Juho Laatu wrote:
A = 1000
B = 200
max_support = 100
C = 50
approval = 30
D = 1
min_support = 0
E = 0
F = -100
max_preference_strength = 10
Approval interpretation is A=B=CD=E=F.
Range interpretation is A=B=100, C=50, D=1, E=F=0.
Rankings interpretation is ABCDEF.
Rankings interpretation with
--- On Wed, 28/1/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
A = 1000
B = 200
max_support = 100
C = 50
approval = 30
D = 1
min_support = 0
E = 0
F = -100
max_preference_strength = 10
Approval interpretation is A=B=CD=E=F.
Range
http://www.rangevoting.org/RRV.html
I wonder what would be reasonable strategies for RRV.
Initially, I was thinking something like
Set the approval threshold where you would set it in normal approval
but only include candidates from your favourite party of those that
have a reasonable chance of
Lately, I've been busy trying to generalize STV, the method, to be
applicable to any weighted positional method. At first, this seems quite
easy to do. STV (discarding Meek) works like this:
---
STV for a (k,n) election (election to a council of size k, out of n
candidates)
0. If k = n,
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Subject: [EM] STV and weighted positional methods
Lately, I've been busy trying to generalize STV, the method, to be
applicable to any weighted positional method. At first, this seems quite
easy to do. STV (discarding Meek) works like this:
Raph Frank wrote:
http://www.rangevoting.org/RRV.html
I wonder what would be reasonable strategies for RRV.
For RRV, and probably for any sort of multiwinner method that works
according to the elect and punish cycle (I think that's Warren's term,
but it's fairly descriptive), the method is
Kathy Dopp wrote:
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Subject: [EM] STV and weighted positional methods
Lately, I've been busy trying to generalize STV, the method, to be
applicable to any weighted positional method. At first, this seems quite
easy to do. STV (discarding Meek)
On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 8:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
The construct the assembly and then let it vote approach might be
reducible to ordinary Bayesian Regret. The idea would be this: single-winner
BR assigns utilities to all candidates and voters. Call the
Seeing RRV used in a post reminded me of some earlier discussions.
Analysis of team computer rankings in sports that do NOT have round-robin
schedules use Retrodictive Ranking Violations to characterize computer
ratings with AB after B has won a match against A. (This is not an error,
since the
Kathy Dopp Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2009 8:08 PM
I see that what you are suggesting as a change to STV such as
using the Borda method does seem to be a *lot* better than
current implementations of STV,
Now THAT really would be an improvement. Borda can fail to elect the majority
James,
Thanks but I don't need to read any references, the arithmetic is obvious.
In Borda there can be more than one candidate with majority approval
and the candidate with the *most* majority approval may not be the
plurality majority winner like it would be in a first round majority
winner in
Juho Laatu wrote:
But I think people [a] also try to keep
the internals of their head in good
order. They don't voluntarily become
irrational inside. Many [b] believe that
they are almost always right and
consistent, and want to maintain
this belief.
Agreed, but it can't be understood from
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
My primary reason for the post (and the change/generalization of STV) is to
find out what makes a good multiwinner method a good multiwinner method,
and thus how to create good multiwinner methods...
This may have no practical utility, and maybe it's been
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