--- On Sat, 31/1/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: People are not always good at reason based free
discussions.
How could they be? What, in our political systems,
encourages reason based discussions? The method
I've outlined cultivates
--- On Sun, 1/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
(I hope the role of public image
doesn't get so strong that people
would start thinking that their
whitened teeth and wide smile are
what they are, more than their
internal thoughts
--- On Tue, 3/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
3. Eventually reason prevails. The dwellers in
the favelas and
the peasents in the villages (despite long
suppressed bitterness
and anger)
Juho Laatu wrote:
No need to be suppressed nor angry. Some
may be but better
in the societies one can be
sure that this is not straight forward
task either.
See more detailed inside the mail and
some more generic again at the end.
--- On Wed, 11/2/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
The claim is that a direct democracy is probable. Based on
Juho
Laatu's comments, I
step to cover.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
and
probable without continuous monitoring).
Juho
P.S. One more approach to modelling the
transitions is to separate interests among
different interest groups. One could e.g.
say that (exaggerating again) for lobbyists
and politicians corruption is a temptation
but for regular citizens
-party systems.
that they are controlled by oligarchs beyond the
reach of the people, that they are inherently corrupt, that
they defeat the checks and balances intended to restrain
excesses?
Having an opinion on this would
require defining the country in
question.
Juho
to the editor, discussion lists in
the Internet etc. It is not too easy to say
what the crucial new thing that makes the
difference is. Maybe the emergence of a
global (or nationally) dominant easy to use
and well organized IT system would make a
difference?
Juho
Election-Methods
--- On Wed, 25/2/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Probably one can not avoid formation of some kind
of
groupings or parties, and of course they may also
contribute
positively. Just need to avoid the numerous common
pitfalls
/ problems
--- On Thu, 26/2/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Tue, 17/2/09, Fred Gohlke
fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Whether or not the US is a democracy is a semantic
question.
I use this term roughly so that a country
is democratic
their nature (to
respect the true opinions of the
citizens more).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
lesser candidates.
This mail is getting long so you
need to figure out which ones of
the methods have tendencies to
either reduce or increase the
number of nominations.
Rules concerning nominations are
naturally also important (e.g. x
signatures required to nominate
someone).
Juho
--- On Thu, 5
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Is the target here to have a method
that would allow and encourage having
multiple candidates? (to allow the
people of Owego to select the winner
themselves instead of others/parties
telling
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: [my comment] If we design a process that does not
require
campaigning, the evils of campaigning will be
avoided.
[you asked] How will you do that?
The method outlined in my February 4, 2008
--- On Fri, 6/3/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Several cents might make a dollar.
There are many small problems that
together may make the system fall
short of the planned ideal state.
Or that together, might not.
In arguing that DD is probable, we
--- On Sun, 8/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Yes, that method reduces campaigning since all
decisions are
very local. The answer in
this case seems to be to reduce
the number of candidates that each
voter can vote.
The purpose
, then democracies do not
need revolutions any more.
(except if one fancies leading and
ruling and revolutionary elite
groups like in fascism, communism
and other ideologies that consider
themselves to be morally above
the others)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
--- On Tue, 10/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: (Exchange of ideas could be also weak in many
triads.)
I wonder why you think the point worth mentioning? Is
it not self-evident?
Yes, quite self-evident. I just
noted it since I wondered at what
--- On Sat, 14/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: ... I wondered at what level in the society the
discussions
yield best results and where they
will stimulate new
discussion.
At all levels!
At the very first level, when three people
--- On Wed, 18/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
I've been on the fence about whether or not it is
appropriate for me to respond to your last message on this
thread. Since I'm aware you ... value many of the
political systems of today higher than ... I do
--- On Sun, 22/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: Our political systems do have serious problems but on
the
other hand we are somewhat above
'the laws of jungle'.
We may be ... somewhat above 'the laws of the jungle',
but that's no testament
them in such a way that individual
ballots can not be recognized (or
verified to the buyer/coercer).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--- On Wed, 25/3/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
On Mar 25, 2009, at 12:19 AM, Juho
Laatu wrote:
Yes, good question. IRV votes thus don't
take excessive amount of space and can be
compressed and can be summed up (although
not very compactly).
Possible answers
kind of
grouping of people and
ideologies is likely we better
have means to heard them.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
(and the better future) may
however lead to improvements one day,
so keep up building the understanding
and awareness..
Juho
--- On Fri, 27/3/09, Don Cathy Hoffard dchoff...@verizon.net wrote:
The first amendment includes freedom
of speech and freedom to assemble and
are very important
--- On Sat, 28/3/09, Fred Gohlke fredgoh...@verizon.net wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: I'd encourage maintaining some separation of the
political
and business segments of the
society..
How would you go about accomplishing that?
I think there are many options. One
could start
in this
election was in Burlington but I hope
that it will be at regular levels in
the future. Otherwise the complexity
of the method may have an impact on
the results.
Juho
--- On Mon, 30/3/09, Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net wrote:
Date: Monday, 30 March, 2009, 4:16 PM
Warren
there
in the hope of making the last
candidate lose more?
Juho
--- On Tue, 31/3/09, Terry Bouricius ter...@burlingtontelecom.net wrote:
Juho,
The number of voters participating in the 2009 Burlington
mayoral election
was somewhat higher than typical recent, non-IRV elections.
In general
turnout
that they might win if they could
stay in the race until the end).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Actually it may be a quite good strategy in
IRV not to rank those favourite candidates
that do not have a chance but to rank only
those candidates that have a chance. This
increases
Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be:
25: DrDmRmRr
20: DmDrRmRr
05: DmRmDrRr
05: RmDmRrDr
20: RmRrDmDr
25: RrRmDmDr
Juho
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
To: election-methods
(especially if the votes will be
published). (Alternatively some variants of
IRV could be used.)
Juho
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be:
25: DrDmRmRr
20: DmDrRmRr
05: DmRmDrRr
05: RmDmRrDr
20: RmRrDmDr
25: RrRmDmDr
Juho
).)
clip
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
:-)
I'll skip the more detailed analysis
of the possible seat allocation
methods for now.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that *want* a two party system should
not use it. But if one allows multiple
parties then groupings of size 1/n
(local or evenly spread) could well
be allowed to get one of the n seats.)
Juho
--- On Sun, 3/5/09, Anthony O'Neal watermar...@gmail.com wrote:
It is a rather huge problem. It
effects
allocation is counted
separately at each district).)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
this choice
is difference between manually written
codes vs. use of voting machines.
Simple (handwritten) numbers may be
easy to read without errors and quick
to write. Mnemonic names are easier to
check after one has filled the ballot.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
.
- -
This is enough for now. Maybe I'll one
day get also to the alternative seat
allocation methods. :-)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
are and then monitor and
adjust the rules as needed.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
method that always elects
the candidate that would win every other
candidate?
(Depending on the formulation one may need
to add ...whenever such a candidate exists.)
Juho
--- On Thu, 4/6/09, Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org wrote:
From: Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org
Subject: [EM] simple
and BC
at the same time can not be expressed
in Range.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
approval style Range voting
could in such circumstances be better
than Range with a mix of sincere and
tactical voters.
(Intentional weak votes would be ok
though, but cases where sincere voters
cast weak votes without understanding
that would be a problem.)
Juho
Election-Methods
of the
Approval vote alternatives.
Juho
--- On Fri, 5/6/09, Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com wrote:
From: Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods
To: Warren Smith warren@gmail.com
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Date: Friday, 5 June, 2009
P.S. Below I should have said that Nader
would be a Condorcet winner or winner in
Condorcet methods etc.
--- On Sat, 6/6/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Subject: Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods
To: election-methods
according to their preferences.
- If some candidate is preferred over
all other candidates then that
candidate shall be elected.
Juho
--- On Sun, 7/6/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jun
7, 2009 at 7:35 PM, Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org
wrote:
- The electors rank
--- On Mon, 8/6/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 11:52 PM, Juho
Laatujuho4...@yahoo.co.uk
wrote:
My thinking was that if the question on the
referendum excludes IRV, then the final outcome
is anyway likely to be Schulze (and the
unlikely event of choosing
) that could be generally
recommended to the voters would not be that
easy.
Juho
--- On Tue, 9/6/09, Warren Smith warren@gmail.com wrote:
One problem is nobody really has a
good understanding of what good strategy is.
If one believes that range voting becomes approval voting
in the
presence
--- On Thu, 11/6/09, Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org wrote:
2009/6/10 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I just want to agree with this
viewpoint. I have seen e.g. claims
that Condorcet (that can elect
compromise candidates) would favour
candidates that have no strong
opinions. But I
static.
Could you point me to studies about this?
Does it have to be a single-winner method?
Yes, multi-party systems are usually
built on (proportional) multi-winner
methods. Condorcet methods work well
in a multi-party setting when one has
to elect one single winner in some
election.
Juho
probable in
the next elections or to increase
his/her weight in some totally
different arena.)
Juho
--- On Wed, 17/6/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 4:50 PM, Juho
Laatujuho4...@yahoo.co.uk
wrote:
Do you mean that one individual vote
practically never changes
--- On Thu, 18/6/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Do you mean that one individual vote
practically never changes the result
of a large election?
One can see this from two viewpoints.
1) can I change the result
2) can I and similar minded people
of candidates with looped opinions or
campaigns. Do you have also some other kind of potential (real-life,
rational, large election) strong cycles in mind?)
Juho
On Dec 10, 2009, at 1:31 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2009/12/9 seppley sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu
Without studying details
On Jan 29, 2010, at 3:36 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
it's amazing
some rules
that the voters or parties/candidates could recommend to implement
some of the strategies in real life?
Juho
On Jan 29, 2010, at 6:17 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/1/28 Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com
To be exact, one could also break an already existing cycle for
strategic
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
49.
- A loses to C, 49-51
generic results
(with no assumptions on the applicability of the used model).
For many cases Yee and 2D models, with some chosen voter distribution etc. may
work very well, but one has to check and justify their applicability well
before drawing any strong conclusions.
Juho Laatu
On 28.1.2011
one may assume that regular voters need not worry about strategies.
Juho
On 9.5.2011, at 6.53, Jameson Quinn wrote:
How hard it is to vote in each system is an empirical, not a theoretical
system. The evidence is pretty clear that it is easier for most people to
rate candidates
ratings (i.e. there are many bullet votes).
Juho
On 10.5.2011, at 2.03, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
So, not everybody knows that you can have equal ranking and truncation in
rank methods. But how about this idea that the default rating in Range
ought to be mid-range (i.e. half an approval
On 16.5.2011, at 15.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
The final of the Eurovision Song Contest of this year was held last
saturday. In the vote all countries give points to the songs of all
other countries (that made it to the final). The voting traditions
are a bit biased
the state of the vote calculation
process to the real-time audience of millions of viewers. :-)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
/htdig.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com/2006-December/019127.html.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
related to
practical needs and consensus on some chosen approach, marketing theme or
generally accepted set of good quality solutions (for different needs).
Juho
Cheers and thanks to all for the great work done in furthering the art
and science of choosing our leaders!
Matt
.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
facts).
Juho
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 28.5.2011, at 23.16, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If
minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives 95% of the advantage vs.
plurality
of that election).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 29.5.2011, at 2.09, James Gilmour wrote:
On 27.5.2011, at 10.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. We draw up a statement which details the serious problems
with plurality in the US context, and states that there are
solutions.
Juho Laatu Sent: Friday, May 27, 2011 9:43 PM
Good approach. I
strategic thinking is not
needed. Giving one's sincere rankings is already enough and with good
probability the best strategy for all voters.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 29.5.2011, at 5.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Margins elects A here:
35 AB
25 B
40 C
Is this going to be defensible when this method is
proposed? Can you
argue a case for A without mindreading off
strength of preference to be
expressed (e.g. ABCDE).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 30.5.2011, at 18.41, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
summarize my argument concerning generalized ballot and generalized ballot
completion and in the end of this email I suggest a new single-member
Condorcet election system.
Nomenclature: I think that null-candidate (marked X
neither.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
)?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 1.6.2011, at 13.48, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Hi,
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I agree with Kevin that elect the CW if there is one,
else elect the
candidate ranked
(how far in the chain) to
sell them. (The price could typically be e.g. a nice seat in some office.)
That's enough for now,
Juho
On 5.6.2011, at 7.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Message contents:
Section 1. When isn't SODA more condorcet compliant than condorcet methods
Section 2. Smoke-filled
and strategy promoting parties, experts and media?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
and problems and recommended use for each good method
(good = can be considered to be a local optimum in some environments). The list
of recommended methods could be a long one, a short one, targeted for certain
target audiences or maybe all possible (single-winner and/or multi-winner)
environments.
Juho
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
additional
...).
I think I covered these matters already in another mail. I don't know yet what
your targets are (what kind of a paper, for what audience).
Juho
Jameson
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
) would be irrational.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 9.6.2011, at 1.31, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one
On 9.6.2011, at 4.51, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2. Voters submit approval ballots, with up to two write-ins. Do not
delegate is a valid write-in.
Your definition seems to define also the used ballot
with
preference order CXYBA could have bullet voted for candidate C with
declared preference order CXYAB.
So, at least the voters should be made well aware that in these elections there
may be some trading before the final decision.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
On 9.6.2011, at 8.45, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
I think the coming paper in votingmatters on hybrid methods, shows
that strategy voting can be a problem in Condorcet methods (beatpath).
I would say that fears in a sense always are irrational, as they are
emotions. I think, that fears
that delegate. Only the delegated votes may make further decisions based
on the outcome of the first round and negotiations between the rounds. A voter
that does not want to delegate may be interested in active participation in the
second round too.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see
On 9.6.2011, at 5.28, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of
Condorcet
in the
second round.
Juho
On 9.6.2011, at 12.49, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/9 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 9.6.2011, at 11.23, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
(this is worse than IRV.) i (and i would hope that most intelligent
On 10.6.2011, at 3.04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods
that offer two
bad options and one of them is burial, though.
(There is no working strategy
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are
some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I agree with Kevin
the most risky scenarios are just like in this
example, and things would be quite ok if voters that do not delegate would
approve at least two candidates.
Juho
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
back to decent voting practices rather than change the method to some other
method that does not elect as good candidates with sincere votes.
All in all, even though there can be no perfect voting methods I'm quite
hopeful that we can do pretty well here.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing
On 12.6.2011, at 0.26, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are
methods
that offer two
bad options and one
On 12.6.2011, at 2.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find
the winner
On 11.6.2011, at 13.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a
écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some
comments.
I think with C
a voting machine).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 13.6.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be
instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I
, multiple strategies and disincentives on each
method. What other useful data (input data for the method) can we derive from
the matrix and ballots than the few points discussed above? Would ratings help
(ref. James Green-Armytage's cardinal-weighted pairwise)?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing
On 15.6.2011, at 14.23, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
I have to trim this due to being short on time.
Thanks, compact opinions are always a good approach.
In margins (and maybe in other variants too) ties
should
not carry any other additional meaning but that
the voter
didn't support XY
that would show that also the reverse is true. (For the sake of completeness I
note also that different societies / elections may have slightly different
needs, and therefore the fine-tuning of the methods might differ.)
Juho
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