On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:29 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i think that the answer is no, if a Condorcet winner exists and
that all bets are off if a CW does not exist, except, perhaps for
these strategy-resistant methods such as Markus Schulze's
method. i
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles? I would still like an example of a
spoiler in Condorcet no matter how unlikely if possible. Thank you.
Kathy
On Thu, Jan 21,
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general) may very
well be so small in typical real elections (large, public, with independent
voter decision making, with changing
In a recent EM post in another thread, I defined and recommended the
Strong Minimal Defense, Top Ratings method (that I first proposed
in 2008) as the best of the methods that meet the Favourite Betrayal
criterion, and also the best 3-slot ballot method:
*Voters fill out 3-slot ratings ballots,
well, since no one else responded...
On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:21 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks Kristofer for the explanations. Do you know a good place that
discusses the Ranked Pairs method of resolving cycles, or all the
methods of resolving cycles?
Wikipedia. maybe start with
Jonathan makes an important point. The term spoiler means a minor
candidate with a small percentage of the vote, who changes which of the
other candidates wins by running. But Kathy and some others wish to expand
the definition to include a front-runner. (Note that these IRV opponents
refer
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication process
here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Variation on previous post. Silly
On Jan 21, 2010, at 3:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
WARNING: this is a metacommunication, about the communication
process here and elsewhere in voting system advocacy, not about
voting methods, per se.
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 11:23 AM,
People, please. This is not a debate class, and even if it were, no, I won
is really useless even if true. Please take this discussion off list, if you
find it important enough not to stop. There's practically no voting system
content left. As for what is left: we all know that the number of piles
i just want to settle the issue about how many piles one needs to be
precinct summable when there are N candidates.
Kathy was pointing to Abd ul as the qualified actor who refuted the
falsifiable assertion that i made that you needed only 9 piles for 3
candidates. She repeated labeled
At 01:48 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
the fact is, transmitting the content (to a central counting
location) of *every ballot* is the transfer of a finite amount of
information. that is even *more* general than sorting to piles and
transmitting the tallies for piles.
Yes, of
From: Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net
To: Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com, Juho
juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Jonathan makes an important point. The term spoiler means a minor
candidate with a small percentage of the vote, who changes which of the
other candidates wins by
At 02:28 AM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 20, 2010, at 12:04 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:52 AM 1/18/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
yes, it's debatable and, since there are 3 different methods all
lifting up different declared winners, it's subjective.
Well,
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, we have a CW... add a candidate, if that candidate does not become
the winner, nor cause a cycle, then the Condorcet Winner we had before
continues to be the CW with the added candidate. (boy, i guess we're
rephrasing the same thing multiple times!)
Yup.
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very abstract concept of spoiler might be: denote f(X) the minimal
number of
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number of
candidates is very small, precinct summability
On Jan 21, 2010, at 5:33 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general)
may very well be so small in typical real elections (large, public,
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define spoiler,
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What's an example of an IRV spoiler who's not a pretty strong
candidate?
A very abstract concept
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that number is 9. if you or
Kathy say it's 15, then
On Jan 21, 2010, at 6:30 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 6:49 AM
but breaking it down to piles regarding every conceivable permutation
of candidate preference is *still* breaking it down to a finite
number of piles. for 3 candidates, that
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then the possible unique preference
profiles are:
A
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:05 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
N Unique Preference Profiles
2 4
3 15
...
then your calculation is mistaken. the fact that you ostensibly need
4 piles when there are only two candidates should serve as a clue.
If there are two candidates, A and B, then
At 04:41 PM 1/21/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:32 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Terry, You cleverly conveniently change all the definitions whenver it
is necessary to make yourself and Fairytale Vote right on the facts.
Define spoiler, please, unambiguously.
The term has
ballot to legally equivalent votes. The reduced set is this:
A
B
C
AB
AC
BA
BC
CA
CB
Note that this assumes a 2-rank ballot.
no, it can be a 3-rank ballot where the voter declines to rate their
last choice. 3rd choice is left unmarked.
It also assumes that majority vote isn't
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
That may be true in Australia, but is not true in the US where
typically voters are allowed to rank up to only three candidates.
I put the general formula
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:34 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a...@lomaxdesign.com wrote:
At 04:41 PM 1/21/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:32 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Terry, You cleverly conveniently change all the definitions whenver it
is necessary to make yourself and Fairytale
Kathy,
I ask that you stop smearing me on this (and other) discussion lists. I
did not alter any standard definition of spoilers. Webster's online for
example defines it as:
1. A candidate with no chance of winning but who may draw enough votes to
prevent one of the leading candidates from
On Jan 21, 2010, at 7:42 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
James,
Your formulas below are only correct in the case that voters are
allowed to rank all the candidates who run for an election contest.
James didn't put forth any formulae. but he did put forth a table
which appears to be consistent with
On Jan 21, 2010, at 8:58 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Kathy,
I ask that you stop smearing me on this (and other) discussion lists.
rots o' ruk.
I did not alter any standard definition of spoilers. Webster's
online
for example defines it as:
1. A candidate with no chance of winning but
At 05:17 PM 1/21/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 4:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
But ... it raises some security issues. And with central counting
there are other issues. This is a red herring, because we are
talking about precinct summability, and when the number
Start telling the truth about IRV at Fairytale Vote, and then when
people speak the truth about Fairytale Vote, it won't sound like a
smear.
If you don't like the sound of your own behavior when retold, try some
different behavior, rather than falsely accusing others of smearing
you when they
On Jan 21, 2010, at 9:03 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Start telling the truth about IRV at Fairytale Vote, and then when
people speak the truth about Fairytale Vote, it won't sound like a
smear.
Ha ha! I've been meaning to compliment you, Ms Dopp, on that sidesplitting
line. It was really funny the
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