Re: [EM] Multipile Transferable Votes

2009-11-25 Thread Raph Frank
On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 4:12 AM, Stephen H. Sosnick shsosn...@ucdavis.edu wrote: If your here refers to Meek's method (or, for that matter, to any other version of STV), then see Appendix 1 and/or read the paragraph in which I said the following: I was wondering about the whole principle.

[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

2009-11-25 Thread Chris Benham
Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009): Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate  the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset  voting, i might call it commodity voting: your vote is a  commodity that you transfer according to your

Re: [EM] IRV is best method meeting 'later no harm'?

2009-11-25 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Warren Smith wrote: Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the 'later no harm' criterion? Woodall's Descending Solid Coalitions method does. Minmax(pairwise opposition) also does, but it has an awful Plurality failure: 1000: A 1:A=C 1:B=C 1000: B and C wins in

Re: [EM] IRV is best method meeting 'later no harm'?

2009-11-25 Thread Jonathan Lundell
On Nov 25, 2009, at 11:41 AM, Warren Smith wrote: Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the 'later no harm' criterion? Plurality (trivially). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

2009-11-25 Thread robert bristow-johnson
On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:05 AM, Chris Benham wrote: Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009): Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV (asset voting, i might call it commodity voting: your vote is a

Re: [EM] Is there a PR voting method obeying participation criterion?

2009-11-25 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 11:21 AM 11/18/2009, Terry Bouricius wrote: Abd wrote snip Under Robert's Rules, if a voter writes something on a ballot, the voter has voted, and the vote is counted in the basis for majority, snip This is not necessarily correct. Bouricius raises a doubt, but does not impeach the

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

2009-11-25 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
robert bristow-johnson wrote: my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious about). where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is elected, is there still possible later harm? As far as I

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

2009-11-25 Thread robert bristow-johnson
On Nov 25, 2009, at 3:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: robert bristow-johnson wrote: my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious about). where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is

Re: [EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

2009-11-25 Thread Dave Ketchum
Trying to sort this out as to Condorcet and LNH: Seems that cycles are involved before, after, or both. And the voters change their votes, getting more affect on result than they might expect. So what, assuming the counters properly read the vote? I agree with those who expect cycles to

Re: [EM] Helping a candidate in the case of ties

2009-11-25 Thread Dave Ketchum
Of course, you have to read the voter's mind to know if the change might have been seen as desirable. I was into tactics. One thought I had was a base from which to think of more-or-less controllable changes: Start with equal size parties and all members doing bullet voting - result is a