Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Mike, De : MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com À : election-meth...@electorama.com Envoyé le : Samedi 26 Novembre 2011 13h39 Objet : [EM] An ABE solution This was answered in the first part of the paragraph that you're quoting. What Woodall calls a preferential election rule is by definition

[EM] An ABE solution

Kevin said: By definition an election method doesn't use approval ballots. [endquote] Whose definition? Do you think that if you hold an election by Approval, you aren't using an election method? Mike Ossipoff Election-Methods mailing list

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

2011/11/24 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au Jameson, Your range scores are a little bit wrong,.. I've re-checked them and I don't see how. I gave each candidate 2 points for a top-rating, 1 for a middle-rating and zero for a bottom rating (or truncation). So in the initial sincere

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Forest, In reference to your new Condorcet method suggestion (pasted at the bottom), which elects an uncovered candidate and if there is none one-at-time disqualifies the Range loser until a remaining candidate X covers all the other remaining candidates and then elects X, you wrote: Indeed,

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Chris: Your range scores are a little bit wrong, so you have to add half a B vote for the example to work (or double all factions and add one B vote if you discriminate against fractional people), but yes, this is at heart a valid example where the method fails FBC. Note that in my tendentious

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Jameson,   Your range scores are a little bit wrong,.. I've re-checked them and I don't see how. I gave each candidate 2 points for a top-rating, 1 for a middle-rating and zero for a bottom rating (or truncation).   So in the initial sincere scenario for example C has 9 top-ratings and 1

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

I agree it's silly to create complicated rules for a two-slot ballot. But, though Forest didn't quite say so, I also think that FBC and (voted ballot) Condorcet are not incompatible for a 3-slot ballot. Jameson 2011/11/22 Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.au Forest, When the range ballots

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Forest,   When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is simply Approval, which does satisfy the FBC.   When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used for simplicity. I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm on 2-slot

[EM] An ABE solution

Mike, thanks for your comments. I'll respond in line below. From: MIKE OSSIPOFF Hi Forest-- Thanks for answering my question about MTA vs MCA. Your argument on that question is convincing, and answers my question about the strategy difference between those two methods. Certainly,

[EM] An ABE solution

Forest Simmons, responding to questions from Mike Ossipff, wrote (19 Nov 2011): 4. How does it do by FBC? And by the criteria that bother some people here about MMPO (Kevin's MMPO bad-example) and MDDTR (Mono-Add-Plump)? I think it satisfies the FBC. Forest's definition of the method

[EM] An ABE solution.

Hi Forest-- Thanks for answering my question about MTA vs MCA. Your argument on that question is convincing, and answers my question about the strategy difference between those two methods. Certainly, electing C in the ABE avoids the ABE problem. I'd been hoping that the election of C can be

[EM] An ABE solution.

Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range Style, say three slot for simplicity. When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are determined among the candidates. The covering relations are also determined. Candidate X covers candidate Y if X