[EM] (MA-0) A medium of assent for the support of large scale communicative action
(May I post this draft for the record? And for comment, if anyone is interested?) I describe a medium in which agreements arising from discussion can build incrementally to include large numbers of people. I suggest that the medium might enable the institution of communicative action at societal scales. Consensus of the population might then decide such questions as the allocation of state power and the promulgation of norms. (I'll post each section separately, as I finish drafting it.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent
(Draft section 1 of A medium of assent for the support of large scale communicative action.) http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht Communicative assent is the expression of agreement, particularly of agreement that arises from discussion. I describe a medium in which communicative assent is formalized through voting. The voting mechanism is a delegate cascade that is open to recasting. In a delegate cascade, a delegate is any participant who both receive votes (like a candidate), and casts a vote of her own (like a voter). But when a delegate casts a vote, it carries with it those received. And so on... Passing from delegate to delegate, the votes flow together and gather in volume - they cascade - like raindrops down the branches of a tree.^[4] FIGURE 1. Cascades in tree form. The measure of assent for each participant is the quantity of votes currently received (circled number). Vote flow is depicted by arrows, with volume shown for each. The votes flow together until they pool at the bottom (red), where they are held by the leading candidates. (The depiction is unrealistic. Actual cascades would likely be bushier, with perhaps 5-20 voters per candidate on average.) http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade.png Every participant has a single vote. She may either cast it or withold it. If she casts it, she may cast it for anyone. There are no pre-declared candidates. All participants are eligible to receive votes. All non-participants are also eligible. A non-participant who receives a vote is thereby made a participant. Votes are open to recasting. If a voter changes her mind about a candidate, she is free to withdraw her vote, or to recast it for another candidate. Polls are intended to remain open indefinitely, year round, with the votes shifting as new information becomes available to the voters. There is never a final result that cannot be undone by recasting. Votes are public. There are no secret ballots. For every vote that is cast, the identities of the voter and the candidate are visible. Anyone may trace the flow of a vote from its original caster, through all intermediate delegates, to the final candidate who holds it.^[9] Assent for each candidate is measured as the quantity of votes received (circled numbers in figures 1 and 2). Note that a single vote may be received by multiple delegates before it is received by the final candidate. As each delegate or candidate receives the vote, her measure of assent is incremented. When the vote finally reaches the candidate from whom it can flow no further, it is held by that candidate. The total of votes held by a candidate (red numbers) has no bearing on the measure of assent. The typical structure of a delegate cascade is a tree. As shown in figure 1 (above), it has a single candidate at the root; voters at the leaves (top); and delegates among the branches in between. The general structure however is a cyclic graph, as shown here in figure 2. FIGURE 2. Cyclic cascade. Depicts a cascade that has formed into a nearly perfect ring structure. A single voter outside of the ring has injected a vote. It carries nearly full circle until it comes to rest with a candidate who consequently holds two votes (bottom left). Nevertheless the assent within the ring is equal, at 6 for each candidate. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade-cyclic.png A vote never actually cycles. It flows through every candidate exactly once, but stops before it encounters a candidate for a second time. It then remains held where it is. Consequently assent is equalized in a cycle. A vote also stops before it encounters its original caster. Consequently a vote for oneself has no effect. FIGURE 3. Tight cycles. The tightest cycle is actually between two voters (left). A cycle with a single voter (right) is a null cycle, equivalent to a withheld vote. http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade-cyclic-tight.png Assent is an expression of agreement. Assent is formalized in the medium by casting a vote. The vote is cast for the person who best represents the thing agreed to. Of all the things that might be ageed to, I wish to consider only acts. For example, Juanita may propose to build a sandbox for children in the neighbourhood park. Samantha may formally express her agreement to that act by voting for Juanita. A person has a single vote for every act that could possibly be proposed. If Juanita also proposes that Rajiv should be appointed as Park Superintendent, then Samantha could vote for Juanita on this act, too. The two votes - one to build the sandbox, and one to appoint Rajiv - would have no formal connection to each other. They would be cast in separate elections, so to speak. Variant acts may be proposed. Variant acts are acts that differ from the originally proposed act. When a variant act is proposed, the
Re: [EM] language/framing quibble
Good Morning, Raph re: My concern would be that their opinions would be dismissed out of hand. If there is nobody pushing them at a national level, then that is an almost instinctive reaction to weird ideas (including 'good' weird ideas). Any opinion that can be dismissed out of hand, should be. Even a 'good' weird idea must have enough appeal to inspire thought. re: Well, would be worth seeing if it works at the council level first. I agree. That's why I was helping with the draft for the Sefton Borough Council. Will it cause a ripple? I dunno. re: (About explaining the worst case, where all except a minority gets removed), Ahh, I did with the religious minority? As I said in my response to that explanation, the reasoning is seriously flawed. It is based on the idea that an individual can 'veto' any selection except his own. That's a losing proposition because it prevents the individual's advance. It is not a strategy by which any ideology, however rabid, can gain power. re: The question comes down to how well the 'Veto anyone else being promoted' works. and the strained rationale that follows: The entire derivation leading to A 10.41% minority would take 10 rounds to be virtually 100% and 6 rounds to have a majority. is based on irrational assumptions. I recognize the need to find a hole in the concept, but a concerted ideological attack isn't one of them. The proposal atomizes all ideologies, the 'good' ones and the 'bad' ones, and forces their detailed examination. re: (with regard to a zealot), He says nothing about his veto plan, and then at the end if he can't get through he vetoes. That is roughly equivalent to a suicide bomber. Fortunately for all of us, such people are but an infinitesimal portion of our society (although they do damage in excess of their number.) Note that the process prevents the zealot from affecting more than two people. The effect, for them, is bad, but they have two things in their favor: They have an opportunity to convert the zealot to a different view and they have the knowledge that elections are a repetitive process. They'll have another chance. re: (with regard to whether a zealot could advance), Would people see through him? That depends on his talent for obfuscation and deceit and the perceptiveness of his peers. We currently endure a system that elevates unscrupulous people by design. They are masters of deceit and obfuscation. Were they subjected to the critical examination proposed in Practical Democracy, very few would attain public office. As I said in the outline (and to Kristofer Munsterhjelm, the other day): This is a distillation process, biased in favor of the most upright and capable of our citizens. It cannot guarantee that unprincipled individuals will never be selected ... such a goal would be unrealistic ... but it does insure that they are the exception rather than the rule. re: It would depend on how the voting works. That will be an implementation matter. In my opinion, the three people in a triad, after due deliberation, will either be able to say 'We've agreed on a candidate' or 'We cannot agree on a candidate'. I'm not sure more should be required. re: You could assume that a person from a religious group was going to be a zealot. One should not assume anything. That is particularly true when the process provides an opportunity to examine the person and determine the extent of their zealotry. re: Reason is both the problem and solution here. Reason sets up the system and reason tries to find ways to abuse it. And, that, dear Raph, is a very astute observation. No system is impervious to corruption. That's why it's important to probe for weaknesses in the proposal ... as you've been doing. re: ... I was just responding to the suggestion that having pairs of triads would cause a problem if there was an uneven number of triads. It seems the same solution could apply. That's a good point. I should have seen it ... but didn't. re: ... the increase from 2 to 3 people isn't a major increase. If people can handle 2, then they can handle 3. I don't agree. Oh! I agree they can handle 3, but I don't agree they can be as detailed or thorough in their evaluation. It takes time and attention to gain insight into another person's nature. The amount one devotes to the task affects the depth of their understanding. First impressions are slowly validated or rejected over time, and the greater the time the more accurate the assessment (and the less chance a zealot will slip through). re: The point was that the number of triads that end up in a stalemate would increase as the number of rounds pass. This is a good thought. The circumstances set up interesting dynamics. Since those who advance will be people with a strong desire for public office,
[EM] Range-Approval hybrid
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV. http://rangevoting.org/ I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing disapproval and all others as expressing Approval. The default rating is the bottom-most. Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also Approval Opposition score (the approval score of the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve X). All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating. I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no no opinion option, so I think the resulting method is not more complex for voters. This method would work much better than normal RV in avoiding a split-vote problem in a '2 sub-factions confront a big faction' scenario (such as Obama and Clinton versus McCain). In this method if Obama and Clinton supporters all approve both candidates and not McCain, then if there are more of them voting than McCain supporters McCain must be disqualified, so Obama and Clinton can compete with each other more meaningfully and with much less risk of a McCain win. Minor party supporters can make approval distinction between the front-runners and then rate their sincere favourites exclusive-top with very little added risk (compared with rating their preferred front-runner equal-top) of allowing their greater evil candidate to win. It meets a sort of Approval Strong Minimal Defense that says that if more voters approve X and not Y than approve Y, Y can't win. And a sort of Approval Majority for Solid Coalitions that says that if more than half the voters rank/rate a subset S of candidates above all others, and approve all the members of S and none of the non-members, then the winner must come from S. (This of course is only worth mentioning because the voters supporting the S candidates can still make meaningful preference distinctions among them, unlike in plain Approval.) Like normal Range it clearly meets Favourite Betrayal, because if X wins with some voters insincerely down-rating Y, then if Y is raised to the top slot alongside X; X will still be qualified (because X's approval score will not be reduced and X's AO score can only be reduced), no non-XY candidate can have a reduced PO score so no previously disqualified non-XY candidate will become undisqualified; and of course only Y's Average Ratings score will be changed so if there is a new winner it can only be Y. Like normal Range and unlike methods such as Bucklin, it meets Independence from Irrelevant Ballots (IIB). This wouldn't be the case if the rule regarding the approvals specified for example that candidates need to be disapproved by a majority to be disqualified. I can't see that this method fails any desirable criterion that normal Range meets. Comments? Chris Benham Make the switch to the world#39;s best email. Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
