Hi Fred,
Let's sum up. You propose an electoral process to correct the evils
of party politics. You hope that people somewhere will give it a try.
However, if they do, you cannot foresee any sequence of events by
which the promised benefits could be realized. Is that correct?
I'm not sure
I don't know which name would be better.
First, some background:
The trouble with rank methods, and with all of the defection-resistant
methods (so far as I'm aware), is that they're too labor-intensive for
a count-fraud-secure handcount. Additionally, rankings can be counted
in innumerable
But Approval has been criticized for the co-operation/defection
problem. In fact, that problem is the subject of the Approval
bad-example that I've discussed at EM.
That problem can happen, but Forest Simmons proposed an excellent
solution to it. Forest suggested what I call strategic
Jameson:
The idea is to give to B just enough so that B will be able to beat C
and win, only if the B voters are more numerous than the A voters.
After all, if B is bigger, then you don't mind helping B win for you.
B is then the rightful winner in {A,B}. But you don't want to help B
win if
