fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
By the way, (contrary to Marcus' confusion) UncAAO does satisfy Monotonicity,
Clone Independence, IDPA, and Independence from Non-Smith Alternatives, as well
as the following:
1. It elects the same member of a clone set as the method would when restricted
to the clone
Andrew Myers wrote:
On 7/22/64 2:59 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
However, I strongly urge people who attempt to analyze the situation
and to propose reforms to:
1. Keep it simple. An extraordinarily powerful system for fully
proportional representation consisting of a seemingly-simple
Admitting that I didn'f fully follow the topic:
I think my selfish incentives are enough to make me
vote. Maybe I have also altruistic incentives but they
are surplus. Also, my selfish incentives in great part
have ethical and community nature, but still selfish.
How can a selfish motive have
About a century ago, a proposal was made in a major western U.S. city to
have a city council where each member exercised, in the council, the number
of votes they got in the election.
Which city? When?
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At 10:56 AM 4/23/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
[I'd written:}
About a century ago, a proposal was made in a major western U.S.
city to have a city council where each member exercised, in the
council, the number of votes they got in the election.
Which city? When?
Well, I couldn't find it.
Forest wrote:
..MinMax is the only commonly known Condorcet method that satisfies the
following weak form of Participation:
If A wins and then another ballot with A ranked unique first is added to the
count, A still wins.
That is Mono-add-Top, I think coined by Douglas Woodall. It is met by
Suppose that voters fill out questionnaires of twenty or more yes/no answers.
What is a good way to
calculate the “distance” between questionnaires? (Remember this is the key to
getting an IIAC
compliant voting system.)
The big problem is that some of the questions are apt to be clones of
Warren, Jameson and Kristofer,
For my part, I argue that Nash can *never* be applied within the
context of voting. The reality as evidenced by the empirical data
(in vivo) invalidates the basic assumptions of Nash. Individual
voters are *not* attempting to affect the outcome of
Warren Smith wrote:
... I think you are pretty much right... But I think there is a
deeper truth First of all, as I said in the ESF thread quoting
Selten, it is interesting to consider the consequences of
maximally-rational behavior, even if humans aren't it. Second,
there is the
