Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Yes, well organized and undivided groupings tend to have somewhat more voting power than fragmented collections of similar minded people. There may be many reasons why people can trust that there will be also other voters that will vote similarly, e.g. 1) A well coordinated group with explicit

[EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Warren, How true is it that approval-style voting is strategic for Schulze? Not very true. It depends on the voter's information and  sincere ratings. Schulze, being a Condorcet method fails Favourite Betrayal. Is Schulze with approval-style ballots a better or worse voting system than plain

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Chris Benham wrote: The trouble is, range voting is simple. Simple enough that you can reach a pretty full understanding of what strategic range voting is. (Which is not at all trivial, but it can pretty much be done.) In contrast, a lot of Condorcet systems including Schulze are complicated.

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Chris Benham wrote: And I have to reply to myself. Warren Smith wrote that, not Chris Benham. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Kevin, I have found that Schulze(wv) had little favorite betrayal incentive. In simulations I mentioned in June 05, out of 50,000 trials, Schulze(wv) showed incentive 7 times, compared to 251 for Schulze(margins), 363 for Condorcet//Approval, and 625 for my erroneous interpretation of

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

Hi Chris, --- En date de : Mar 9.6.09, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au a écrit : Kevin,   I have found that Schulze(wv) had little favorite betrayal incentive. In simulations I mentioned in June 05, out of 50,000 trials, Schulze(wv) showed incentive 7 times, compared to 251 for

[EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

One problem is nobody really has a good understanding of what good strategy is. If one believes that range voting becomes approval voting in the presence of strategic voters (often, anyhow)... One might similarly speculate that strategic voters in a system such as Schilze beatpaths ALLOWING

Re: [EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

I have a rather practical approach to strategies. Often we talk about theoretical properties of the methods. I prefer talking about the practical impacts (of the known theoretical vulnerabilities) since often the theoretical cases talk only about some marginal cases. I'll explain more below.