Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread Kristofer Munsterhjelm
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ... Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming Condorcet-like at all. Here's a good example: Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval. While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread Juho Laatu
On 11.6.2011, at 13.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Juho Laatu wrote: On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi Juho, --- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit : I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments. I think with C//A it

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread Juho Laatu
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to rate than to rank, anyway.) Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or something. A rating based ballot could be

[EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread fsimmons
From: Juho Laatu On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to rate than to rank, anyway.) Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or something. A

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread fsimmons
Kristofer, I think the following complete description is simpler than anything possible for ranked pairs: 1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1). The voter rates a candidate on a scale from zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add up to the desired

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread James Gilmour
fsimm...@pcc.edu Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2011 10:42 PM I think the following complete description is simpler than anything possible for ranked pairs: 1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1). The voter rates a candidate on a scale from zero to seven by darkening the

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread Kathy Dopp
I like it Forest - Very simple and yet it makes a lot of sense. I can think of no objections to such a method. What does C/A stand for? Condorcet/Approval? From: fsimm...@pcc.edu To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: [EM] C//A Message-ID: e38f8415600fc.4df3f...@pcc.edu

Re: [EM] C//A

2011-06-12 Thread Dave Ketchum
Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy weakness. On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote: Kristofer, I think the following complete description is simpler than anything possible for ranked pairs: 1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles

Re: [EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

2011-06-12 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hi Juho, --- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit : Maybe strategic, maybe misled to think that ranking C above B would always decrease the chances of B to win, maybe you want to discourage B by showing that he is not much more popular than C. Why