On Apr 13, 2010, at 4:20 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
De: Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
À: Election Methods
Warren Smith wrote:
Well, that is a Nash equilibrium because no single voter can
change the election result! ... Nash says almost nothing about
voting. It is worthless. ... But now here is a very simple and
highly effective fix ... Have each voter cast, not one vote but
rather each voter
Hi Terry,
... a concern in larger organizations, especially those with power
(let's say governmental use, rather than Free Association) that
media-savvy demagogues (e.g. Glenn Beck) might not gain
oligarchic-sized proxy holdings, and what effect that would have on
deliberation? ... Is there
Have each voter cast, not one vote but rather each voter casts a
standard gaussian random variable number of votes of each possible
type. The voter does not get to control her vote, she only gets to
control the mean of the Gaussians. So for example, in the
Gandhi-Hitler example, she can
On Tue, Apr 13, 2010 at 5:02 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
This is a great idea at its heart, but I can see a couple of problems which
need fixing. For one thing, you didn't specify that the sum of the means for
all vote types must be 1.
Actually, it would probably be
My proposal resolves most of those issues, after the votes are cast,
each ballot has a probability of p to be excluded from the count.
That works out to be the same as the poisson proposal, in the limit as voter
number - infinity and p - 1. I think that the poisson proposal leads to
cleaner
If you are interested, further discussion is happening at the Election
Science Foundation
http://groups.google.com/group/electionsciencefoundation
thread 929.
--
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking
endorse as 1st step)
and
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mar 13.4.10, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
This time the
election will be arranged using WV. B supporters
note that
they can win by not supporting C any more. C
supporters do
not have the same incentive since they are about
to win.
That's only true
just curious. maybe it might increase exposure of the issues and
content.
i dunno, maybe soc.something .
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
Imagination is more important than knowledge.
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