David L Wetzell wrote:
On Sat, Nov 26, 2011 at 3:20 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com
mailto:wetze...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a bunch of responses
dlw: SL may be more proportional than LR Hare, but since I'm advocating
for the use of a mix of single-winner and multi-winner
We're still hitting the same disagreements. I say look at the others,
you say this time it'll be different, I say Condorcet IRV, you
say marketing differences are great while in practice, there's no
difference between Condorcet and IRV large enough to make a difference.
Thus, let me do some
On Fri, Dec 2, 2011 at 2:35 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
wrote:
David L Wetzell wrote:
On Sat, Nov 26, 2011 at 3:20 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.commailto:
wetze...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's a bunch of responses
dlw: SL may be more proportional than LR Hare,
The third rank in IRV3/AV3 is essentially only useful for turkey-raising.
For instance, imagine the 2000 election with two Nader clones,
Bush/Gore/Nader1/Nader2. Bush voters could vote BushNader2Nader1, and
possibly eliminate Gore from the IRV3 round. (Or with honest voting, Gore
could be
-- Forwarded message --
From: robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Thu, 01 Dec 2011 22:18:32 -0500
Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
On 12/1/11 5:14 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:If
From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 10:17:52 -0600
Subject: [EM] IRV3/AV3
The third rank in IRV3/AV3 is essentially only useful for turkey-raising.
For instance, imagine the 2000 election with two Nader clones,
On Fri, Dec 2, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
wrote:
We're still hitting the same disagreements. I say look at the others,
you say this time it'll be different, I say Condorcet IRV, you say
marketing differences are great while in practice, there's no difference
It's natural to look for a method based on the Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC).
I posted one about a week ago. It wasn't written right.
In this post, I propose a different wording of MMT. It's only slightly
different from my initial wording, modified to meet FBC. This new wording
is now what
In my alternative definition of voting x over y, in the first sentence, I
accidentally wrote
is when I meant if. Here is the posting written correctly:
Alternative definition of voting x over y:
You're voting x over y if switching the names of x and y on your ballot could
change the winner
David Wetzel said:
s for center-squeezing, that's not really a problem in the US as a
whole...
Third parties are too small and scattered.
[endquote]
Ok, so David is saying that IRV is adequate adequate only in a two-party system.
Mike Ossipoff
-- Forwarded message --
From: MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
To: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 2011 19:19:28 +
Subject: [EM] IRV's adequacy depends on a two-party system
David Wetzel said:
s for center-squeezing, that's not really a problem in the US as
There is a fundamental difference between two-party dominance, which will
probably not change any time soon, and a two-party duopoly. 45%, 40%, 8%,
5%... is dominance; 51% 47% 1%... is duopoly. Any system which gives bad
enough results when there are more than two parties will be a two party
Analysis Finds Incorrect Use of Ranked-Choice Voting
By SHANE SHIFFLETT
Published: December 2, 2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/us/analysis-finds-incorrect-use-of-ranked-choice-voting.html
The results are in: San Francisco voters have trouble with ranked-choice
elections.
Despite a
On Fri, Dec 2, 2011 at 2:49 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
There is a fundamental difference between two-party dominance, which will
probably not change any time soon, and a two-party duopoly. 45%, 40%, 8%,
5%... is dominance; 51% 47% 1%... is duopoly. Any system which gives
On 02 Dec 2011 13:05:04 -0800, David L. Wetzell wrote:
On Fri, Dec 2, 2011 at 2:49 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
There is a fundamental difference between two-party dominance, which will
probably not change any time soon, and a two-party duopoly. 45%, 40%, 8%,
-- Forwarded message --
From: Ralph Suter rlsu...@aol.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com, Range Voting
rangevot...@yahoogroups.com
Date: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 16:02:22 -0500
Subject: [EM] Analysis Finds Incorrect Use of Ranked-Choice Voting in San
Francisco
Here’s a method that seems to have the important properties that we have been
worrying about lately:
(1) For each ballot beta, construct two matrices M1 and M2:
In row X and column Y of matrix M1, enter a one if ballot beta rates X above Y
or if beta gives a top
rating to X.
Mike,
Someone said that IRV lets you vote more preferences than Approval
does. But what good
does that do, if it doesn't count them?
The term count here can be a bit vague and propagandistic. Also you
imply that it is always better to count preferences (no matter how)
than to not.
Also
It's no more crap than your cranky knee-jerk comments, which are clearly
based on your speculative (and therefore dubious) negative assumptions
about the intent of the article's author and the people who conducted
the university study. The article only briefly describes that study
(which runs
Just the subject line on this is the most amusing thing I've read on this list
in a while.
Well said, sir!
On Dec 2, 2011, at 2:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
David Wetzel said:
s for center-squeezing, that's not really a problem in the US as a
whole...
Third parties are too small and
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