Mike,
Someone said that IRV lets you vote more preferences than Approval
does. But what good
does that do, if it doesn't count them?
The term "count" here can be a bit vague and propagandistic. Also you
imply that it is always better to "count" preferences (no matter how)
than to not.
Als
Someone said that IRV lets you vote more preferences than Approval does. But
what good
does that do, if it doesn't count them?
Approval counts every preference that you vote.
Since Approval doesn't let you vote all of your preferences, it doesn't count
all of your
preferences. But, unlike IRV,
Ted Stern wrote (29 Nov 2011):
47: A
05: AB (sincere is A>B)
41: B
07: BC
Approvals: B53, A52, C7
I find this example contrived.
* If mass polling is available, many people will be aware of the
52/48 split between A and B ahead of time.
* Corruption is a separate issue. With prope
On 30.11.2011, at 7.23, C.Benham wrote:
> Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011):
>> I'd like to add that IRV is an algorithm for those that want to favour the
>> large parties.
>
>
> The main thing that favours large parties is legislators elected in
> single-member districts versus some form of P
Juho Laatu wrote (29 Nov 2011):
We may compare IRV also to the other commonly used single-winner
method TTR. To be brief, one could say that IRV is better than TTR
since it has more elimination rounds. IRV's problem in this comparison
is that it collects so much information that one can, after
On 28 Nov 2011 20:24:37 -0800, Chris Benham wrote:
>
> Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
>
> Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
>
> To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
> any unstable weirdness and it is much simp
To say that IRV fails FBC is an understatement.
IRV fails FBC with a vengeance.
IRV thereby makes a joke any election in which it is used.
As I've already said, all it takes is for favoriteness-support to taper
moderately gradually away from the middle, something
that is hardly unusual. Elimin
On 29.11.2011, at 6.07, C.Benham wrote:
> In IRV if you are convinced of that you have no compelling reason to
> compromise because you
> can expect F to be eliminated and your vote transferred to C. No, to have a
> good reason to compromise
> you must be convinced that F *will* be one of the to
Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
>
>To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
>any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler and cheaper to do than
>IRV.
>
If we are talking about the classi
Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler and cheaper to do than
IRV.
If we are talking about the classic versio
On 27.11.2011, at 18.35, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Nov 2011 23:05:49 -0700
>> From: matt welland
>
>> I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
>> better or worse than IRV and why?
>
> Approval is a far superior system to FPTP and IRV because approval:
>
> 1. unlike FPTP and
Nov 2011 23:05:49 -0700
> From: matt welland
> I wasn't clear. I want to hear opinions from the list: Is approval
> better or worse than IRV and why?
Approval is a far superior system to FPTP and IRV because approval:
1. unlike FPTP and IRV, it solves the spoiler problem of a nonwinning
candid
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