Re: [EM] C//A (was: Remember Toby)

On 11.6.2011, at 6.09, Dave Ketchum wrote: Why are we here? It certainly made sense to come and explore. . We find ourselves asking the voters to do some truncating. . Counters may have to adjust counting ballots. Among the many variant Condorcet methods there are various ways of

Re: [EM] Theoretical Issues In Districting

Warren Smith wrote: A preliminary web page on this topic is now available here http://rangevoting.org/TheorDistrict.html Your comments would be appreciated to help me improve this page. [There is a much longer scientific paper in the works by me others on this, but it unfortunately has been

Re: [EM] C//A

Juho Laatu wrote: On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, --- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit : I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments. I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find the winner, and the

Re: [EM] C//A

I think voters could be confused over that where one truncates actually matters to the method. That is, the method isn't resolvable if everybody votes untruncated and there's a cycle; no single ballot can break the tie unless it also breaks the cycle. Further, if only some people truncate,

Re: [EM] Theoretical Issues In Districting

There is an ISO standard for Geographic information -- Geodetic codes and parameters (ISO/TS 19127:2005) but there do not appear to be any ISO standards for census or population. The interest expressed here may be exclusively for USA, but other countries take very different approaches from that

Re: [EM] Theoretical Issues In Districting

Quote: /Democracy is voters choosing their leaders. But when politicians get to draw their own districts, such as (most http://rangevoting.org/CrossCountryG.htmlegregiously) in the USA, the result is the opposite -- the politicians choose their voters./ When you want to divide cake evenly

Re: [EM] Theoretical Issues In Districting

Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2011 09:41:24 -0700 From: Michael Rouse mrou...@mrouse.com To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] Theoretical Issues In Districting Message-ID: 4df39ab4.9030...@mrouse.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1; Format=flowed Quote: /Democracy

Re: [EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods DK

Hi Dave, --- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit : Seems that some are so lacking in understanding Condorcet that they fear it.  So, a couple basics: .  The voter can rank such as A=B=C, saying exactly equal approval of these three over all other

Re: [EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

Hi Juho, --- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit : --- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods that offer two bad options and one of them is burial, though. (There is no

Re: [EM] MRSODA (Mr. Soda), a SODA-inspired PR method (NP-complete???)

I was hurried on that example. Here's a better one: 35 AXYB 15 XYA=B 35 BYXA 15 YXA=B Note that both X and Y have 100 percent approval, while neither A nor B has more than 35 percent approval, yet in a two winner election STV elects {A,B}. - Original Message - From: Date: Friday,

Re: [EM] C//A (was: Remember Toby)

Hi Juho, --- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how the method is supposed to work. I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find the winner, and the strategy becomes obvious. No defeat

[EM] C//A

From: Jameson Quinn I think voters could be confused over that where one truncates actually matters to the method. That is, the method isn't resolvable if everybody votes untruncated and there's a cycle; no single ballot can break the tie unless it also breaks the cycle. Further, if

[EM] C//A

Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ... Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming Condorcet-like at all. Here's a good example: Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval. While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest approval candidate that

Re: [EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

On 12.6.2011, at 0.26, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, --- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit : --- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods that offer two bad options and one of

Re: [EM] C//A (was: Remember Toby)

On 12.6.2011, at 2.07, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, --- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how the method is supposed to work. I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find the winner, and the