On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all,
I am sending a post scriptum to the email below.
1. The conservative method is only interesting if, the unambiguously
pre-elected president and vice president(s) are not in
Markus Schulze wrote:
Richard Fobes wrote (2 May 2010):
Once again Markus Schulze is trying to discredit
the Condorcet-Kemeny method.
If I really wanted to discredit this method, then
I would mention ...
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to put these issues
into perspective.
Dear Richard Fobes,
you wrote (4 May 2010):
The book does not refer to the independence
of irrelevant alternatives criteria, so
where did you get the idea that it claims
to satisfy that criteria?
For example, on page 256 you claim: When VoteFair
ranking is used, adding or withdrawing
This is a good approach in the category of simple (only one method
used) proportional ranking based methods.
Use of proportional ranking reduces the proportionality of the council
and the set of n presidents a bit but not much.
The election of the president can be seen to happen before the
If you are looking for a proportional Condorcet method, I will also
recommend the proportional election method that I developed. It is not
STV-like, but it achieves proportionality when there are blocs of
voters. It has the added advantage that it is already built into a
running Internet
On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 8:12 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
I am affraid that this is not possible. First we have mostly odd-numbered
council sizes, and secondly the gender rule does not require that half of
the men should be men and the other half women.
Our current gender rule
Kevin,
I'm sure that you are right, but it makes me think that the only reason ordinary
Approval complies with Monotonicity is that the information from polls is not an
official part of the election: showing (true or alleged) support for a
candidate in the polls can change her from a winner to a
On May 4, 2010, at 6:17 AM, C.Benham wrote:
I think the idea that the CW should always be elected but it is
sometimes ok to elect
from outside the Smith set is a bit philosophically weird, and not
easy to sell.
I think electing outside the Smith set is a healthy idea :-). I agree
that it
Some more comments on how the male/female requirements could be handled.
In the description of Markus Schulze (see below) there were two steps
where the male/female proportionality was handled. That approach works
if there are separate requirements for the set of three first
