for more complex, and thus
rarer, cycles.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:11 PM, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
Assume (for the sake of simplicity) that we can get ranked information
from the voters. What difference would a SEC with Random Pair make, with
respect to Random Ballot?
This sounds interesting, but what
Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 8:11 PM, Jobst Heitzig heitzi...@web.de wrote:
Hello Kristofer,
Assume (for the sake of simplicity) that we can get ranked information
from the voters. What difference would a SEC with Random Pair make, with
respect to Random Ballot?
This sounds
On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
In the context of SEC, it would be:
Voter submits two ballots - one is ranked and the other is a Plurality
ballot. Call the first the fallback ballot, and the second the consensus
ballot.
If everybody (or
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