2012/1/2 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Mike wrote ..
MMPO with symmetric completion at bottom, while avoiding Kevin's
bad-example, also sometimes loses
MMPO's ABE-success:
60: AB
55: B
100: C
Forest replied
Here is the pairwise opposition matrix for MAMD:
[[155, 110, 87.5],
Chris:
You said:
Forest:
Why are your suggested grade options labelled A, C, F and not A, C, E?
[endquote]
Because that's the school letter-grading system in the U.S.
A,B,C,D,F
Why do we skip E? Probably because E can be construed to stand for
Excellent, and so F is used instead, to
I've seen examples in which Bucklin (with equal ratings) fails the
Participation criterion, AKA Woodall's mono-add-top criterion for
deterministic methods:
the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot,
where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an
existing
It depends on the tiebreaker used when there is are multiple majorities
at second level. If the tiebreaker is that the most second-level votes
wins, then I believe that the method meets participation. Otherwise, AB
votes can cause BA (instead of just A) to pass the second-level threshold
and
That's very interesting, Mike. I didn't know that three slot voting equipment
was already in place; I never
knew how exactly they handled ballot iniatives. All the more reason to narrow
down to the best three
slot methods!
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