Warren Smith wrote:
It seems to me that approval and range voting eliminate most of the
strategic opportunity in single winner elections and the marginal
improvement of other methods is fairly small. Can anyone point me to
analysis, preferably at a layman level, that contradicts or supports
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 5, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i don't think a sequence of elimination rounds would be okay, but the
method of picking the biggest loser for each round needs to be
debated. i am not sure what would be
Dear Kristofer,
both Approval Voting and Range Voting *are* majoritarian: A majority can always
get their will and suppress the minority by simply bullet-voting.
So, a more interesting version of your question could be: Which *democratic*
method (that does not allow any sub-group to suppress
OK, this is an attempt to reply to Robert Bristow-Johnson.
WDS: For Condorcet systems with ranking-equalities
allowed,
they might behave better with strategic voters, though. I've posted
on that topic before.
RBJ: ... so [range is] *not* always better than every rank-order system for
...
Matthew,
I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
Tideman's recent book Collective Decisions and Voting has an analysis of
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
voting method that has ever been proposed and concludes that Range
Terry Bouricius:
I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
Tideman's recent book Collective Decisions and Voting has an analysis of
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
voting method that has ever been proposed and concludes that Range
On Nov 8, 2009, at 6:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 5, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
...
Unlike FairVote et al, we don't have a strong voice saying Hey
public, if you think Plurality sucks, implement [method here].
but if
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius
ter...@burlingtontelecom.net wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral paper by
James Green-Armytage (Strategic voting and Strategic Nomination:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:00 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
2. Bouricius forgot to mention, same way he usually forgets to
mention, that Tideman also found IRV to be unsupportable.
conditionally supportable, actually.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Terry and Matthew,
Terry Bouricius wrote:
I'm not sure if it is quite at the layman level, but Prof. Nicloaus
Tideman's recent book Collective Decisions and Voting has an analysis of
vulnerability to strategic manipulation of virtually every single-winner
voting method that has ever been
under a condition which is, in fact, violated.
On 11/8/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:00 AM, Warren Smith wrote:
2. Bouricius forgot to mention, same way he usually forgets to
mention, that Tideman also found IRV to be unsupportable.
conditionally
Response to Warren... inserted below each of his points (marked by ***)
Terry Bouricius
- Original Message -
From: Warren Smith warren@gmail.com
To: election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Sunday, November 08, 2009 1:00 PM
Subject: [EM] (no subject)
Terry Bouricius:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 8:43 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Nov 8, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
wrote:
A somewhat more accessible (and available online for free) analysis
of
strategic vulnerability of various methods is in this doctoral
paper by
James
2. Bouricius forgot to mention, same way he usually forgets to
mention, that Tideman also found IRV to be unsupportable.
*** 2. Warren Smith is wrong. He either hasn't read Tideman or is
intentionally miss-representing Tideman here.
--I wrote a review of Tideman's book, remember? And I cited
On Nov 8, 2009, at 7:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 4:35 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Tideman said IRV was unsupportable if it is feasible to compute
pairwise matrix. That was
because Tideman had other voting methods he considered clearly
superior to IRV and these methods used
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:40 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 7:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 4:35 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Tideman said IRV was unsupportable if it is feasible to compute
pairwise matrix. That was
because Tideman had other voting methods
On Nov 9, 2009, at 1:46 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 10:40 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 7:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 8, 2009, at 4:35 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
Tideman said IRV was unsupportable if it is feasible to compute
pairwise
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