James Gilmour wrote:
Kevin Venzke Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:49 PM
The reason I believe LNHarm is more valuable than
monotonicity is that when a method fails LNHarm, the voter is
more likely to realize in what insincere way to vote
differently, in order to compensate. When a method
Kristofer,
Woodall's DAC and DSC and Bucklin and Woodall's similar QLTD
all meet mono-raise and Mutual Majority (aka Majority for Solid Coalitions).
DSC meets LNHarm and the rest meet LNHelp.
Chris Benham
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sun.Dec.21):
snip
In any case, it may be possible to
At 04:31 AM 12/21/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In any case, it may be possible to have one of the LNHs and be
monotonic and have mutual majority. I'm not sure, but perhaps
(doesn't one of DAC or DSC do this?). If so, it would be possible to
see (at least) whether people strategize in
Kevin Venzke Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2008 1:49 PM
The reason I believe LNHarm is more valuable than
monotonicity is that when a method fails LNHarm, the voter is
more likely to realize in what insincere way to vote
differently, in order to compensate. When a method fails
Hi Kathy,
You are responding to me, not Abd ul-Rahman Lomax.
--- En date de : Mar 16.12.08, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com a écrit :
Hi,
--- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com a ?crit?:
That's not very generous. I can
think of
a couple of defenses.
At 08:49 AM 12/16/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Thus, *all things being equal* (which must
be kept in mind if it's IRV that is on your mind), I would expect that
failing LNHarm will provoke more insincerity (and thus destroy more
information) than failing monotonicity.
Highly speculative. Bucklin
