Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose of
IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
I think the problem, or at least a part of it, is that if we (the
On Fri, 17 Oct 2008 22:08:32 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose
of IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
Dear Kristofer,
you wrote:
Since Condorcet is a majoritarian method (as it needs to be in order to
be a good single-winner method) ...
A good single-winner method *must not* be majoritarian but must elect C
in the situation of
55% voters having A 100 C 80 B 0 and
45%
On Wed, 15 Oct 2008 18:49:41 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders
were about
equally
On 10/13/08, Aaron Armitage [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Any strategically informed voter will give approval-like ratings, and will
approve the top two frontrunner he likes better, as well as any candidates
he prefers to that frontrunner, which means that the stated ratings will
look like that
Aaron,
I agree that not electing a voted CW is undesirable, and any method
that fails the Condorcet criterion needs to be justified by complying
with at least one desirable criterion that isn't compatible with Condorcet.
Low social utility (SU) Condorcet winners with little solid support and
I think his point is that he prefers any and all Condorcet methods over
IRV, and probably over any non-Condorcet method. I happen to agree.
--- On Sat, 10/11/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
To: EM
.
--- On Sat, 10/11/08, Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV vs Condorcet vs Range/Score
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Saturday, October 11, 2008, 10:30 AM
All possible Condorcet methods?
- Original Message
From: Aaron
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about
equally deserving.
It matters because IRV reinforces the 2 party system.
it would be
On Thu, 9 Oct 2008 15:18:50 +0100 Raph Frank wrote:
On 10/9/08, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If there is a near tie among three or more, they often disagree but
usually get one of the leaders - matters little since the leaders were about
equally deserving.
This was part of my
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I started this thread to compare IRV vs Condorcet, believing that IRV is
provably less capable and deserves discarding.
Dave,
Comparing a decisive method with a criterion is a bit like comparing a
person with virtue. As soon as you tell us which *decisive method*
you
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose of
IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
Condorcet uses essentially the same ballot as IRV, with essentially the
same meaning:
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