--- On Wed, 8/4/09, Don Cathy Hoffard dchoff...@verizon.net wrote:
Thanks Peter for your comments
Suppose that by my estimation about the electorate is
about
400: Smith, Jones, Johnson
300: Jones, Smith, Johnson
600: Johnson, Jones, Smith
Johnson loses regardless as to whether
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Actually it may be a quite good strategy in
IRV not to rank those favourite candidates
that do not have a chance but to rank only
those candidates that have a chance. This
increases
Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be:
25: DrDmRmRr
20: DmDrRmRr
05: DmRmDrRr
05: RmDmRrDr
20: RmRrDmDr
25: RrRmDmDr
Juho
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV and Brown vs. Smallwood
To: election-methods
(especially if the votes will be
published). (Alternatively some variants of
IRV could be used.)
Juho
--- On Thu, 9/4/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Sorry, fifth line was wrong, should be:
25: DrDmRmRr
20: DmDrRmRr
05: DmRmDrRr
05: RmDmRrDr
20: RmRrDmDr
25: RrRmDmDr
Juho
--- On Thu, 30/4/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 3:18 AM,
Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com
wrote:
STV has *all* the same flaws as IRV but is even
worse.
I think that it has all the same flaws, but that the damage
they do is
mitigated by the fact that it
--- On Thu, 30/4/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
In Ireland, the constitution requires at least 3 per
constituency and
over time the average number of seats per constituency is
being
reduced. It is currently illegal (by statutory law)
for
constituencies to have more than 5 seats.
In order to be a bit more concrete
and to complement my other mails I
draft here one approach to combining
STV like and shorter open list/tree
style ballots. The point is to see
what could be done when the number
of candidates grows large in STV
(and to try to take in what is good
in trees).
and
implementing a seat number to their favor.
Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Thu, 30/4/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com
wrote:
In Ireland, the constitution requires at least 3
per
constituency and
over time the average number of seats per
constituency is
being
reduced. It is currently
--- On Sun, 3/5/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
I think a candidate list system is better though as it
allows more
general inheritance ordering. Ofc, it is always going
to be a
tradeoff between precision and complexity (both for the
count and for
the voter).
Closed party list
--- On Tue, 5/5/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
My preference is to use a different method of counting for
election
and elimination.
Election: Vote is shared between all candidates at current
rank
Elimination: Vote is given to each candidate at current
rank at full strength
Why
--- On Tue, 5/5/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
Btw, one way that this approach might
somewhat simplify things is that the
votes could be shorter than in STV.
(There might be such shortening needs
also to keep the votes unidentifiable
(to avoid vote buying and coercion).
--- On Wed, 6/5/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
The vote could be e.g. C999C888C111.
Pairs of candidates like C999 and C888
might be rare enough to allow some vote
buyer to mark numerous ballots.
Ofc, a law banning vote buying might be enough in 99% of
cases anyway.
Yes,
You could try to describe the very central
Condorcet principle in an understandable
way and then add Schulze as an attribute
(just as a name that is not explained in
detail) if you want and need to point out
that particular Condorcet method.
Maybe something like Would you like to
use the Schulze
--- On Fri, 5/6/09, Warren Smith warren@gmail.com wrote:
Now consider tactics.
In contrast, with
preferential ballot, the
number of possible
exaggerated-tactical-style votes is
{Dem Nader Repub}
and {Repub Nader Dem}
which is only 2 options.
Do you have an exact definition
--- On Fri, 5/6/09, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
Hi,
--- En date de : Jeu 4.6.09, Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org
a écrit :
I guess the list might have opininons
in this discussion.
If you argue that tactical voting reduces Range to
Approval, you can expect the response
Yes, and ties may be allowed in
rank-order votes.
Warren Smith also assumed rank-order
ballots to be transitive. That is
not necessary. If we allow any kind
of votes then there are many more
possible rank-order votes. Most of
them are not typically needed but
the same applies to many of the
P.S. Below I should have said that Nader
would be a Condorcet winner or winner in
Condorcet methods etc.
--- On Sat, 6/6/09, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Subject: Re: [EM] Some myths about voting methods
To: election-methods
To me all this sounds still a bit too
complex for the referendum. I'd drop
out all the criteria, Smith set etc.
since the voters will not understand.
There is also the risk that experts
and opponents of the reform will
sabotage the referendum by digging
into the details (and thereby
proving to
--- On Mon, 8/6/09, Raph Frank raph...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 11:52 PM, Juho
Laatujuho4...@yahoo.co.uk
wrote:
My thinking was that if the question on the
referendum excludes IRV, then the final outcome
is anyway likely to be Schulze (and the
unlikely event of choosing
I have a rather practical approach to
strategies. Often we talk about theoretical
properties of the methods. I prefer talking
about the practical impacts (of the known
theoretical vulnerabilities) since often
the theoretical cases talk only about some
marginal cases. I'll explain more below.
--- On Thu, 11/6/09, Árpád Magosányi mag...@rabic.org wrote:
2009/6/10 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I just want to agree with this
viewpoint. I have seen e.g. claims
that Condorcet (that can elect
compromise candidates) would favour
candidates that have no strong
opinions. But I
--- On Thu, 11/6/09, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
In Schulze you foremost want to defeat every other
candidate head-to-head.
If we are even looking at beatpaths, all candidates have
failed their
first goal.
Yes, in Schulze and other Condorcet
methods the primary goal can be said
Yes, well organized and undivided groupings
tend to have somewhat more voting power
than fragmented collections of similar
minded people.
There may be many reasons why people can
trust that there will be also other voters
that will vote similarly, e.g.
1) A well coordinated group with explicit
--- On Thu, 18/6/09, Michael Allan m...@zelea.com wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
Do you mean that one individual vote
practically never changes the result
of a large election?
One can see this from two viewpoints.
1) can I change the result
2) can I and similar minded people
It is also interesting to separate different types of cycles.
I'll assume that the number of voters is high.
1) Weak cycle (random cycle, noise level cycle, or noise generated
cycle)
- the looped candidates are almost tied
- can be a result of some almost random variation in the votes
- one
On Jan 29, 2010, at 3:36 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
it's amazing that
some rules
that the voters or parties/candidates could recommend to implement
some of the strategies in real life?
Juho
On Jan 29, 2010, at 6:17 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/1/28 Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com
To be exact, one could also break an already existing cycle for
strategic
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Juho,
we have the example
49: A
48: BC
3: CB
you wrote to me:
- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
48.
- B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is
49.
- A loses to C, 49-51. In
generic results
(with no assumptions on the applicability of the used model).
For many cases Yee and 2D models, with some chosen voter distribution etc. may
work very well, but one has to check and justify their applicability well
before drawing any strong conclusions.
Juho Laatu
On 28.1.2011
Luckily Condorcet can use both ranking and rating style ballots (because
rankings can always be derived from the more complex rating information). If
one uses ratings, voting in Condorcet is easier than in Range in the sense that
the voter need not care what numeric scale one uses. The first
In sincere / non-competitive Range mid-range default value could make sense. If
0 is the neutral value, then a negative value would mean that the voter prefers
a random unknown candidate to that candidate.
In competitive elections the default value should normally be the lowest value
/ ranking
On 16.5.2011, at 15.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
The final of the Eurovision Song Contest of this year was held last
saturday. In the vote all countries give points to the songs of all
other countries (that made it to the final). The voting traditions
are a bit biased
On 16.5.2011, at 15.49, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
currently, there is the tradition to give 12, 10, 8 points
always to its political/ethnic/geographic neighbours. I recommend
that a Condorcet method should be used to reduce the effects of
this voting behaviour. As Condorcet methods put
For a legislature one could use also multi-winner and proportional methods, but
I think the question was what single-winner method to recommend. (I'd probably
recommend proportional methods for most multi-winner elections, unless the
community explicitly wants to have a two-party system.)
On 26.5.2011, at 7.10, matt welland wrote:
On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 01:07 +, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
matt welland wrote ...
The only strategy in
approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
more to
On 26.5.2011, at 4.35, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
being that they choose the same winner in the case that there are only 3
candidates in the cycle, i would recommend Tideman over Schulze (sorry
Marcus) for the simplicity of explanation. while getting a Condorcet cycle
is expected to be
On 27.5.2011, at 10.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
This thread, like this list, has two purposes - practical advocacy and
mathematical exploration.
One could divide the field also further by making a difference between 1)
practical advocacy, 2) practical exploration of real life examples, 3)
On 28.5.2011, at 23.16, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If
minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives 95% of the advantage vs.
plurality
On 29.5.2011, at 1.33, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Margins elects A here:
35 AB
25 B
40 C
Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you
argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of the
ballots?
I guess the common assumption is that the unranked
On 29.5.2011, at 2.09, James Gilmour wrote:
On 27.5.2011, at 10.01, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. We draw up a statement which details the serious problems
with plurality in the US context, and states that there are
solutions.
Juho Laatu Sent: Friday, May 27, 2011 9:43 PM
Good approach. I
On 29.5.2011, at 3.53, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.
Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters on the winning side
(that will be overruled in the case of a top cycle). That's one concern. I have
some problems
On 29.5.2011, at 5.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Margins elects A here:
35 AB
25 B
40 C
Is this going to be defensible when this method is
proposed? Can you
argue a case for A without mindreading off
On 29.5.2011, at 16.06, Peter Zbornik wrote:
On the other hand I might rather prefer My Political Opponent to be elected
than Pol Pot.
Thus a ballot on the form AXMy Political OpponentPol Pot, might be a good
idea to allow.
I like this kind of explicit cutoffs more than implicit ones (at
. no need for fixes in the basic case, it
works fine as it is)
- There are many possible rules on how to take the cutoffs into account in the
vote counting process (check impact on strategic voting)
Juho
Best regards
Peter Zborník
On Sun, May 29, 2011 at 4:29 PM, Juho Laatu juho4
On 31.5.2011, at 12.58, Peter Zbornik wrote:
That would be, I think the smallest improvement on IRV, which could make a
positive change in real life and would support centrist candidates.
From the Condorcet criterion point of view, the Condorcet winner is a good,
often centrist candidate. If
On 1.6.2011, at 5.46, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I agree with Kevin that elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of ballots is
plenty simple, and is much
more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
In what
On 1.6.2011, at 13.48, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Hi,
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I agree with Kevin that elect the CW if there is one,
else elect the
candidate ranked
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
If there are three candidates and their declared preferences are ABC, BCA
and CAB, the method may introduce some additional problems. If most voters
delegate, then we may easily
There has been quite a lot of discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities
of Condorcet methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and in most typical
elections their vanilla versions are simply good enough. In the case
Jameson
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
There has been quite a lot of discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities
of Condorcet methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and in most typical
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
additional
On 8.6.2011, at 18.58, Jameson Quinn wrote:
In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems,
Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems?
Yes.
These apply to WV Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an
unsophisticated voter), and with margins, there is
On 7.6.2011, at 10.53, Peter Zbornik wrote:
I'd say that FBC (and LNH) is quite a big problem for Condorcet
methods, at least for someone (like me) who think sincere voting
should be the norm.
One could also claim that in typical political elections Condorcet methods will
work fine, and
On 9.6.2011, at 1.31, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one
On 9.6.2011, at 4.51, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2. Voters submit approval ballots, with up to two write-ins. Do not
delegate is a valid write-in.
Your definition seems to define also the used ballot
On 9.6.2011, at 5.04, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i still think this Asset thingie is crappy. it is *immaterial* how
candidates rank or value the other candidates. the only thing that matters
is how the electorate values the candidates.
No Smoke-Filled Rooms!!!
Yes, there are risks.
(instead of typically
irrational) to describe this kind of strategies could be e.g. no need to
consider or no need to worry (at least not until further notice by the
experts).
Juho
Best regards
Peter Zbornik
On 6/8/11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 7.6.2011, at 10.53, Peter
On 9.6.2011, at 11.23, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
(this is worse than IRV.) i (and i would hope that most intelligent
voters) do *not* want someone else voting for me in elections.
And in SODA, you and anyone else who feels that way
On 9.6.2011, at 5.28, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of
Condorcet
in the
second round.
Juho
On 9.6.2011, at 12.49, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/9 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 9.6.2011, at 11.23, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
(this is worse than IRV.) i (and i would hope that most intelligent
On 10.6.2011, at 3.04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods
that offer two
bad options and one of them is burial, though.
(There is no working strategy
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are
some comments.
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I agree with Kevin
On 9.6.2011, at 5.48, Jameson Quinn wrote:
It seems I have to give one more example to cover also
cases where the difference between major an minor candidates
is not that clear.
26: AB
25: BA
49: C
Again, if two of the B supporters vote BC, then B wins.
If some A and B
On 11.6.2011, at 6.09, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Why are we here?
It certainly made sense to come and explore.
. We find ourselves asking the voters to do some truncating.
. Counters may have to adjust counting ballots.
Among the many variant Condorcet methods there are various ways of
On 12.6.2011, at 0.26, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are
methods
that offer two
bad options and one
On 12.6.2011, at 2.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I think with C//A it is easier to explain how to find
the winner
On 11.6.2011, at 13.30, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.6.2011, at 4.54, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a
écrit :
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some
comments.
I think with C
On 12.6.2011, at 2.17, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a
retired teacher I find iot easier to
rate than to rank, anyway.)
Maybe the default ballot formats should also have names or something. A rating
based ballot could be
On 13.6.2011, at 5.37, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
I don't recommend that voters not be
instructed on how
the method is
supposed to work.
I
On 13.6.2011, at 17.33, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?
I agree with Jameson Quinn, the gap is too far and so it could be quite
tempting to compromise as in FPTP (and failing that, to engineer a cycle if
your candidate has great first
On 15.6.2011, at 14.23, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
I have to trim this due to being short on time.
Thanks, compact opinions are always a good approach.
In margins (and maybe in other variants too) ties
should
not carry any other additional meaning but that
the voter
didn't support XY
On 22.6.2011, at 2.53, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I am more convinced than ever that the best way to measure defeat strength in
Beatpath (aka CSSD) is
by giving the covering relation the highest priority
Being uncovered is a positive criterion in the sense that it tries to improve
the outcome
What is the difference between least extra votes and MinMax(margins)? Isn't
least extra votes pretty much the definition of MinMax(margins)? (assuming
that the extra votes rank the candidate in question first)
Juho
On 22.6.2011, at 10.28, Jameson Quinn wrote:
My impression was that the
On 24.6.2011, at 3.47, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Marcus wrote:
Maskin's argumentation doesn't work because
of the following reason: Whether an election
method is good or bad depends on which criteria
it satisfies.
Now, if good and bad are defined by which criteria methods satisfy, it
Should the order be a proportional order or a best single winner order? I
guess both are possible although so far the assumption obviously was
proportional set or proportional order.
Juho
On 26.6.2011, at 1.21, Warren Smith wrote:
The musical group who wanted me to process their election,
On 3.7.2011, at 18.49, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Someone from Europe on this list recently said that they did not like
the party list system. Why not? Party list seems like a fair, simple
system of electing legislators who represent people in approximately
the same proportion that they exist in the
On 3.7.2011, at 20.44, Toby Pereira wrote:
The problem I have with party list systems is that you do not elect
individuals but organisations, who can then put in who they like.
Closed and open party lists have different philosophy. Basic closed lists
contain an ordered list of candidates and
This was a good overall description of party list proportional
representation. I wrote few (actually quite many) minor comments below.
On 4.7.2011, at 2.06, James Gilmour wrote:
First we have to recognise that there is no one voting system called party
list proportional representation.
On 4.7.2011, at 4.08, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Thanks for the responses. In response to the party leaders having too
much control, I believe it is possible to make party-lists on the
fly from voters' own rank choice ballots in a way that the most voters
would naturally support -- which would put
On 3.7.2011, at 20.34, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:33 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Kathy Dopp wrote:
I do not like this system and believe it is improper to call it
Condorcet. It seems to have all the same flaws as IRV -
On 4.7.2011, at 16.33, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I must say then, I simply do not like the Droop quota as a criteria
because it elects less popular candidates favored by fewer voters
overall and eliminates the Condorcet winners some times.
If you want the most popular single candidates to be elected
On 4.7.2011, at 16.53, Kathy Dopp wrote:
That is an interesting idea that would require a different ballot type
than in existing party list systems whereby one could rank all the
candidates within a particular party one votes for.
I just note that if we combine party lists and candidate
On 4.7.2011, at 18.59, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 4:30 PM
(Of course the idea of having proportionally ordered
candidate lists in a closer list election would make voting
in the actual election even simpler. But then one would need
to have a primary
One possible unwanted feature in Asset like methods is that they make it
possible for the candidates to trade with the votes. The voters may trust their
candidate, but they should not trust them too much, since in extreme cases they
might even sell their valuable vote assets to someone.
One
On 5.7.2011, at 3.09, Russ Paielli wrote:
Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to
IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider
a major defect.
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end up
using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail I send:). In that
approach there is no risk of having loops in the candidate transfer order.
Votes would be
On 6.7.2011, at 6.42, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 5.7.2011, at 11.19, Russ Paielli wrote:
If one wants to simplify the inheritance rules even more then we might end
up using a tree method (I seem to mention it in every mail
On 7.7.2011, at 22.54, Russ Paielli wrote:
Also, consider the fierce opposition that would develop from any group that
thinks they would suffer. And who might that be? How about the two major
parties! Do you think they would have the power to stop it?
If we assume that one of the main
saying?
From: Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
To: election-methods Methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Sent: Thu, 7 July, 2011 22:51:45
Subject: Re: [EM] Toby Pereira, PR voting methods
I'd like to add one more option. It is actually close to option 2 below.
Specify separately how
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the argument was
that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky risky from the two leading
parties' point of view as methods that are more compromise candidate oriented
(instead of being first preference oriented). I think that is
On 8.7.2011, at 8.55, Russ Paielli wrote:
On Thu, Jul 7, 2011 at 3:32 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
What didi people think before the nowadays generally agreed idea that all
countries should be democratic. Maybe some idealists discussed the
possibility that one day ordinary
On 8.7.2011, at 11.00, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and these
victories were significant, i.e. people really preferred the CW to the rest).
Say Montroll won. Then Kiss-supporters and Wright-supporters might try to
unite in the
On 8.7.2011, at 17.16, Andy Jennings wrote:
Also, I think IRV's seemingly intuitive nature has something to do with it.
For those who *did* investigate more deeply, IRV seemed sensible, too:
instead of holding a bunch of expensive runoffs, collect all the required
information at once and
. And they are the ones that are in power (or have more power than many
others).
Juho
On 8.7.2011, at 12.43, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.7.2011, at 11.00, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But now consider a parallel universe where the CW always won (and
these victories were
There are many reasons why it is difficult to find a statement that numerous
people on this list would be willing to sign. As you know there are probably as
many different opinions on different methods as there are people on this list.
There have been some related (inconclusive) discussions
On 9.7.2011, at 14.23, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party systems I
thought it would be interesting to discuss two-party systems also in
a more positive spirit. The assumption is thus that we want the
system to be two
On 9.7.2011, at 16.14, James Gilmour wrote:
Juho Laatu Sent: Saturday, July 09, 2011 10:35 AM
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party
systems I thought it would be interesting to discuss
two-party systems also in a more positive spirit. The
assumption is thus that we
-part systems that is an interesting question (actually there
I have actively promoted the idea that they should be allowed to have their
proportional share of representation, without the limits set by thresholds,
district sizes and related mechanisms).
Juho
James
Juho Laatu Sent
On 9.7.2011, at 22.23, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here's an idea.
First pick a party (with full knowledge who the candidates are in each party).
Then hold an open primary to pick the winning candidate from the winning
party.
This sounds like a two-phase single winner election. The first
On 10.7.2011, at 12.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
On 9.7.2011, at 14.23, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote:
After some recent discussions and thoughts around two-party
systems I thought it would be interesting to discuss two-party
systems also in a more
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