Andy Jennings wrote:
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 12:03 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Andy Jennings wrote:
If you want a clustering PR method, then I would highly
recommend Monroe. In Monroe, the score of each slate is equal
to the sum of each voter's score of his a
When someone pointed out to Borda that his method led to strategic order
reversals, he replied that he
only intended it for honest voters. Unfortunately, that's only half the
problem; Borda is highly sensitive to
cloning:
Assume honest votes:
80 A>B
20 B>A
Candidate A wins by Borda and any
On Wed, Jul 27, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Forest,
>
> --- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a
> écrit :
> > Andy's chiastic method is a way of
> > utilizing range ballots that has a much more mild incentive
> > than
> > Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the
>
Er...
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> So the first one asks:
> 50% rated 3? 33.3% rated a 2+? 16.7% rated a 1+?
> four-slot ballot to mean 133.3%. So then I get:
> 66.7% rated 3? 50% rated 2? 33.3% rated 1+?
>
> I must not have this correct, because isn't the first test
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> Andy's chiastic method is a way of
> utilizing range ballots that has a much more mild incentive
> than
> Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the
> method in a class of methods each of which is based on a
> different
Hi,
The BPW (= "Beats Plurality Winner") method is a cyclebreaker proposed
by Eivind Stensholt that he found to be resistant to burial. When there
is a cycle among three candidates, you elect the one who defeats the
first preference winner. (It's unknown how to define the method for
more than thr
On 27.7.2011, at 22.50, Toby Pereira wrote:
> Very simple case - two voters and two candidates. Candidate A get scores of
> 0/10 and 10/10. Candidate B gets 5/10 and 5/10. Under normal range voting, it
> would be a draw. But to me, candidate B seems the much fairer choice.
Different choices and
Andy's chiastic method is a way of utilizing range ballots that has a much more
mild incentive than
Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the method in a class of methods
each of which is based on a
different increasing function f from the interval [0,1 ] into the same interval:
Elect t
Very simple case - two voters and two candidates. Candidate A get scores of
0/10
and 10/10. Candidate B gets 5/10 and 5/10. Under normal range voting, it would
be a draw. But to me, candidate B seems the much fairer choice. Although
there's
only a single winner, we can apply some PR thinking.
> Don't you mean "each candidate is joined to EITHER ZERO OR V*K/W voters"?
--I meant each WINNER is joined to exactly V*K/W voters.
However you are correct -- the way to do this is to use the complete
bipartite graph
on all voters (red) & candidates (blue) and demand each candidate be joined
to
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