James Gilmour wrote:
It is extremely important to refer to STV as the SINGLE Transferable
Vote, because each voter must have only one vote to ensure PR. This
distinguishes STV from all multiple vote systems, like
Multi-Member-FPTP or the Cumulative Vote. It is also important to
emphasise the
Jameson Quinn wrote:
3) Create (by hand or using genetic programming) and test strategy
heuristics, by which a given voter can use the polling (and knowledge
of the underlying probabilistic models) to estimate the expected value
of various strategic options, assuming all similar voters use
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 7:07 AM, Kristofer
Munsterhjelmkm-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Could your third point be done, for very small electorates, by use of
minimax game tree algorithms like the one used in computer chess? The
objective for each voter would be to get his own candidate to win (and
I have changed the subject to make it clear and to link it again to the related
posts - apologies for not doing that on my previous
post.
What you describe below is not a feature of the SNTV voting system but the
careful strategic and tactical manipulation of the voting
system to obtain a PR
What you could do is take a poll and have 10 random voters. You
then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate.
--there is no such thing as optimal strategy in games with =3
players. Game theory breaks down. So, in general, this cannot be
done. The only way to do it is to add to
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:10 PM, Warren Smithwarren@gmail.com wrote:
What you could do is take a poll and have 10 random voters. You
then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate.
--there is no such thing as optimal strategy in games with =3
players. Game theory breaks down.
2009/8/30 Warren Smith warren@gmail.com
utterly false is a bit strong language
--No: absolutely unbeatable is what is strong language.
And it is false. And what really pisses me off, is you accusing me of
being false, when it was you all along being false, and indeed I had
publicized
2009/8/31 Warren Smith warren@gmail.com
What you could do is take a poll and have 10 random voters. You
then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate.
--there is no such thing as optimal strategy in games with =3
players.
This is true.
Game theory breaks down.
I
On Aug 31, 2009, at 4:10 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
On 8/31/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
What you could do is take a poll and have 10 random voters. You
then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate.
--there is no such thing as optimal strategy in games with =3
On Aug 31, 2009, at 7:15 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I want to be discussing practical questions here. I started off the
parent of this thread with a provocative big-picture statement,
trying to provoke debate about that larger point. I feel that
getting caught up in whether Range has the
Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:10 PM, Warren Smithwarren@gmail.com wrote:
What you could do is take a poll and have 10 random voters. You
then work out optimal assuming that they are the electorate.
--there is no such thing as optimal strategy in games with =3
players. Game
IEVS is available (and has been for quite a while) as source code to all, here:
http://rangevoting.org/IEVS/IEVS.c
I warn you it may not be as wonderful and bug-free as you might like.
However various versions of it have worked to do a lot of stuff, and
if you (please!) improve it and debug it
Raph Frank wrote:
However, can minimax be applied in a single step game?
Sure. Consider the dictator game: the first player proposes a share of
an integer amount of money, and the second either agrees or disagrees.
If the second agrees, he gets (total - share) and the first gets share,
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