fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelmwrote ...
Some methods pass the Condorcet criterion without seeming
Condorcet-like
at all.
Here's a good example:
Initialize a variable X to be the candidate with the most approval.
While X is covered, let the new value of X be the highest
On 11.6.2011, at 13.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a
écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some
comments.
I think with C//A it
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a
retired teacher I find iot easier to
rate than to rank, anyway.)
Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or something. A rating
based ballot could be
From: Juho Laatu
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style
ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to
rate than to rank, anyway.)
Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or
something. A
Kristofer,
I think the following complete description is simpler than anything possible
for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1). The voter rates a
candidate on a scale from
zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add up to the desired
fsimm...@pcc.edu Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2011 10:42 PM
I think the following complete description is simpler than
anything possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1).
The voter rates a candidate on a scale from
zero to seven by darkening the
I like it Forest - Very simple and yet it makes a lot of sense. I can
think of no objections to such a method. What does C/A stand for?
Condorcet/Approval?
From: fsimm...@pcc.edu
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] C//A
Message-ID: e38f8415600fc.4df3f...@pcc.edu
Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy
weakness.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
I think the following complete description is simpler than anything
possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Maybe strategic, maybe misled to think that
ranking C above
B would always decrease the chances of B to win,
maybe you
want to discourage B by showing that he is not
much more
popular than C.
Why