Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:08 AM, Juho juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
(I note that Raph Frank proposed also an approach where the election of the
last representative would be free of these sex related requirements. That is
one way of relieving the proportionality related problems
Hallo,
here is that paper where Condorcet proposes
the Bucklin method:
http://archive.numdam.org/ARCHIVE/MSH/MSH_1990__111_/MSH_1990__111__7_0/MSH_1990__111__7_0.pdf
Markus Schulze
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On May 5, 2010, at 1:36 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Juho,
I wrote (4 May 2010):
This is my proposal:
--Use the Schulze proportional ranking method.
--The top-ranked candidate becomes the president.
--The second-ranked candidate becomes the vice president.
--If the first two candidates
On May 5, 2010, at 10:28 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Let's say that there are three different criteria that an election
method should meet. They are related to three different strategic
voting related problems. As in the world of security also election
methods are as
Some interesting history...
I was recently sent a chapter from the book _Proportional Representation_
written by Clarence Hoag and George Hallet and published in 1926.
The first inventor of STV apparently (though with repeat voting rather
than ranked ballots) was Thomas Wright Hill. He devised
On May 5, 2010, at 12:22 PM, Juho wrote:
In the pairwise comparison based methods we must also take into
account the fact that we do not measure the strength of personal
preferences, and therefore the decisions that we make are often
simplified assumptions (i.e. one set of votes may
robert bristow-johnson Sent: Wednesday, May 05, 2010 6:29 PM
BTW, Juho, I heard a BBC news story about your election tomorrow
regarding the desirability of FPTP vs. proportional methods in
electing Parliament. so it sounds like that the UK, with its new Lib-
Dem party, is also being
Dear Markus Schulze,
thank you for your proposal.
It seems that your method is the one, which fulfills the requirements I set
up for the Green party council elections the closest at the moment.
Its drawbacks is however, that it is a new, complex method with only limited
testing on data an no
Chris,
thanks for the helpful comments, Your point is well taken on the first two
examples, it's hard to argue
against the Approval winner in the top cycle. That's one reason I like UncAAO:
it always picks from the
Smith set, and will always pick the highest approval member of the Smith set
On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 9:19 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
What is the advantages of Schulze proportional ranking to the simpler top
down STV modified method described in
http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE9/P5.HTM?
The first problem with this one is that it will elect the
a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences.
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen often. Compared with
each other candidate, the CW must win in each such pair. Each such
can have first preference over the CW as seen by SOME voters.
IRV,
Terry, i didn't originally intend to just pile on ...
On May 5, 2010, at 9:48 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences.
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen often.
i dunno, but my derriere still hurts. in Burlington
On May 5, 2010, at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Terry, i didn't originally intend to just pile on ...
On May 5, 2010, at 9:48 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences.
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen
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