[EM] Electoral experimentation

On 12/14/2011 12:59 PM, David L Wetzell wrote: if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support I

Re: [EM] Forest: MAMT

Chris and Mike, I think I finally have the right version which I will call MSAC for Majority Support Acquiescing Coalitions: Definitions: A coalition is a subset of the candidates. A ballot acquiesces to a coalition of candidates iff it rates no candidate outside the coalition higher than an

[EM] Chris: The alternative to mutual majority

Chris: Sure, the alternatives to majority that you used in your alternatives to MTA worked well in those methods, though it made the methods' definitions somewhat more complicated. So, in a similar way, it may well be that the alternative to a mutual majority set that you described will work

Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.

Like Andy I prefer SODA as well, especially for a deterministic method. In some settings I prefer certain stochastic methods to deterministic methods. But my curiosity impels me to see what can be done while ignoring or putting aside the advantages of both chance and delegation. Election

[EM] Egg or Chicken.

if we push hard for the use of American Proportional Representation it'll give third parties a better chance to win seats and they will prove great labs for experimentation with electoral reform. This is also a good reason to strategically support IRV, since we can trust that with changes, there'l

[EM] Forest: The example. Jameson: SODA

Forest: I find nothing wrong with electing C in the example below, unless someone can point out a strategy problem. 33 A 17A=C 17B=C 33 B Of course I also find nothing wrong with an A,B tie there either, as is given by some other good FBC/ABE methods, and by Approval. Either outcome seems per

[EM] Forest: I found an FBC failure for Minimal Aquiescing Majorities-Top

Forest-- Say it's like the ABE, except that there's one more candidate, D. In the ABE, you were an A voter, but now, with D in the election, you like D best, with A your 2nd choice. (Say all the A voters vote as you do) The B voters, while willing to middle-rate A for a majority coalition, w

Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.

Further responses to Andy's advantage list: 2011/12/14 Andy Jennings > Jameson, > > Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than > LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. > > In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: > > 1. The lazi

Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.

Thanks, Andy, for the SODA endorsement. I agree with the advantages you list, but I would add the avoidance of the chicken dilemma (that is, the lack of either a self-reinforcing truncation incentive or hard-to-defend "mindreading"results that give a burial incentive) as an important advantage. Com

Re: [EM] SODA might be the method we've been looking for.

Jameson, Believe me, I'm on board with SODA. I think I, too, like it better than LRV, but I'm still trying to get a handle on LRV to make sure. In my opinion (and my wording), SODA's advantages are: 1. The laziest possible voter, who just bullet votes for his favorite, is still casting a (nearl

[EM] Forest: MAMT

In my last post (13 Dec 2011) I wrote: A better method would (instead of "acquiescing majorities") use the set I just defined in my last post. *If there is a solid coalition of candidates S (as measured by the number of ballots on which those candidates are strictly voted above all others)